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“Saying it once and for all, man only plays, when he is man in every sense 
of the term, and he is only fully man when he is playing.” Author's trans-
lation of Friedrich Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, 15th 
letter, 1795.
“Machines are worshipped because they are beautiful, and valued because 
they confer power; they are hated because they are hideous, and loathed 
because they impose slavery.” Bertrand Russell, Sceptical Essays, “Ma-
chines and the Emotions,” 1928.

INTRODUCTION
In 1952, Alexander Douglas, a Ph.D. student at the University of Cambridge, 
England, programmed an interactive game of Noughts and Crosses (Am. Tic-tac-
toe) as an experiment in human-computer interaction  (see Douglas 1954). It 
was a single-player game in which the player used a telephone to dial the num-
ber of the square she wanted filled. In 1958, Willy Higinbotham, a scientist at 
the Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York programmed Tennis for Two, 
a rudimentary Pong-like game which was played on an oscilloscope, a technical 
device for visualizing  changing electrical  currents.  Both Douglas  and Higin-
botham created working prototypes of their games and demonstrated them. 
The time was not ripe, however, and the interest in their work waned soon 
after. In the summer of 1961, however, a new mainframe computer called the 
Programmable Data Processor 1 (PDP-1) arrived at the computer lab of the 
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology.  Unlike its  predecessors,  it  boasted a 
cathode-ray tube screen and was capable of handling the input of more  than 
one user at a time. In order to demonstrate the visual and interactive capabilit-
ies of the newly arrived machine, Steve Russell, an engineering student, decided 
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to write a program which would use graphics and respond to users' input in 
real-time.  The result  was  Space  War (1962),  a  two-player computer  game in 
which two space ships fight one another moving around a gravity-emanating 
planet at the center of the screen. Each player can rotate her spaceship, thrust 
its  engines and fire missiles to the other ship.   Interestingly,  Space  War was 
among the first graphical computer applications. By way of comparison, the 
first digital computer-generated film was made in 1963 by Edvard Zajac at Bell 
Labs in order to simulate the motion of a  communication satellite  (Binkley 
1993) and the first time computer graphics were publicly exhibited as art was by 
Georg Nees at the Studio Galerie at the University of Stuttgart in January 1965 
(Candy & Edmonds 2002).
When comparing the evolution of computer games to that of film some 
half a century earlier, a number of parallels can be observed. A first element 
that they have in common is their technological origin. When Thomas Edison, 
inspired  by  Eadweard  Muybridge's  demonstration  of  moving  image  photo-
graphy, filed his patent for motion picture recording and playback in 1887, he 
did not see his invention as a step toward a new form of representation, let 
alone art, but simply as a technological means for recording reality. It was only 
later when films grew longer and montage developed into a powerful grammat-
ical tool that people began to see film as an artistic form. In a similar way, 
neither Alexander Douglas who developed Noughts and Crosses as an experiment 
in human-computer interaction, nor Steve Russell who created Space War as a 
demonstration program for the PDP, saw computer simulation as anything but 
a programming challenge. At best, they realized that it had potential as a form 
of entertainment, but as computers were large expensive hulks at the time, any 
commercial endeavor was bound to fail.
A second parallel between the development of film and that of computer 
games is that, at least in the USA,2 they both went through a phase in which 
they were marketed as  coin-operated attractions on fairs  and in amusement 
halls.  Edison's  Kinetoscope,  which appeared in 1894, was a peep-show-type 
2 In Paris, Louis and Auguste Lumière built the cinématographe, a device serving both as camera 
and as projector,  and patented it  in  February  1894.  They organized a  private  screening in 
March 1895 and a first paying show later that year. They would never build a peepshow or 
coin-operated version of their invention.
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viewer. The spectator would insert her coin and then look through a small hole, 
as if it were a telescope, behind which a short sequence, usually no more than 
twenty seconds, of moving images would be projected. The Kinetoscope be-
came a commercial success and different versions would be placed in parlors all 
across the United States: “a flotilla of picture peephole machines featuring films 
of flexing strongmen, highland dancers, cockfights, trapeze artists, contortion-
ists, and trained bears” (Herz 1997: 46). As for computer games, the first com-
mercial instance was  Computer Space (1971), a simplified version of Steve Rus-
sell's Space War built into an arcade cabinet. Like Edison's Kinetoscope, it was 
fitted with a coin-operating slot and placed in public places like bars or amuse-
ment parks. Computer Space was not a large commercial success, however, prob-
ably because it intimidated potential players by its complexity. This did not dis-
courage its creator, Nolan Bushnell, however, who started his own company 
and together with Alan Alcorn built a simpler, tennis-like game. Pong (1972) was 
an instant hit  and Bushnell's  company, Atari,  would dominate the computer 
game industry for more than a decade.
HOME TOGETHER
In the second half of the 1970s, as computer equipment grew smaller and less 
expensive with the invention of microchips and cheaper production methods, 
computer games, like the moving image through television, migrated from the 
arcades to the living room, a shift which would not only change computer gam-
ing from an economic and social point of view, but which would also have an 
impact on the technology and its content. Whilst Edison's Kinetoscope would 
play a short, fixed sequence, usually some 15 seconds of moving images for a 
coin, arcade computer games, like pinball, did not explicitly limit the playing 
time but allowed the player to continue until she made a fatal mistake. Hence 
they needed to be at the same time difficult enough so as to prevent advanced 
players from playing forever and easy enough for novice players to get started 
without having to go through pages of instructions and without being killed 
after only a few seconds of play. Moreover, for both categories there needed to 
be an incentive to play again and again so that another quarter would be inser-
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ted.  Typically,  arcade  game  developers  solved  these  issues  by  making  their 
games simple at the start, but after a minute or so strongly increasing difficulty, 
usually by raising speed and number of enemies. In this way the novice player 
would  not  be  discouraged  and  get  a  good  taste  before  being  relentlessly 
slaughtered and the more advanced player would continue to be challenged 
even after several sessions.
All this changed, however, when the first so-called home entertainment or 
video computer systems – consoles we would call them today – appeared on 
the market. They were small special-purpose devices which had to be connec-
ted to a television set and were meant to be played in the living room. Initially, 
they would contain one read-only chip with a fixed number of games, usually 
variations of Pong. By the end of the 1970s, however, they could use pluggable 
cartridges allowing games to be sold separately.  As computer games moved 
from bars and amusement parks to the home, their audience broadened signi-
ficantly and their social function changed. Families, young and old, would sit 
together in front of the television and watch each other play. This may well 
have been one of the reasons for the success of the 'mostly harmless' platform 
game genre which largely shuns violence and emphasizes characterization and 
colorful graphics (see also chapter 4 on avatarial introjection). Even more im-
portant was that, with the migration, the commercial imperative of having  to 
strip the player of a quarter every five minutes or so had disappeared. Initially, 
home  systems  would  continue  to  draw  upon  the  success  of  arcade  classic 
genres  such  as  space  shooters  and  racing  games.  Gradually,  however,  they 
would shake loose their arcade heritage and begin to evolve their own forms.
Arcade computer games are indiscriminately action-based, cramming as 
much spectacle and excitement in as short a playing session as possible. Home 
computer games,3 on the other hand, freed from the shackles of having to keep 
playing sessions under ten minutes, began to develop more epic proportions, 
and devote more attention to background story and character development. 
Furthermore,  the release  from arcade  constraints  permitted home computer 
3 I use the term 'home computer game' here not to refer to games played on home computers 
such as the Spectrum or the Commodore, but to all games which could be played at home in-
cluding those played on a video game system or console.
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games to link up with the pre-arcade tradition of university mainframe com-
puter gaming which likewise had not been faced with the economic restrictions 
of coin-operation.  In mainframe gaming,  student  experimentation and com-
puter science research had led to the development of a broad array of computer 
simulations and games. These included a strategy game: Ham(m)urabi / Kingdom 
{David Ahl 1970};4 an evolution simulator: Life {John Conway 1970}; a cave-
crawling role-playing game: Hunt the Wumpus {Gregory Yob 1972}; a primitive 
flight simulator:  Lunar Lander {Jack Burness 1973}; and a text adventure,  Co-
lossal Cave Adventure {William Crowther & Donald Woods 1975}, which would 
have a tremendous influence on the development of computer games not so 
much in terms of technology, but as a cultural mediator between tabletop Dun-
geons & Dragons role-playing {Gary Gygax 1974} and computer gaming. In the 
course of the 1980s, all these genres would gradually be reintroduced into home 
gaming, eventually leading to the development of a renewed economic imperat-
ive  for  game designers:  i.e.  closure.  Whereas  arcade  game designers  had  to 
eternally postpone closure so that players would return to play again and again, 
home computer game developers were forced to introduce endings  to their 
games so that players would cease playing them and run to the supermarket to 
buy more.
A fourth and final parallel can be drawn between the role played by the 
American film industry in the building of the USA's cultural identity as a global 
superpower, and that of computer games in establishing the image of Japan as 
an economic heavyweight in the 1980s. Cinema, that is to say the concept and 
technology  for  public  screening,  was  a  French  invention,  but  the  Lumière 
brothers failed to turn it into a successful business. It was primarily the Americ-
an filming industry, symbolized by Hollywood, that managed to develop film-
making  into  a  profitable  commercial  enterprise  which  came  to  dominate 
cinemas  all  over the world.  Computer  simulation,  on the other hand,  is  an 
American invention,  first  technologically  with  Steve Russell's  Space  War and 
4 In this study, I use two types of brackets: round ( ) and curly {}. Round brackets refer to sec-
ondary, usually academic sources which can be found in the “Publications Cited” list where 
they are ordered by author. The curly brackets are used to refer to primary sources – literature, 
film, television series, toys, computer games and software – which can be found in the “Media 
Cited” list, where they are ordered by name (e.g. look for Space War, not Russell).
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some ten years later commercially with Atari's Pong. In the course of the 1980s, 
however, the traditional American media industry, which had meanwhile ab-
sorbed Atari, failed to grasp the intricacies of the new form and by the second 
half of the 1980s, it was the Japanese game manufacturer Nintendo which came 
to dominate the global game market with their Entertainment System. In the 
mid-1990s, the Japanese electronics giant Sony took over the lead from Nin-
tendo with the release of the first Playstation console. Since then, computer 
games have become one of the primary exporters of Japanese popular culture 
(see also chapter 4 on playing god).
THE PIED PIPER
Computer games will soon be celebrating their fiftieth birthday and they are 
growing more important both culturally and commercially.5 Moreover, in edu-
cational circles, the interest in using computer games for training and learning is 
growing, particularly because of their automotivating power, the fact that they 
do not need external rewards to encourage performance. Combine that with the 
ability of the computer to effortlessly take into account myriads of variables in 
the game and you have an excellent training ground for today's increasingly 
complex world. Furthermore, computer simulation and games play an import-
ant, if not the most important, role as a driving force in technological innova-
tion in the area of desktop computing. They are among the last desktop com-
puter applications to require ever more powerful processors and graphical units, 
driving competition between technologists and developers. In turn, this pro-
duces better  algorithms,  new software libraries,  industry  standards  and even 
programming languages. Despite their relative age, however, their educational 
potential and their role in technological innovation, computer simulation and 
games are still looked upon with suspicion and disdain, and are regularly treated 
with  downright  hostility  by  the  general  public,  the  press  and  the  academic 
world. Fear of the unknown, particularly of new forms of representation is of 
5 There is a persistent myth that is regularly picked up by the media, saying that the gaming in-
dustry is now the largest in entertainment. Until today, this is not so however. Reports publish-
ing these claims usually compare combined console and game sales with box office returns neg-
lecting for example the DVD resale market and television rights.
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course not new.6 The attacks on computer games have been so fierce, however, 
that they merit a closer look.
A first wave of what could be called ludophobia, fear of computer games, 
rolled over the USA in the early 1980s when first the popular media and later 
the  scientific  community  interpreted young children's  devotion to  computer 
game play as a sign of pending addiction. In 1982, the US Surgeon General C. 
Everett Koop announced that computer games were producing “aberrations in 
childhood  behavior,”  and  that  children  were  becoming  addicted  to  games 
“body and soul” (cited in Morris 2003). These claims turned out to be inspired 
by fear rather than scientific evidence, however, mistaking the self-motivating 
quality of computer game play for a form of addiction. The panic culminated in 
1981 when computer games were banned in the Philippines, where arcade own-
ers were given two weeks to destroy their machines.7 Instead of looking at com-
puter game play as a meaningful – in the sense of having purpose and sense – 
occupation, the majority of researchers in the 1980s failed to overcome their 
prejudices towards computer games as colossal time-wasters.  “The zeal with 
which researchers tried to calculate how many hours children devote to playing 
video games, as if this held the key to the quality of their education, is curious, 
to say the least” (De Aguilera & Méndiz 2003: 7). In the aftermath of the addic-
tion discussion, there were also concerns about the possible negative health ef-
fects of extensive playing. Often named hazards were  obesity, far-sightedness 
6 Janet Murray notes in this context that man has always greeted powerful new representational 
technologies with suspicion, from the bardic lyre, to the printing press, to the secular theater, to 
the movie camera, to the television screen. “We hear versions of the same terror in the biblical 
injunction against worshiping graven images; in the Homeric depiction of the alluring Sirens' 
songs, drawing sailors to their death” (1997: 18). In most cases, the suspicion is motivated by a 
concern that the new form of representation will be used for the deception of mankind. The 
question then remains,  however,  whether we should attempt to ban the new form or help 
people understand it (see also chapter 2).
7 A similar panic, and subsequent banning of pinball machines in New York in 1941 led to thou-
sands of machines being smashed and dumped into the sea (Morris 2003).
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and epilepsy.8 The fiercest assault on  computer games, however, occurred al-
most a decade later.
The trigger of this second wave of ludophobia was the commercial suc-
cess of two violent computer games in 1992. The first was Mortal Kombat (John 
Tobias & Ed Boon), a conventional so-called beat 'em up game – a genre in 
which two or  more  warriors  are  pitted  one against  the  other  in  a  two-  or 
pseudo-three-dimensional  environment  and  which  had  been  popularized  by 
games  such as  Double  Dragon {Yoshihisa  Kishimoto 1986} and  Street  Fighter 
{Yoshiki  Okamoto  1987}.  Mortal  Kombat was  perceived  as  being  different, 
however, because it did not have cartoony computer graphics like Double Dragon 
or  Street Fighter, but used digitized photographic images. Moreover, it allowed 
the  player  to  perform so-called  'finishing  moves'.  When  her  opponent  was 
beaten, she could press a combination of keys and her avatar would carry out a 
spectacular but gruesome fatality such as tearing out the opponent's spine. The 
combination of photorealistic imaging and virtual bloodshed upset many par-
ents and led to the formation of  the Entertainment Software Rating Board 
(ESRB) in the USA. The second game that caused uproar in 1992 was Wolfen-
stein 3D {John Romero & John Carmack}, a highly successful – both technolo-
gically and commercially – first-person shooter which would play an important 
role in the popularization of the format. In the case of Wolfenstein, it was not so 
much the graphics, but the player's point of view – seeing directly through the 
eyes of the shooter – which caused concern. The idea was  that the player, by 
performing violent actions in first-person perspective, would be inclined to also 
carry out those actions in real life.
In 1999, after the Columbine massacre, in which Eric Harris and Dylan 
Klebold,  themselves  students  at  the  Columbine  High  School  in  Littleton, 
8 Loftus & Loftus mention an amusing case in which computer game play is not linked with 
physical but with psychiatric illness. An article in the September 1982 issue of the Journal of 
the American Medical Association reported on a curious psychiatric disorder termed 'Space In-
vaders Obsession'. The victims of this illness were men about to be married who demonstrated 
a fourfold increase in the playing of Space Invaders in the weeks preceding the marriage. The au-
thors of the study claimed that the principal goal of the game, i.e.  defending a home base 
against aliens, acquired a special symbolic significance in the face of an impending marriage. It 
was also reported that, for whatever reason, game playing dropped dramatically following mar-
riage (1983: 109).
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entered their school building, blindly murdered thirteen students and staff, and 
wounded twenty-three others before killing themselves, the discussion regard-
ing violent content in computer games strongly resurfaced. Not long after the 
tragedy, the media discovered that Eric and Dylan were habitual  Doom {John 
Romero & John Carmack 1993} players and that  Eric Harris had created a 
modification of the game, the so-called 'Harris-levels', presenting circumstances 
similar to those of the actual shooting (two shooters, multiple shotguns, un-
armed opponents  etc.).  Soon,  media and politicians began pointing towards 
computer games as the probable cause of the massacre. Their implicit claim was 
that Eric and Dylan had experienced the pleasure of killing harmless victims in 
computer simulation and then imitated this  behavior in the real  world.  The 
question of  why they programmed such a  simulation in the first  place was 
meanwhile happily ignored. Computer games,  it was decided, was to be the 
scapegoat. In the months after the massacre, the hate campaign against the me-
dium raged violently and eventually lead to senate hearings regarding the mat-
ter. Even academics indulged in what Sue Morris (2003) would describe as a 
'moral panic'.9 Indeed, the violent tone of some of the researchers' reports is 
peculiar, to say the least. All of a sudden, it was claimed that there was a con-
sensus among experts regarding the effects of computer game play and that lay 
people (sic.) needed to get the message (Anderson & Bushman 2002). Playing 
violent computer games was at least as dangerous as unsafe sex (2001: 357), 
passive smoking and exposure to lead and asbestos (Anderson 2002: 115).
THE ARTFUL DODGER
At the other end of the spectrum, probably partly as a reaction against the neg-
ative depiction of computer games in media and press, a number of researchers 
and theorists made contrary claims. Whereas prophets of doom such as Koop 
and Anderson saw computer games as a waste of time or a source of perver-
9 The term 'moral panic' was first used by Jock Young in 1971 to describe the pattern of events 
that followed public concern over marijuana smoking by middle-class youth in London. Media-
fueled public pressure prompted to set up drug squads which led to an increase in the number 
of people arrested. This in turn validated and reinforced the initial concern. A large number of 
moral panics since World War II have been associated with the emergence of various forms of 
youth culture.  Great concerns have been expressed at one time or other about jazz, pinball, 
movies, comic books, rock ‘n’ roll, ‘snuff’ movies and role-playing games (Morris 2003). 
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sion, these enthusiasts claim that they should be seen as a logical next step and 
a new and possibly superior art form. One of the first to take this position was 
Chris Crawford in his otherwise excellent plea for the appraisal of computer 
games: The Art of Computer Game Design (1984). Crawford, who was a successful 
game designer in the heyday of Atari,  sees computer games as a poorly de-
veloped and generally misunderstood medium which holds great promise for 
both artists and public (1). As a reason for why computer games are not recog-
nized as an art form, Crawford puts forward what he calls the 'timidity of the 
marketplace' prescribing 'feckless' computer games. “These machines are new; 
the public is unfamiliar with them and the manufacturers are hesitant to press 
the public too hard too fast. We therefore opt to build inhibited little games 
pathetically  whispering  some  trivial  emotion”  (3).  For  Crawford,  computer 
game art is a logical and consistent development from the history of representa-
tion. Initially, there were only static media such as painting and sculpture, which 
were conceived to represent a single moment in time, a snapshot in the middle 
of events. In the nineteenth century, dynamic media like film were added to the 
equation and for the first time it became possible for artists to represent the 
changing nature of the world. Computer simulation, then, goes one step further 
in that it not only allows a designer to represent change in terms of its results, 
but also in terms of its mechanics. It allows to create a framework in which the 
player is free to actively interfere and explore not just what it is that changes, but 
also how and why it does so, the web “of causes and effects by which all things 
are tied together. Thus, the highest and most complete form of representation 
is interactive representation” (1984: 9-10).10
Present-day  defenders  of  computer  games  as  an  artistic  form  include 
Mark Wolf, who compares them to early silent black and white films and who 
predicts rapid improvement (2001a: 7), and Henry Jenkins, for whom they are 
the artform for the digital age.  “Over the past three decades, computer games 
have progressed from the primitive two-paddles-and-a-ball Pong to the sophist-
10 In a similar vein, Alain and Frédéric Le Diberder declared computer games the tenth art in Qui 
a peur des jeux vidéo? (Who is afraid of video games?, 1993). In France, the six traditional arts are 
considered to be architecture, sculpture, painting, music, engraving, and drawing. Photography 
is equally considered as sixth art. The seventh art is cinema, the eighth is television, the ninth 
comics and the graphic novel, and the tenth digital art.
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ication of Final Fantasy [{Hironobu Sakaguchi 1987}], a participatory story with 
cinema-quality graphics that unfolds over nearly 100 hours of game play, or 
Black and White [{Peter Molyneux 2000}], an ambitious moral tale where the 
player’s god-like choices between good and evil leave tangible marks on the 
landscape.” Using Gilbert Seldes' concept of lively art (1957), Jenkins describes 
computer games as a logical successor to popular forms of entertainment such 
as film and comics. He notes that many of the reasons that are often given as to 
why computer games are not a form of art are the same as those used fifty years 
ago to reject cinema: i.e. its commercial motivations and technological origins, 
its appeal to violence and eroticism, and claims that there are no works of last-
ing value. Like Wolf, Jenkins believes that computer games will follow in film's 
footsteps and become an important artform in the not too distant future. He 
cites  game  designer  Warren  Specter,  co-creator  of  Deus  Ex:  Invisible  War 
{1999}, who sees computer games as only just emerging from infancy. “We’re 
still making (and remaking!)  The Great Train Robbery  [{Edwin Porter 1903}] or 
The  Birth of a Nation [{David Griffith 1915}] or, to be really generous, maybe 
we’re at the beginning of what might be called our talkies period [The Jazz Sing-
er, {Al Jolson 1927}].” 
OBJECTIVES
I reject both the ludophobic claim that computer games are a source of perver-
sion and the ludophiliac one that they are a logical next step in the development 
of representation and art. Both of these perspectives are based on unmotivated 
bias and are intrinsically associated with the theoretical paradigm of technolo-
gical  determinism which has  dominated technology and media  studies  since 
their inception. In a deterministic frame of thought, technological development 
is something that happens outside of human society and functions independ-
ently from cultural signification and understanding. It is a fixed process – there 
is only one possibility, neither its tracks nor its goals can be altered – and every 
now and again disruptive innovations appear which unilaterally change society 
and culture. Technological determinism denies the role of man in technological 
innovation. The question of where technology comes from and what guides its 
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development is left open. Consequently, technologically deterministic studies 
tend to be motivated by either anxiety or by blind enthusiasm. Because techno-
logy is seen as something that evolves outside of human control, it is seen as a 
higher power and alternately regarded as a dangerous intruder or as an example 
of divine providence. My approach, however, is constructivist in nature. Con-
structivism or social shaping of technology (see also chapter 1, section 3) is an 
alternative paradigm which made its appearance as a reaction to the reduction-
ism of technological determinism. It rejects the idea that technological develop-
ment is something that happens independently from the society by which it is 
pursued and that its path is unchangeable. Technological innovation is seen as 
an inherently social and cultural process steered by human insight and desire. In 
this study, I analyze and describe computer games from the perspective that 
they are a response to human needs and wishes and the result of a fundament-
ally socio-cultural development process.
The main thesis of this study is that computer games are a cultural form 
and that they are very much a product of their day and age. They are not ob-
jects determined by the technology on which they run, but artifacts, human cre-
ations shaped by the meanings, understandings and preoccupations that make 
up the society in which they evolved. The main aim of this study is to describe a 
number of these ideas and situate them in their cultural context. Thereby I do 
not mean to provide a 'ready-made' framework for the analysis or interpretation 
of  computer games,  but  wish to contribute to the development of  a  useful 
vocabulary and critical discourse. This study is not one of individual computer 
games. It is an inquiry into computer game culture, its codes, meanings and 
technology, what constitutes a computer game and why it was thus conceived. 
Hence not just computer games constitute my object of inquiry but also other 
forms of popular culture such as literature, film, television, tabletop games etc, 
when relevant. Special interest goes to the way in which meanings and ideas mi-
grate between these cultural forms, leading to a first secondary claim which is 
that, in view of today's so-called 'media ecology', it is unuseful to study any cul-
tural form in isolation as is still all too often done in present-day cultural re-
search, usually due to institutional boundaries. Finally, I do not avoid technolo-
gical matters and neither do I separate them from the discussion of cultural in-
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fluences. This leads me to another secondary claim, which is that it is unuseful 
to make a radical distinction between cultural and technological shaping factors 
as they are more often than not inextricably linked (see for example chapter 4 
on introjection). Technology is not a danger, not even an enemy to human cul-
ture; it is one of its primary creations.
METHOD
When looking at various research strategies, a distinction can be made between 
analysis, synthesis and meta-analysis. Analysis deals directly with the object of 
inquiry, describing its formal characteristics, analyzing its structure, developing 
categorizations etc. Synthesis operates one level higher, looking at various ana-
lytical  frameworks,  finding common grounds,  resolving conflicts  and overall 
working toward a common vocabulary and frame of reference. Meta- analysis, 
finally, functions as a control body for the two previous categories, a critical 
voice identifying and questioning in which areas research is required and how it 
should be carried out. When looking at how the three categories are distributed 
in various fields and disciplines, there are significant differences. Some are more 
directed toward analysis, others toward synthesis. When I began looking into 
computer game studies, the distribution of analytic, synthetic and meta-analytic 
research was highly uneven. Despite the relative youth of computer game stud-
ies at the time, there was already a remarkable body of analytical material avail-
able, if you managed to find it. What was also remarkable, however, was the 
variety of theoretical frameworks and different conceptualizations that were be-
ing used and the apparent lack of communication between their creators. Apart 
from analytical work, there was also a significant body of meta-analytic discus-
sion on methodological issues, the large majority dealing with the question of 
whether narrative would be a useful category when analyzing computer games. 
What was lacking, however, was a common frame of reference, not necessarily 
one methodology, but a conceptual apparatus and a useful synthesis of previous 
research. This study should be seen as an attempt to help fill this synthetic gap 
in computer game studies and work toward a useful set of concepts and cat-
egories.
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This book is the result of an extensive study of secondary literature com-
bined with analytical work on relevant primary sources. These sources were of-
ten computer simulations and games, but at least as often literature, film or tele-
vision series. The choice of material, both secondary and primary, has not been 
based on formal criteria, but on selection as I went. I have started by gathering 
as much material on computer games as was available and by then selecting a 
number of relevant problematics. From then on I have searched more precisely 
for material  dealing with these topics.  The main selection criteria have been 
clarity and explicative power and I have deliberately sought to cross disciplinary 
borders and work eclectically. For processing the material, I have used Michel 
Kabay's  Computer-Aided  Thematic  Analysis  (CATA),  a  qualitative  heuristic 
technique  which  helps  you to  structure  large  quantities  of  diverse  material. 
CATA uses the automated sorting capabilities of word processing or spread-
sheet software for the organization of non-numerical qualitative information. 
The gist of the technique is to repeatedly classify, sort, reinterpret and reclassify 
notes. By continuously creating new categories, changing the configuration of 
the material and adding new ideas, relationships emerge that are otherwise not 
evident. By progressively refining categories, they become increasingly intuitive 
and better accorded to the material they are meant to describe. By leaving the 
iterative sorting to the computer, it becomes much easier to focus on the cat-
egories involved and to adapt them as you proceed. “Such flexibility encourages 
experimentation, which may lead to unexpected juxtapositions that encourage 
new ways of thinking” (Kabay 2003).
OVERVIEW
The first  chapter deals  with methodological  issues.  In it,  I  look at  two ap-
proaches to computer game analysis, which I both discuss and eventually reject 
for various reasons, and I propose a third. In the first section, I look at the pro-
posal to describe computer games as interactive texts. I explore the notion of 
interactivity, how it is used in human-computer engineering and marketing, and 
how a specific form of participation, i.e. introjection can help to describe the 
mechanism of being projected into the computer game world. I look at the 
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ideas of hyper- and cybertext which are both problematic when applied to com-
puter game analysis, the first because of its nodal structure, and the second due 
to its focus on programmatic rules and its disregard for the perceptions they 
evoke. And I look at the notion of ergodic literature, which is useful, but which 
suffers from formalistic reduction. In the second section, I evaluate media the-
ory as a theoretical framework for computer game analysis. I look at Bolter and 
Grusin's remediation theory and Manovich's general theory of new media. I re-
ject the fundamentals of both approaches on the basis that they are technolo-
gically deterministic. In the third and final section, I go deeper into the idea of 
determinism by looking at Postman's dystopian view on technological develop-
ment. I reject his deterministic perspective and formulate a constructivist altern-
ative which allows for the incorporation, not just of technological issues, but 
also social, cultural and ad hoc ones in the description of technological evolu-
tion. I sketch what a constructivist approach to computer game studies could 
look like. Finally, I formulate a hypothesis as to what computer games could tell 
us about the society in which they were shaped, what characteristics of the time 
in which we live are reflected in the computer game form.11
The second chapter deals with the principles underlying computer simula-
tion. In the first section, I describe the foundations of mathematical modeling, 
the molding of real-world phenomena into mathematical structures and proper-
ties. I describe computer simulations and games as instances of dynamic com-
puter modeling consisting of entities, states and events. Then I look at the tech-
nique's specificity and limitations as a form of representation of physical and 
behavioral phenomena. And I look at how and why events occur in a simula-
tion and describe them as an emergent phenomenon, a result of the low-level 
interaction of dozens of entities and events rather than that of one top-down 
imposed structure. The second section is an excursion into the relation between 
mathematical modeling of reality and thought about that reality. I lay out Tur-
ing's imitation game for detecting artificial intelligence and I present Searle's re-
11 From chapter two onward, the overall structure of this study is bottom-up, starting from the 
technological groundwork of computer simulation in the second chapter; over the imagining 
they generate, their virtual nature, in the third; the role of the simulated player in the fourth; to 
finish in the fifth with the question of why one desires to be cast in a simulated virtual environ-
ment so much. 
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futation in the form of his Chinese room argument which I confront both with 
top-down logical and bottom-up emergent A.I. The third section deals with the 
issue of the interpretation of computer simulation and games. My claim is that, 
despite  their  being  dynamic  and  quantitative  representations,  they  are  very 
much susceptible to qualitative criticism. Then, to illustrate my point, I look at a 
number of strategy and simulation games which inevitably present a biased and 
culturally determined view on reality, and at a number of propagandistic games 
which blatantly promote political views or even advertise hate. In the fourth 
and final section, I go into the relation between mathematical modeling and our 
contemporary society and culture. I look at Turkle's claim that computing has 
moved its emphasis from calculation to simulation and point  to the fallacy of 
placing too much emphasis on modeling as opposed to real-world analysis. Fi-
nally, I evaluate Baudrillard's view that our culture is slowly becoming a simula-
tion in itself due to its unrestrained reliance on models and representations. I 
reject his analysis on the basis that we are a society in transition and that com-
puter simulation is not a cause, but an effect, a human attempt to improve the 
understanding and representation of certain aspects of the world.
The third chapter is an exploration, no longer of simulation's organization 
in entities, states and events, but of the perceptions they evoke. In the first sec-
tion, I inquire into the ontological nature of the virtual, first by looking into 
Pierre Lévy's philosophical account of the virtual as potential reality, and then 
by describing how online virtual environments are sometimes described as po-
tentially real worlds. In particular, I deal with the phenomenon of real trading 
of virtual items whereby virtual in-game objects such as weapons or estate are 
sold for real money. In the second section, I evaluate the option of describing 
virtual environments as logically possible worlds. I sketch the basics of pos-
sible-worlds semantics, describe its merits when applied to the description of 
fiction, but arrive at a fundamental objection, i.e. that fictional worlds violate 
the logical laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. I zoom in on the ap-
plication of possible-worlds logic to the description of virtual environments and 
reject it on the basis of them being subject to contagion from the real. In the 
third and final section, I look at Kendall Walton's theory of representation as a 
game of make-believe. I describe its foundations which are derived from chil-
INTRODUCTION          23
dren's pretense play and see how they can be applied to how we deal with rep-
resentations  in  general  and  virtual  environments  in  particular.  I  criticize 
Walton's views on the relation between mimesis and truth and his attempt to 
analyze the difference between fiction and non-fiction as a binary opposition. I 
stick with his framework, however, and use his distinction between objective 
and subjective imagining to describe the difference between our dealing with 
traditional representations and introjective play. Finally, I return to the issue of 
virtual trading and reject the view that virtual economies constitute a possible 
reality on the basis that they are a form of mimesis, an imitation rather than lo-
gically identical to the real.
The fourth chapter, “Simulating a Self,” deals with the structural role that 
is foreseen for the player of a computer game. In the first section, I present the 
concept of introjection (Lat. being cast into), which refers to the fact that the 
player of a computer game is projected into the virtual world where she is as-
signed a role by the system. I discuss the notion in relation to other concepts 
such as 'presence' and 'immersion' and point to its specificity. In the second 
section, I go deeper into the role that is designated to the player and I distin-
guish between two configurations: avatarial introjection, whereby the player as-
sumes the role of a member of the virtual world and is tied to its restrictions, 
and transcendental introjection, whereby the player is given a unique status in 
the game-world, that of a transcendental deity. In the third and final section, I 
zoom in on the question of point of view in computer games. I begin my dis-
cussion by looking at Britta Neitzel's proposal to derive a conceptual apparatus 
from Gérard Genette's framework for the description of narrative focalization. 
Although intrinsically useful, I point to its limited applicability and its failure to 
explain computer simulation's specificity. For this reason, I present a more de-
tailed, layered framework dealing with the construction of the virtual world, the 
role of the player's character in that world, and the role of the player in the 
character  consecutively.  In  conclusion,  I  reflect  upon  my  own analysis  and 
point to a number of paths for future research.
In the fifth chapter, I finish my voyage from form to function, from ma-
chine to man by looking at the player's motivations, why he engages in such a 
trivial, seemingly purposeless activity such as playing. In the introduction, I look 
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at Richard Bartle's classification of players into achievers, explorers, socializers 
and killers which is useful for analyzing the differences between players, but 
which does not explain the deeper purpose of why anyone would want to play 
in the first  place.  In the first  section,  I  look at  various  perspectives on the 
concept and activity of play of which I keep the cognitivist notion of play as re-
hearsal and the psychoanalytical one of play as negotiation, the former claiming 
that play is a way of acquainting oneself with various activities and the latter de-
scribing it as a means of emotional coping with reality. In the second section, I 
move from the general notion of play, which includes motor and fantasy play to 
the idea of game play, i.e. competitive play constrained by a rule-based system. I 
begin my discussion by comparing the narratological concept of narrative con-
flict with that found in competitive games, i.e. ludic conflict. I point to a num-
ber of correspondences and to one major difference, i.e. the introjection of the 
player. I then continue with why a player would want to enter a rule-based en-
vironment and I will claim that it is due to the desire to gain control over her 
environment and over her own feelings of anxiety toward it by striving for per-
fection. In conclusion, I go back to the main claim of this work, i.e. that com-
puter simulation and games are a cultural form, a human artifact answering to 
specific human needs and wishes, which I find in its being a way of coping with 
an increasingly competitive society.
I
CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY
Technologies do not (...) evolve under the impetus of some necessary in-
ner technological or scientific logic. They are not possessed of an inher-
ent momentum. If they evolve or change, it is because they have been 
pressed into that shape.
Wiebe Bijker & John Law, introduction to         
Shaping Technology / Building Society, 1992, 3.      
Despite their relatively advanced age – depending on whether you identify Al-
exander Douglas' Noughts and Crosses (1952) or Steve Russell's Space War (1962) 
as  a first,  computer games have recently or will  soon celebrate their fiftieth 
birthday – the study of computer games 'an sich' is a remarkably recent phe-
nomenon. Early computer games were developed as experiments in graphical 
programming, human-computer interaction or artificial intelligence. They were 
run on large mainframe computing systems and hardly ever left university en-
26         UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER GAME CULTURE
gineering or computer science laboratories. There they were experimented with 
by a whole generation of soon-to-be computer scientists and software engin-
eers, many of whom would, in later years, play a major role in the development 
of information technology as we know it today. During the 1960s the cultural 
influence exerted by games such as  Space War and later  Ham(m)urabi/Kingdom 
{David Ahl 1970}, Lunar Lander {Jack Burness 1973} and Colossal Cave Adven-
ture {William Crowther & Donald Woods 1975} is difficult to overestimate. In 
fact, the increasing popularity of spatial metaphors in computer programming 
during the 1970s and 1980s may well have been inspired by long nightly ses-
sions of Space War or Advent. From the academic front, however, there was still 
little  interest  in the new form outside  of  computer  science and engineering 
which were exclusively interested in technological issues, not cultural. During 
the 1970s, as arcade computer games grew in popularity and the gaming in-
dustry began to take shape, the situation would largely remain the same. Every 
now and again, computer games would pop up in popular press reports, but the 
academy remained mute on the subject, a rare exception being Howard Ball's 
1978 article “Telegames Teach More Than You Think,” an early study of com-
puter games' educational potential.
In the 1980s, popular media began to show interest in the new form of 
entertainment as an increasing number of articles appeared on the subject. Ini-
tially, these reports were neutral in their description of the new pastime, a little 
amazed at its popularity at the most, describing how not just shy twelve year 
olds would populate the arcades, but also lawyers and accountants,  “Gucci's 
and three-pieced suits stuffing quarters into Asteroids [{Lyle Rains & Ed Logg 
1979}].” This changed in January 1982, however, when computer games made 
it to the cover of Time with a multi-page story titled “Games That Play People” 
(Skow 1982). All in all, the Time article was a fairly balanced review of the com-
puter game phenomenon discussing its attractions, its fans, its industry and its 
economic potential. The eye-catcher of the piece, however, was one Steve Jur-
aszek, a fair-haired, bright-eyed thirteen-year old who had recently set a world 
record by playing Defender {Eugene Jarvis 1980} for sixteen hours straight with 
one quarter while being fed pizza and cola by his friends. As it often goes, not 
the actual content of the article caught the public imagination, but the image of 
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countless teenagers being glued to endless rows of flickering and bleeping ma-
chines.  The  subtitle  of  the  story  read  that  “[t]hose  beeping  video  invaders 
[were] dazzling, fun, and even addictive.” Many readers, however, would forget 
the first two observations, remembering only that computer games could be ad-
dictive. In the course of 1982, an avalanche of negative reports on worried par-
ents, addicted gamers and possible health hazards would ensue, which would 
eventually lead to the American Surgeon General C. Everett Koop expressing 
his concern. At the end of 1982, the first so-called computer crash took place 
when Atari sales missed their predictions and Warner's stock plummeted. After 
that, the media storm subsided and the public attention waned.
In the same period, the first tentative examples of computer game studies 
began to appear,  by which I mean the first  studies which discuss computer 
games in and for themselves. In 1983, Geoffrey and Elizabeth Loftus' Mind at  
Play: the Psychology of Video Games (1983) was published, a psychological study, 
which, despite its sometimes narrow behaviorist focus, managed to provide in-
sight into the basic mechanisms of player motivation. Although obviously in-
spired by the public concern regarding the possible addictiveness and health 
hazards of computer game play, Loftus and Loftus succeeded in sketching a 
clear and objective picture, and at several occasions they made interesting ex-
cursions into the deeper psychology of  Pacman {Toru Iwatani, 1980} for ex-
ample  or  into  the  possible  educational  benefits  of  computer  game  play.  A 
second example, is  The Art of Computer Game Design (1984) by previous Atari 
game  designer  Chris  Crawford.  Although  not  exactly  an  academic  or  even 
vaguely scientific work, it deserves to be included as Crawford successfully ex-
pressed some of his basic intuitions and experiences regarding the form. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, Crawford saw computer games as an undervalued 
and underused form with much greater potential. As such, his work can be seen 
as the beginning of computer game design theory. The third and by far the 
most interesting study of computer games from the 1980s is Sherry Turkle's 
The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (1984). Although the book did not 
exclusively deal with computer games (in fact, only one chapter does), Turkle 
succeeded in describing a number of fundamental elements that determine the 
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relationship between man and machine (see also chapter 5), whereby she took a 
firm stance against the ludophobes who saw computer games as a threat.
Around 1992, the second storm of ludophobia raged over the USA re-
garding the relation between violence in computer games and actual violent be-
havior by children. By the mid-1990s, however, this controversy (which would 
briefly resurface in 1997 after the Columbine tragedy) was overshadowed by the 
advent of the World-Wide Web which drew most media and academic atten-
tion. The Internet frenzy would last the entire second half of the 1990s until the 
dotcom crash around the turn of the millennium and would spawn such popu-
lar yet short-lived fields as cybersociology, cyberpsychology and Internet Stud-
ies. Also during this period, however, a renewed interest in digital narrativity 
lead to a new generation of seminal studies to be published, most notably Es-
pen Aarseth's Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature and Janet Murray's Hamlet  
on the Holodeck,  both 1997. Aarseth's  Cybertext,  while not primarily a study of 
computer games but one of text-generators,  introduced a previously unseen 
conceptual apparatus into (digital) literary studies which would play an import-
ant role in raising interest in dynamic, computerized fictional forms. Murray's 
Hamlet on the Holodeck, on the other hand, is a hypothetical inquiry into virtual 
reality's potential as a form of narrative representation, musing on the possibil-
ities of full immersion and boundless interactivity. Although neither of these 
examples were actual 'game studies', they succeeded in drawing the necessary 
attention to the subject and thus paved the way for the discipline's founding.
In this chapter, I look at two lines of research each of which have pro-
posed their own approach to computer game analysis and I put forward a third. 
First, I look at the research tradition of digital literature analysis which has pro-
posed to analyze computer games as interactive texts. I sketch a brief history of 
the paradigm and look at its major conceptualizations: i.e. interactivity, particip-
ation, hypertext, cybertext and ergodics. While I value the contribution of sev-
eral  of  these notions,  most  notably  Murray's  participation and Aarseth's  er-
godics, I do not employ them as a basis for my own discussion because I be-
lieve that they fail to grasp the specificity of computer simulation. The second 
research tradition I evaluate is that of new media studies, which proposes to 
look at computer games within the broader perspective of digital media and to 
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understand them based on their technological and teleological underpinnings. 
Again, I accept some elements, but overall reject new media theory on the basis 
that it is severely technologically deterministic. In the third and final section, 
then, I propose my own approach to computer game analysis which is based on 
work by British and mainland European researchers who reject the determinist-
ic view and instead see technology as a socio-cultural construction. I first look 
more closely at the deterministic frame of thought and identify its main weak-
nesses. Next, I formulate a constructivist alternative and see what this would 
mean when applied to computer game studies. Finally, I present a number of 
hypotheses regarding the extent to which computer games reflect the cultural 
context in which they developed, i.e. what they can tell us about the time in 
which they evolved.
1. COMPUTER GAMES AS INTERACTIVE TEXT
In July 1945, one month before a uranium-235 atomic bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima,  and  a  half  year  before  John  Presper  Eckert  and  John  William 
Mauchly presented the Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer (ENI-
AC), the first general-purpose electronic computer, Vannevar Bush proposed a 
new method for information storage in an article in  The Atlantic Monthly titled 
“As We May Think.” Bush, who had been working as an engineer in the Amer-
ican War industry, realized that the modern world would be facing new techno-
logical challenges, urged not so much by the desire to win the next war as to 
prevent it. The solution he saw before him was a new, more efficient and more 
intuitive system for storing and searching information. Since the days of square-
rigged ships (15th - 18th century), Bush claimed, the ways of handling and access-
ing information had not changed. Archives and libraries were expanding at such 
a rate that they were becoming uncontrollable and inaccessible. For Bush, these 
numerically,  thematically  or  alphabetically  ordered systems needed to  be re-
thought and replaced by a structure closer to how humans deal with informa-
tion cognitively. As an example of such a structure, Bush proposed the Memex, 
a proof of concept system of levers, motors and microfilm. At one point in his 
essay, he refers to computers, “the advanced arithmetical machines of the fu-
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ture,” which he foresees to “perform 100 times present speeds, or more,” but 
still  he conceived of his  Memex as a mechanic microfilm device operated by 
levers. “On deflecting one of these levers to the right [the user] runs through 
the book before him, each page in turn being projected at a speed which just al-
lows a recognizing glance at each. If he deflects it further to the right, he steps 
through the book 10 pages at a time; still further at 100 pages at a time” (Ibid.). 
As opposed to traditional linear classifications, Bush puts forward associative 
indexing as a structuring system, creating what we would today call hyperlinks. 
“When the user is building a trail, he names it, inserts the name in his code 
book, and taps it out on his keyboard. Before him are the two items to be 
joined, projected onto adjacent viewing positions (...).  The user taps a single 
key, and the items are permanently joined (...). Thereafter, at any time, when 
one of these items is in view, the other can be instantly recalled merely by tap-
ping a button below the corresponding code space” (Ibid.). The  Memex was 
never built, but Bush's ideas found many followers.
In 1965, Theodor Holm Nelson, one of Bush's admirers, wrote an article 
titled “A File Structure for the Complex, the Changing, and the Indeterminate” 
for the Association for Computing Machinery. In this groundbreaking text, he 
introduced the concept 'hypertext' from the Old Greek 'υpiερ', meaning over, 
above, behind, beyond. In his writings, Nelson has always been vague as to the 
precise nature of the hypertext concept, but in Literary Machines (1981), he de-
scribes it as “non-sequential writing – text that branches and allows choices to 
the reader, best read at an interactive screen.” In 1967, Nelson presented his 
plans  for  Xanadu,  an  international  hypermedia  system  named  after  Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge's imaginary utopia in the poem “Kubla Khan” {1797}. Nel-
son's Xanadu was meant to become a system in which all contemporary know-
ledge and literature could be represented, and which would automatically calcu-
late and charge the cost of copyright and retrieval by means of micro-payments. 
In  1979,  Nelson  founded the  company  Xanadu,  which failed  to  produce  a 
working prototype even after it was taken over by Autodesk, Inc in 1988. In 
1992, the project came to a halt and in 1999 its source code was released. This 
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lead to the scornful remark by some specialists that indeed it resembled poetry 
rather than programming code.
In this section, I look more closely at some of the theorizing on electronic 
literature and evaluate the possibility of describing computer games as interact-
ive text. First, I look at the notion of 'interactivity' and formulate some criti-
cism. Then, I move on to Janet Murray's idea of participatory media and pro-
pose  a  specific  type of  participation to  describe what  happens in computer 
game play, i.e. introjection, the casting of the player into the fictional world. 
Secondly, I evaluate textual analysis as a tool for the description of computer 
games. I present hyperfiction theory and its approach to the description of hy-
pertext as an embodiment of poststructuralist theory. Then, I point to a num-
ber of theoretical problems when trying to apply hyperfiction theory to com-
puter games, most notably the fact that hypertext is multi-linear whereas simu-
lation is intrinsically non-linear. One solution to this problem is Espen Aarseth-
's proposal to look at computer games as algorithmically generated or cyber-
text. This is again not entirely satisfactory, however, as it still does not manage 
to do away with the idea of textuality and because it fails to grasp the most fun-
damental characteristic of computer games: their playfulness. Finally, I look at 
the promising ludology movement which builds on the cybertext tradition to 
create an analytical framework for computer game studies and express the hope 
that it will eventually transcend its structuralist roots.
INTERACTIVITY
In computer science and software engineering, the concept of interactivity is 
used to describe a process whereby the user can exert influence on a running 
computer program and thereby influence its course.12 Interactive systems are 
12 The concept of interactivity is not exclusively tied to computer science. In psychology for ex-
ample, it is used to refer to the condition of being able to act upon one's environment. Thereby 
it is often stressed that it is important for the cognitive development of an agent (man, animal) 
to maintain an interactive relationship with her environment. In 1963, Richard Held and Alan 
Hein described a now classic experiment in which two kittens from the same litter were placed 
in identical surroundings. Both kittens were exposed to identical visual experiences, but one 
was able to move freely while the other was restrained in a gondola chair. When they were not 
being tested, both kittens were left in total darkness. After ten days, the active kitten reacted 
normally to visual stimuli, while its restrained sibling behaved as if it was blind. A few days 
after the restrained kitten was released it started to develop normal visual skills.
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opposed to batch computers which can only perform a number of predefined 
actions on preloaded data. An example of a batch process could be a request to 
order a number of files alphabetically, while its interactive equivalent would al-
low the user to order the files according to her wishes using an input device like 
a keyboard or a mouse. Interactive systems are studied in a subfield of engineer-
ing called human-computer interaction which attempts to describe and enhance 
the  exchange  of  information  between  user  and  machine.  Causal  chains  of 
events in a human-machine system are described as a closed information/con-
trol loop. The efferent or motor loop runs from human response to machine 
state (e.g. input through a keyboard), and the afferent or sensory loop from ma-
chine state to human senses (e.g. output on screen, printout). In order to de-
scribe the role that different apparatuses and interfaces play in the exchange of 
stimuli, the mappings from operator to computer and vice versa are described 
as two filters: an efferent and an afferent filter respectively (Sheridan 1992). Us-
ing this framework, it is possible to analyze speed and ease of operations using 
different computer interfaces. In web design for example, this type of analysis is 
often called usability testing. Possible parameters are the number of clicks re-
quired by the user  to  find a  piece of  information and the amount  of  time 
between them. The general aim is to improve the intuitiveness of the mapping 
between action and result.  Important  items of an interface should be easily 
found, intuitively accessed (e.g. by clicking), and should produce expected res-
ults.
Interactivity and usability testing are useful tools for analyzing menu-driv-
en software interfaces or determining the accessibility of hyperlinked material. 
For  analyzing  stimulus-response  intensive  activities  like  playing  computer 
games they are much less suited however. When using a word-processor or a 
photo editor, a user has a goal in mind, which she can formulate and which she 
tries to attain in the most efficient way possible. Similarly, a visitor of a web site 
is looking for a piece of information which she needs to find quickly and easily. 
As a researcher, you can describe how many feedback loops (menu-items selec-
ted, hyperlinks followed) are required and how long each of them takes, before 
the user reaches the desired state or goal. A number of discretely identifiable 
decisions lead to a possibly unknown, but determinable outcome. Menus can be 
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altered, hyperlinks placed differently and the test can be repeated. When look-
ing at computer game play, however, feedback loops are impossible to identify 
and artificially isolating units of interactivity from the broader semantic context 
is unworkable. Analyzing computer games in terms of action-reaction leads to-
ward atomism, whereby macro-structure is relentlessly sacrificed for a meaning-
less  formalistic  description  of  micro-structure.  Particularly  in  action  games, 
where the player is constantly moving, pursuing several objectives at once or 
none  at  all,  where  she  is  acting  on  a  continuously  evolving  environment, 
mouse-clicks and key taps become indistinguishable and function only to facilit-
ate higher cognitive processes related to identification and conflict-resolution. 
Just as it is impossible to describe the Tour de France by counting the turning 
of the pedals, or a book by its average word-length, it is impossible to describe 
computer game play by looking at contextless causal chains of infinitesimal in-
formation/control loops. As with the words in a book or the frames in a film, it 
is what the stimulus-response chains evoke that is of importance: the suspense 
or disappointment they create, the meanings they generate.
PARTICIPATION
In Hamlet on the Holodeck (1997), an exploration of the possibilities of digital fic-
tion and virtual reality theater, Janet Murray develops a conceptual apparatus 
for the analysis and description of various forms of digital narrative. Thereby 
her aim is not just to devise a framework of understanding, but to unveil a sort 
of technological essence of computing which could then be used to explain the 
present and guide the future course of digital storytelling. Whereas earlier stud-
ies, especially in hypertext fiction started from the notion of 'interactivity', for 
Murray, it is too vague and reductive (71). Instead she proposes four principal 
properties for digital environments which refer to their procedural, participat-
ory, spatial and encyclopedic nature. Digital environments are procedural in that 
they are dependent on programming procedures which at any given moment 
generate their state and guide their course. Moreover, because they are proced-
ural, state changes can be triggered by all sorts of events including the actions 
of a user. For Murray, this quality is best caught by the notion of  participation. 
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The third component in Murray's framework is  spatiality, which she associates 
with the fact that digital information tends to be structured in spatial rather 
than linear terms. One question to pose here is, however, to what extent this is 
a technical matter, spatiality being a familiar human metaphor which is used as a 
structuring device in many forms of representation, most notably natural lan-
guage. The fourth property, finally, is referred to as the encyclopedic nature of 
digital  environments,  the  fact  that  they  are  able  to  store  an  almost  infinite 
amount of information. For Murray, the first two properties, procedures and 
participation, should be seen as a replacement for the vaguer notion of 'inter-
activity' and the remaining two (spatiality and encyclopedia) she describes as 
“making up much of what we mean when we say that cyberspace is immersive” 
(71).
Murray's idea of 'participation' is less restrictive than the human-computer 
engineering concept of 'interactivity'. Whereas the former focuses on the actual 
signal exchange between user and state machine, the latter allows for the inclu-
sion of higher cognitive functions, treating the user as a creative contributor 
rather than a mindless goal-directed robot. In this way, 'participation' manages 
to overcome at least partly interactivity's atomism, clearing the way for the ana-
lysis of the relation between the user's decisions and narrative development. As 
for computer game analysis, however, participation alone is still not entirely sat-
isfactory as a descriptive device, mainly because it fails to explain the intuitive 
difference between such forms as hyperfiction and digital cinema on the one 
hand,  and computer  gaming  on  the  other.  Both  hypermedia  and computer 
games are participatory (and interactive, if you like). What distinguishes them 
from one another, however, is the 'imaginary' position of the user. Whereas in 
hypermedia and interactive cinema the user takes an external position, deciding 
on fixed points how the story should continue, in computer games, she is given 
a role within the fictional environment itself.  She steps through the looking 
glass and temporarily becomes both the girl sitting in front of the computer and 
the level 10 wizard who is on a quest to find a holy relic. Whereas the reader of 
hyperfiction or the spectator of digital cinema is like a distant onlooker, the 
player of a game temporarily assumes the identity of one of its entities. She pro-
jects her own self into the actions of her game persona, which can, for example, 
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be observed in the fact that she refers to her wizard in the first person, as in “I 
am entering the cave now.” In order to be able to refer to this type of participa-
tion, I will introduce the notion 'introjection' (Lat. throwing into) in chapter 4 
to describe the mental movement of projecting oneself into the fictional envir-
onment and participate actively as one of its members.
HYPERTEXT
When looking more closely at the idea of treating digital representation as 'text', 
we note that this perception has come a long way. As described earlier, Van-
nevar Bush was the first to plead for a type of multi-linear text in 1945, and it 
was Ted Nelson who termed it 'hypertext' twenty years later. It would take an-
other twenty years, however, before the first functional hypertext systems be-
came available: Apple's Hypercard {Bill Atkinson 1987} and Eastgate's Storyspace 
{Mark Bernstein 1987} being among the first. And it was only in 1990, with the 
publication of an early version of the WorldWide Web, that the advantages of or-
ganizing information in a hypertextual environment began to take root. Tim 
Berners-Lee, researcher at the Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire 
(CERN) in Geneva created a simple yet ingenious system to streamline the in-
formation flow within his research group. Two principal requirements were that 
different media like text and images could be linked and that network users 
with  different  types  of  computers  could access  all  available  information.  In 
1990, the first operational prototype was available and in 1992, its underlying 
technology was released to the public. In 1993,  Mosaic was released, the first 
browser capable of displaying colors and graphical elements and one year later 
its commercial descendant, Marc Andreessen's Netscape Navigator followed. The 
WorldWide Web succeeded in combining the solid and decentered nature of 
the Internet with the flexibility and simplicity of a markup-based hypertext sys-
tem. It became a technology that would color the 1990s in more than one way, 
and became a symbol of the information society.
Meanwhile, in the late 1980s and early 1990s literary scholars developed 
an interest in hypertext as a tool for the creation of new types of literature, so-
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called 'hyperfiction'.13 Theorists such as George Landow, Jay David Bolter, Mi-
chael Joyce and Stuart Moulthrop noted the correspondences between post-
structuralist  theory  and the  idea  of  hypertext  linking.  As  Marie-Laure  Ryan 
notes (2001: 6), the list of common features is indeed impressive. First of all, 
there is Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva's notion of intertextuality, referring 
to the practice of integrating textual fragments by using citations, comments, al-
lusion, imitation etc., all practices which are facilitated by a hypertextual writing 
environment. Secondly, hypertext linking shows reminiscence of Lévi-Strauss' 
notion of 'bricolage', whereby different techniques and materials grow together 
bottom-up into an organic whole rather than top-down from a predefined set 
of demarcations. Thirdly, hypertext is inherently fragmented, an idea that is re-
current in post-structuralist theory of the self (see for example Gaggi 1997). Fi-
nally, hypertext is seen as a materialization of, and a response to the cry for a 
new type of textuality that has resounded in literature and theory long before 
electronic hypertext existed. Often cited paper forefathers include Jorge Luis 
Borges' short story “El jardin de senderos que se bifurcan” {“The Garden of 
Forking Paths”, 1941}; Raymond Queneau's  Cent Mille Milliards de Poèmes {A 
Hundred Thousand Billion Poems, 1961}, a book consisting of strips of paper each 
containing  one  line  that  by  shuffling  can  generate  1014 sonnets;  and  Julio 
Cortázar's Rayuela {Hopscotch, 1963}, a novel in codex form.
To some researchers, applying hypertext and hyperfiction theory to com-
puter game analysis seemed consistent, and indeed there are a number of simil-
arities between them. For example, while traditional narrative forms such as 
prose or analog media like film and television are typically fixed and linear, both 
hyperfiction and computer games break with that  tradition in that  they can 
change shape from one 'reading' to the next and hence, to a certain extent, do 
away  with  linearity.  There  is  also  a  significant  difference  between  them 
however. When looking at the relation between hyperfiction and storytelling, 
one can roughly distinguish between two types of 'hyperstories' which could be 
designated  as  single-  and  multi-story  hyperfictions.  As  the  name  suggests, 
single-story hyperfictions present only one story line, but they allow the reader 
13 For a more extensive discussion, see Van Looy & Baetens 2003.
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to roam through its  representation. Examples of single-story hyperfictions in-
clude  the  canonized  Afternoon:  A Story {1990} by  Michael  Joyce and Stuart 
Moulthrop's Victory Garden {1991}. Again as the name suggests, multi-story hy-
perfictions mold several stories into one interactive text, meaning that the read-
er's decisions do not just influence which part of the story she reads about, but 
the course of the story itself. Examples of multi-story hyperfictions include Ad-
dventure {Allen S. Firstenberg 1994} and Philippa J. Burne's 24 hours with someone  
you know... {1996} which both use an arborescent or tree-branching structure.14 
Computer games, however, are neither single- nor multi-story forms. They are 
simulations, partial models of reality which in real-time generate the events that 
take place in the virtual environment (see also chapter 2). Whereas hyperfiction 
permits the user to seek her way through a fixed set of static material, computer 
games are generated on the spot and are able to produce an almost infinite 
number of different story lines. 
CYBERTEXT
In the 1960s, while hypertext was still in its conceptual phase, another type of 
digital text emerged, i.e. algorithm-generated text. In 1966, Joseph Weizenbaum 
wrote a small experimental program simulating a Rogerian psychotherapist and 
dubbed it  Eliza.  Eliza would analyze the user's textual input for syntactical or 
morphological hooks such as questions or personal pronouns and incorporate 
them in her generally meaningless, but in a therapeutic context, acceptable an-
swers.  Eliza sent a shock through academic circles,  not in the least through 
Weizenbaum himself, who, in later publications, would warn against the substi-
tution of human creative thought for mechanical rules in society. In 1975, Willi-
am  Crowther  programmed  a  playful  interactive  machine-generated  fiction 
known as Advent(ure). One year later, Donald Woods discovered the game and 
added a number of fantasy elements, after which it became known as  Colossal  
14 In order to limit the number of necessary nodes,  in  24 hours  with  someone you know... some 
branches merge at different points in the story. Thus some events may occur in exactly the 
same way in different branches of the structure, but are embedded in different parts of the 
story and are therefore “ontologically” different. For example, there could be a node in which 
character X is  driven to hospital  bleeding severely.  In branch A this  event  occurs after  X 
smashed a window out of frustration because his partner left, and in branch B it could occur 
after he was assaulted with a knife in the metro.
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Cave. In 1977, Marc Blank and Dave Lebling created Zork, a witty text adven-
ture inspired by Colossal Cave. It became a commercial hit (it is said to have sold 
more than a million copies) and spawned a whole series of so-called interactive 
fictions.  This  period is  often referred to as  the Infocom era.  Also in 1977, 
James Meehan programmed one of the first story generators called  Tale-Spin, 
which was able to generate a large number of stories from a limited set of textu-
al elements. In 1978, finally, Roy Trubshaw and Richard Bartle created the first 
Multi-User Dungeon (MUD), a networked text-adventure-like environment in 
which several players could meet and act out scenarios.15
Espen Aarseth was one of the first researchers who set out to include 
both hypertext and algorithmic text into one systematic theory. Because the 
concept of 'hypertext' was so closely associated with multi-linear text consisting 
of a web of nodes and links, it was unsuitable for the description of text gener-
ated by algorithmic rules (1997: 75). For this reason, Aarseth coined the term 
cybertext, a neologism derived from Norbert Wiener's book  Cybernetics:  Control  
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1948). The concept of cybertext 
points to the mechanical organization of a dynamic text (1). Traditionally, text 
has been thought of as something that is separate from its carrier: the same 
string of signs can appear in a newspaper, on a computer screen or be sprayed 
on a wall as graffiti. Aarseth does not accept this separation however. He wants 
to be able to analyze poetry generators and text adventures as a whole, not just 
the text they send to the screen buffer. For this reason, he proposes to extend 
the notion of text to include its underlying generative rules and he makes a dis-
tinction between the text as it appears on the screen (scriptons) and the text as 
it is fixed in the rules of the machine (textons). A simple paper text could then 
be seen as a very simple cybertext, one in which all scriptons are identical to 
their textons. A text like Raymond Queneau's paper sonnet machine Cent mille  
milliards de poèmes {1961}, on the other hand, consists of 140 textons (slips of 
paper), but 100,000,000,000,000 scriptons (combined poems). Finally, in order 
to generate scriptons from underlying textons, many cybertexts require actions 
from the reader, such as textual input, element selection, puzzle resolution etc. 
15 For a comprehensive history and analysis of interactive fiction, see Montfort 2003
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Aarseth stresses, however, that this is not to be confused with interpretive ac-
tion on the part of the reader which also plays a role when dealing with cyber-
texts, but not more or less than when reading linear or multi-linear texts and 
which does not change the configuration of the work itself (62).
All  in  all,  algorithm-generated  text  has  only  been  mildly  successful 
however. One of its problems is that language, meaning-generation in particu-
lar, is not something that can easily be caught in or even imitated by finite logic-
al or mathematical rules. In this area, machine-generated text has to turn to gen-
eral artificial intelligence programming, but that has made only little fundament-
al progress since Weizenbaum's Eliza (1966). Visual representation, on the oth-
er hand, is less dependent on semiotic interpretation.16 Whereas textual repres-
entation needs to 'see through' a situation in order to be able to describe it, 
visual representation  can restrict itself to simulating its superficial results and 
that is much easier to translate into mathematical functions. If a programmer 
wanted to represent an object moving toward another object – say, a human 
figure toward a house – this is easily done using an algorithm redrawing the fig-
ure each time a few pixels closer to the house. If there were robbers in the 
bushes  next  to  the road,  their  appearance on the screen could be triggered 
when the distance between the human figure and the bushes dropped below 
one hundred pixels for example. The player would notice the robbers, flee, and 
be chased across the screen. Representing this sequence of events in an exciting 
form in a cybertextual environment is much more difficult. First of all, the ele-
ment of real-time would largely be lost. The player would not  see the robbers 
appear, she would be told that they have appeared. Second, the excitement of 
direct action would be lost. The player would have no direct control over the 
puppet so she could only order it to flee and hope that it succeeds. Finally, if 
the text programmer wanted to make chase entertaining and unique, she would 
have to create a huge amount of text specifically for this single chase. The visual 
designer, on the other hand, could easily reuse the robbers and the house later 
in the game in a different context using different variables. Consequently, as 
16 There have been a few games such as Rogue {Michael Toy 1980}, that used text characters as 
graphic elements, using rows of characters to form walls and rooms (Wolf 2001b: 55). From 
the perspective of cybertext, these are simply graphical games since the characters depicted do 
not function as language and are therefore meaningless as text.
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computers grew faster and better at displaying graphics, the paradigm of inter-
active fiction was gradually abandoned, and came to an end with the demise of 
Infocom in the mid-1980s.
For cybertext theory, in order to circumvent the restriction to text-based 
interactive fiction, it would not be too difficult to extend its area of application 
to visual representation, a possibility still muffled in Aarseth's Cybertext (1997), 
but openly acknowledged in his contribution to the Cyberspace Textuality reader 
(1999). 'Text' would then come to refer to the underlying structure rather than 
the used sign type. The resulting schema (see below) shows an attractive sym-
metry between verbal and visual media. 'Linear text' in the verbal sense would 
refer to traditional print fiction while its visual counterpart could refer to linear 
media like cinema and television. 'Hypertext' could be used to refer to textual 
hyperfiction on the one hand and to hypermedia and interactive cinema on the 
other. 'Cybertext', finally, could refer to interactive fiction, story generators and 
Multi-User Dungeons in the verbal sphere, and to computer simulation and 
games in the visual. This would result in the following table:
Verbal Visual
Linear text Most print fiction Film, television
Hypertext (multi-linear) Hyperfiction Hypermedia, Interactive 
cinema
Cybertext (algorithm-
generated)
Text adventures, poetry 
generators, Multi-User 
Dungeons
Computer games
Despite the attractive symmetry of the above classification, however, the use of 
cybertext theory for the analysis of computer games is not unproblematic. First 
of all, because the cybertext concept aims to include the program's underlying 
programmatic structure, its logical rules and textons, it is manifest that they be 
available  to  the  person  analyzing  the  work.  This  is  only  seldom  the  case 
however. The programming code of the large majority of commercial computer 
games is closed, unavailable for inspection. An alternative strategy would be to 
look at the computer game itself, play it more than once, compare sessions and 
then  induce  its  underlying  structure.  This  is  a  time-consuming  operation, 
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however, and in the case of modern, finely-grained simulations, it may well be 
unfeasible. Moreover, even if it were possible to derive all generative rules, it is 
unclear what it is that would be revealed about the gaming experience. While 
human-computer interaction theory was atomistic in that it aimed to describe 
the user experience by looking at human-computer signal exchange only, cyber-
text theory tends toward formalism in that it assumes that it is solely the under-
lying logic that is determinant for the gaming experience. It is not the logical 
rules in themselves that are of analytic interest, however, but the perceptions 
they generate (see also chapter 3). It is what the player imagines she is doing, 
that determines her actions and experience, not just the quantitative rules gener-
ating the simulation. Looking at the rules of football, for example, would ex-
plain very little about the pleasure and excitement the game can produce.
ERGODICS
A second notion introduced by Aarseth is that of 'ergodics', a term appropri-
ated from physics and derived from the Greek words 'ergon' (work) and 'hodos' 
(path). It refers to the fact that some texts require non-trivial effort from the 
reader to traverse them (1) Ideally, for Aarseth, there would be two types of lit-
erature: narrative and ergodic. The reader or spectator of a fixed narrative work 
is powerless with respect to its unfolding. She may think what she will about 
the representation, but she cannot change it. She has the pleasure of interpreta-
tion,  but  she does not  have that  of influence.  “The reader’s  pleasure is  the 
pleasure of the voyeur. Safe, but impotent” (4). In an ergodic work, on the oth-
er hand, the reader/spectator/player is confronted with a number of obstacles 
that need to be overcome, to which Aarseth refers as 'aporias'. In traditional lit-
erary theory, the term 'aporia' refers to an insoluble contradiction or paradox in 
the semantic organization of a text. Aarseth, however, redefines it to become a 
formal figure, an obstruction that must be overcome by the actions of the play-
er (1999: 38). When an aporia is solved, it is replaced by an epiphany: “a sud-
den, often unexpected solution to the impasse in the event space” (38). For 
Aarseth, epiphanies are more fundamental to the enjoyment of an ergodic than 
to that of a narrative work, because without their resolution, the rest of the 
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work is not realized. Finally, the relationship between the narrative and the er-
godic is dialectic, not dichotomous. Narrative elements can be found in ergodic 
works, and ergodic elements in narrative ones (34). In adventure games, for ex-
ample, narrative elements (texts, cut scenes, explanations from characters) are 
alternated with ergodic puzzles or action sequences.
Compared to 'cybertext', the concept of 'ergodics' has aroused little aca-
demic interest. This may be due to the radical newness of the concept and to its 
somewhat awkward ring, evoking at the same time religious connotations and 
associations  with  'gothic'  literature.  A  second,  more  fundamental  reason, 
however, has been the term's etymological origin. As described above, 'ergodic' 
is derived from the Old Greek 'ergon', meaning 'work'. Most of the 'texts' quali-
fying as ergodic literature are 'games', however, and are as such strongly associ-
ated with 'playfulness', a semantic category traditionally opposed to 'work'. For 
Aarseth, the ergodic element refers to “a type of discourse whose signs emerge 
as a path produced by a non-trivial element of work” (1999: 32). Yet, games are 
neither valued as 'discourse' – their primary attraction is one of participation, 
not of interpretation – nor as 'work', from which 'play' is meant to be a refuge. 
Finally, the second part of the compound, 'hodos' (path) is not unproblematic 
either in that it seems to refer to a reading path which is associated with the 
web-like structure of hypertext rather than with the algorithm-generated nature 
of cybertext.
Moreover, ergodic theory tends to be mechanistic when it comes to con-
ceptual borders, denying the possibility of hybridization. As a starting point for 
his analysis, Aarseth takes Gerard Genette's discourse typology. For Genette, 
there are two levels of discourse: description (e.g. “the car was a BMW”) and 
narration (e.g. “the car drove through the red light”), whereby the latter is dom-
inant but reliant on the former.  Aarseth accepts Genette's  classification and 
proposes to add ergodics as a third category. Ergodic works such as adventure 
games could then contain description (graphics, descriptive passages), narrative 
elements  (background  story,  pre-scripted  scenes)  and  ergodic  elements 
(labyrinths, puzzles, chases, fights). Unlike Genette, however, who sees his ty-
pology as fuzzy, conceptually vague, Aarseth attempts to make his categoriza-
tion exclusive. “Compared to a non-textual game such as football, which has 
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only action (ergodic elements), the computer game has both ergodics (action) 
and description (graphics, sound), but not narration, since the event space is 
not fixed before the time of play” (1999: 35). Apparently, in an attempt to es-
tablish a firm identity for 'ergodics', Aarseth opposes it strongly to narrative, de-
scribing both notions as mutually exclusive. Consequently, an ergodic element 
cannot be narrative and vice versa. In reality, this is not the case however. Er-
godic elements such as action sequences and puzzles can play an important role 
in  the  narrative  development  of  a  game.  Similarly,  narrative  elements  give 
meaning to action and puzzling in games. Ergodics and narrative are not mutu-
ally exclusive features, but function as catalyzers to one another. They do not 
work against, but with one another in the evocation of imaginary happenings.
Since their inception, cybertext and ergodic theory have been striving to-
ward disciplinary independence, criticizing “the recurrent practice of applying 
the theories of literary criticism to a new empirical field, seemingly without any 
reassessment of the terms and concepts involved” (Aarseth 1997: 14). Little by 
little, it has moved away from strictly textual analysis toward more general com-
puter  game  studies.  In  1999,  Gonzalo  Frasca  proposed  the  term 'ludology' 
(from 'ludus', Lat. game) as a name for the previously non-existent academic 
discipline for studying games. Since then, ludology has played a invaluable role 
in the emancipation of computer games as a research object and has helped to 
overcome the pointless Manichean discussion of whether they are good or bad 
to society. More recently, the ludologist rhetoric has acquired a somewhat bitter 
tone, however, accusing disciplines such as literary and film studies to be organ-
izing a gold rush on ludologist territory with little respect for local culture and 
history. Even if this were the truth, putting up defenses has not been a favor-
able move as it has plunged the discipline into another round of pointless dual-
ist debate. Henry Jenkins, for example, accuses the ludology movement of be-
ing unduly polemical. “[T]hey are so busy trying to pull game designers out of 
their 'cinema envy' or define a field where no hypertext theorist dares to ven-
ture that they are prematurely dismissing the use value of narrative” (Jenkins 
2004). Similarly, Stuart Moulthrop warns against closing the 'hermeneutic circle 
of simulation', a defense maneuver which he deems useful to an extent, but 
which at the same time “threatens to impose a hazardous solipsism” (Response 
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by Moulthrop to Aarseth 2004a). In the third section, I present a cultural per-
spective on game analysis, which, I believe, does more due right to the form 
precisely through its inclusiveness and interdisciplinarity. But first, I look more 
closely at a second approach that has been proposed for the analysis of com-
puter games, i.e. media theory.
2. COMPUTER GAMES AS NEW MEDIA
Roughly speaking, the concept of 'medium' (Lat. middle, between, means, way) 
conjoins three relatively distinct meanings: that of a social institution, an artistic 
mode and type of electronic apparatus. In its first meaning of  social institution, 
'the media'  refers  to  companies,  services,  organizations  and their employees 
working in public and commercial information production and dispersal: Holly-
wood, British Broadcasting Corporation, Sony Corporation, Madonna etc. In 
this sense, computer games are undeniably part of the media. In its second, 
older sense of artistic mode, 'medium' refers to a broad array of instruments and 
styles that are used for creative expression: paint, music, sonnet, novel, televi-
sion show, film, music video, website etc. Also in this sense, computer games 
are decidedly a medium. They are a form of expression, arguably even of artistic 
creation. Finally, in its third meaning, the term 'medium' refers to the electronic  
apparatus of an information technology, strongly associated with the broadcast-
ing of signals, a 'middle' or 'in between' people: the telegraph, telephone, radio, 
television, e-mail etc. In this section, I evaluate the claim that the digital com-
puter in general and computer games in particular should be seen as a medium 
in the sense of apparatus. I look at two theories, Jay David Bolter and Richard 
Grusin's remediation theory and Lev Manovich's digital materialism, which I 
both reject on the basis that they are technologically deterministic and hence re-
ductive, and I plead for a broader cultural perspective on computer simulation 
and games.
REMEDIATION
In  Remediation: Understanding New Media (1999), Jay David Bolter and Richard 
Grusin set out to create an analytical framework for digital information techno-
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logy and content.  Their starting point is McLuhan's idea (1964) that the 'con-
tent' of a medium is always another medium, which they term remediation. The 
telegraph remediates print, which remediates writing, which remediates speech 
(45). Their argument is that “new media are doing exactly what their prede-
cessors have done: presenting themselves as refashioned and improved versions 
of other media. Digital visual media can best be understood through the ways 
in which they honor, rival, and revise linear-perspective painting, photography, 
film, television and print” (14). Bolter and Grusin believe that there is a teleolo-
gical factor at work in the evolution of media technology, that technological in-
novation is working toward a specific goal which is perfect mimesis.17 In order 
to understand this evolution, they refer to two, partly opposed tendencies: hy-
permediacy and immediacy. Hypermediacy refers to new media's tendency to mul-
tiply channels, to saturate itself with sources of information. A web page, for 
example, contains text in different colors and sizes, hyperlinks, images, graphic-
al elements, animation etc. For Bolter and Grusin, hypermedia design privileges 
“fragmentation, indeterminacy, and heterogeneity (...) emphasiz[ing] process or 
performance rather than the finished art object” (31).  Immediacy, on the other 
hand, refers to new media's tendency to “erase or to render automatic the act of 
representation” (33). Through immediacy, technology attempts to erase itself, 
to become transparent so as to present the mediated environment as a unified 
visual space, seamlessly integrated in the actual. A useful example of this is the 
cinema theater where the viewer is submerged in imagery, sound and darkness, 
where the border between spectator and fictional world is made as inconspicu-
ous as possible.
When trying to apply the remediation framework to concrete examples, 
however, it becomes clear that its theoretical foundations are problematic. If we 
say that hypertext remediates print, for example, what do we mean by that? Do 
we mean that it absorbs all qualities and techniques of the older medium and 
then adds its own? If we adopt this explanation, it is plainly wrong since many 
17 One of the more amusing teleological analyses that I have come across is one claiming that all 
technological innovation in media is driven by the pornographic industry, by the desire to reach 
perfect verisimilitude in the simulation of sexual intercourse with a fictional person. One often 
quoted example is the victory of the technologically inferior VHS video cassette format over 
Betamax because Sony would not license the latter to pornographic filmmakers.
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characteristics of print (size, easy access, page numbers etc.) are not taken over. 
A second option is to take remediation as the negotiation and adoption of only 
certain qualities and techniques from the older medium. But why do we then 
speak of remediation and not simply influence or emulation? Moreover, how 
do we explain that some examples of works in other media have great influence 
and others have none whatsoever?  And how do we describe influences from 
other cultural forms that are not media in the strict sense? Do computer games 
remediate pinball machines because they adopted the three lives paradigm? Do 
they remediate sports when they are practiced in teams scoring points? Do they 
remediate literature when they adopt techniques for generating identification, 
characterization and setting? Do racing games remediate driving a car? Etc. In a 
sense, Bolter and Grusin obscure two related but distinct phenomena. On the 
one hand, there is the cultural process of influence and negotiation and on the 
other,  there  is  the competition between technologies,  whereby newer media 
tend to be shaped so as to emulate older forms, speed up their acceptance, and 
permit them to steal away the older medium's audience and market. These two 
processes are not identical, however, the first being part of a cultural dynamic 
and the second induced by a commercial imperative.
LINGUA MEDIA
In 2001, Lev Manovich, a Russian theorist working in San Diego, USA, pub-
lished  The Language of New Media, a voluminous study of digital media. Using 
concepts  and theoretical  tools  from engineering and the  humanities,  mostly 
computer science and visual studies, he devises a theory of what he calls 'new 
media', overall corresponding to computed or digital technology and content. 
Instead of imposing  an a priori  method or framework, Manovich designs his 
theory from the ground up, a method which he terms digital materialism (refer-
ring to Marx, and possibly his own Soviet Russian background). He aims to de-
scribe the nature of digital technology, to “scrutinize the principles of computer 
hardware and software and the operations involved in creating cultural objects 
on a computer to uncover a new cultural logic at work” (10). For Manovich, 
cinema was the technology that paved the way for new media in that it suc-
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ceeded in making abstraction of the relation between carrier and content for the 
first time.18 Film samples time twenty-four times per second, realizing a concep-
tual break from the continuous to the discrete. For new media, “All that re-
mained was to take this already discrete representation and to quantify it” (50). 
Upon this numerical basis, various levels of structuring have been constructed 
so that the computer has become able to manipulate different types of informa-
tion and representation creating what Manovich calls “a new medium – the 
meta-medium of the digital computer” (6).
Like Janet Murray (see above), Manovich identifies a number of funda-
mental principles of new media which he derives from computer scientific con-
cepts (48). There are five in all: numerical representation, modularity, automa-
tion, variability and transcoding. Numerical representation refers to the discrete and 
quantifiable nature of digital representation. Analog media create a material im-
age on, for example, magnetic carriers like tapes or discs. Digital media, on the 
other hand, contain a numerical description, a series of instructions and data 
which can be transcribed for various uses.  Modularity refers to what Manovich 
calls “the fractal structure of new media” (30), the fact that media elements in a 
digital  environment are always represented in similar modular structures,  i.e. 
collections of discrete samples (pixels, polygons etc.).  Automation refers to the 
fact that computer processes can be programmed and hence acquire a certain 
independence from their creator. New media can, to an extent, be made to act 
on their own and will do so in often unexpected ways. Manovich's fourth ele-
ment,  variability, is a variation on the previous, referring to the fact that digital 
media need not be fixed; they can exist in different versions and can be conver-
ted automatically from one version to another. Transcoding, finally, refers to the 
computer's  ability  to  convert  different  types  of  media  into  digital  data.  For 
Manovich, transcoding is the most fundamental principle of new media and will 
change the way in which we create, receive and understand culture. Arguably, it 
is also his most problematic one, however, as he fails to see the technique with-
in a broader perspective. The relation between new media and culture is not 
that of a technology ordaining the transcoding of all instances of human ex-
18 Arguably, this is somewhat of a simplification as discrete symbolic notation exists at least since 
logographic writing systems from around 2000 BC in for example India, Crete, and China.
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pression into its native form, but, inversely, that of a culture carefully but pur-
posefully exploring the possibilities of new forms of representation.
 Like the majority of media studies, Manovich's approach starts from a 
technologically deterministic viewpoint. He describes the creation of computer 
software as an interplay between its use and design on the one hand and the 
broader socio-cultural context on the other. As we work with software, its op-
erations become part of the cognitive arsenal used to understand ourselves and 
the world. “[T]he design of software and the human-computer interface reflects 
a larger social logic, ideology, and imaginary of the contemporary society” (118). 
Manovich does not practice what he preaches however. His main strategy is to 
identify functional principles of computer hard- and software and use them to 
uncover a new 'cultural' logic at work in new media (10). Moreover, when dis-
cussing transcoding, he goes even further in that he foresees that the computer-
ization of culture will gradually accomplish “similar transcoding in relation to all 
[my italics] cultural categories and concepts. That is, cultural categories and con-
cepts are substituted, on the level of meaning and/or language, by new ones 
that derive from the computer’s ontology, epistemology and pragmatics. New 
media thus acts as a forerunner of this more general process of reconceptualiza-
tion” (47). This is rather difficult to believe however. When looking at today's 
networked media, for example, there are digital newspapers, e-books, webcasts, 
animated cartoons,  streaming movies,  games etc.  When looking at  graphical 
user interfaces, there are desktops, windows, buttons, addresses, menus, docu-
ments, folders and so forth. These are all cultural categories used to address 
computing issues, not the other way around. Admittedly, they are shaped by the 
technology in which they are used, but in nature they are cultural. In a similar 
way, computer games are very much reflections of our cultural understanding 
of the world: cars are driven, doors opened, criminals caught etc. Computer 
games are human experiences shaped according to technological constraints, 
not technology shaping human experience. Undeniably, like every form of rep-
resentation, computing imposes constraints on its own development. Claiming 
that it determines its own form and function, however, is naive and incorrect. 
We are not witnessing the digitization of culture, but the cultural development 
of digital technology into a powerful means of human expression.
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One final argument that  must  be put forward against  Manovich's  new 
media theory is that it is trying to do too much. In one go, he speaks about spe-
cial  effects  in films,  digital  animation, websites,  computer games and virtual 
reality relying on a handful of technological principles. Cultural production is a 
much  too  complex  phenomenon  to  be  reduced  to  a  few  linear  variables 
however.  Moreover,  by  referring  to  new media,  Manovich  tends  to  drive  a 
wedge between older technologies and techniques on one side and digital rep-
resentation on the other. The majority of 'new media' show more similarities 
with their analog forefathers than with one another however: webcasts with ra-
dio, streaming with television, computer games with board games and sports 
etc. As Espen Aarseth observes (1997: 19), media are far from neutral, incon-
sequential carriers of information, but the essentialist idea of a 'computer medi-
um' as a singular structure of well-defined properties of communication is un-
tenable. Computer technology can sustain different types of media with highly 
distinctive characteristics. This pluralism avoids the trap of technological de-
terminism and allows to “see the technology as an ongoing process of, rather 
than a cause of, human expression.” There is not one medium of the computer 
game.  “Games  are,  at  best,  a  somewhat  definable  cultural  genre”  (Aarseth 
2004a, see also 2001b).
3. COMPUTER GAMES AS CULTURAL FORM
In Culture and Society (1958), Raymond Williams pleads that culture be accepted 
as ordinary – by which he means basic, close to daily life – rather than high and 
exalted. Every culture has its own shape, its own purposes and its own mean-
ings which are expressed in institutions, arts and learning. Creating and main-
taining a society is a matter of finding common meanings and directions, its de-
velopment an active debate and amendment  lead by experience, contact and 
discovery. Two elements work together in this process: one traditional, consist-
ing of known meanings and forms; and one creative, the active pursuit of new 
meanings  and directions.  'Culture'  conjoins  these  two aspects,  which at  the 
same time function in society as a whole and in each individual member. In 
Television: Technology and Cultural Form (1974), Williams further elaborates on his 
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views and develops a theory on the relation between culture and technology. 
Whereas most research at the time dealt with the influence information techno-
logy has on society, Williams takes a firm stance against this one-way perspect-
ive by stating that media are not so much determined by technological factors 
as  they  are  a  cultural  form,  a  human development  brought  forth  by  social 
change and cultural insight. In Williams' view, technology does not function ex-
ternal to the development of meanings and practices in a society, and neither is 
it dictating them. It is a factor within and at the same time a result of the con-
tinuous debate and amendment which leads a culture in a certain direction.
Also in 1958, Roger Caillois publishes  Les jeux et les hommes, in which he 
analyzes the anthropological phenomenon of 'play' in the broadest sense – re-
ferring to children's play, but also to games of chance, sports, dance, rite etc. 
Whereas Johan Huizinga in  Homo Ludens some twenty years earlier provocat-
ively claimed that culture as a whole is a product of the human desire to play – 
in that it is simultaneously liberty, invention, fantasy, and discipline – Caillois 
takes a more moderate point of view (58). To him, it is clear that any attempt to 
define culture by referring solely to the principle of play would be a “rash and 
probably fallacious undertaking” (66). What he does accept, however, is that 
games can serve as a cultural indicator, as an object of study used to better un-
derstand a culture's underlying semantic patterns and provide indications as to 
the preferences,  weaknesses,  and strengths of a given society at  a particular 
stage in its evolution (83). He postulates a reciprocal relationship between a so-
ciety and the games it likes to play, an affinity between the latter's rules and the 
common characteristics  and  deficiencies  of  the  members  of  different  social 
groups. The games played in a given culture reflect its “tendencies, tastes, and 
ways of thought that are prevalent, while, at the same time, in educating and 
training the players in these very virtues or eccentricities, they subtly confirm 
them in their habits and preferences” (82). Games are a mirror of society: they 
reflect hidden fears, desires and preoccupations, and at the same time, being a 
cultural reflection, they play a significant role in the generation and confirma-
tion of cultural meanings and practices.
In his classification, Caillois distinguishes between four types of games 
(some examples are my own): games driven by (a)  competition (agôn), e.g. foot-
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ball, racing, chess; (b) chance (alea), e.g. dice, poker, lottery; (c) pretense (mimicry), 
e.g. playing family, carnival, theater; and (d)  vertigo (ilinx), e.g. dancing, roller-
coasting, benji-jumping (12). These categories are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, the board game Monopoly {Charles Darrow 1935} is based on chance 
(throwing dice),  but it  also incorporates elements of action and competition 
(building houses, making sure someone else cannot buy all streets of the same 
color), and pretense when exchanging cards or negotiating sales. As for com-
puter games, it can be argued that all four types of play are present in some 
way. Most computer game genres such as sports, racing, platform, shooting etc. 
are action-based. Other genres such as card and puzzle games, virtual gambling 
etc. are based on chance. The degree to which pretense is a factor in computer 
games is a rather complex and contested matter which is dealt with more ex-
tensively in the third chapter on simulating a self. For the moment, suffice it to 
say that in most action, strategy and simulation games, the player assumes an 
in-game identity through which she directs her actions within the virtual world 
(introjection). Hence, within the game, she pretends to be her game character 
or avatar. When looking for elements of vertigo, finally, it can be argued that 
there are none as the computer game player's body remains stationary.19 This is 
only true in case of an unimaginative and literal transposition of the notion 
however.  Most  action  games,  particularly  since  real-time  three-dimensional 
graphics have appeared on the scene, place much emphasis on engaging and 
highly immersive special-effects provoking emotions and excitement akin to ac-
tual vertigo.
For Caillois, the presence and popularity of certain types of play in a cul-
ture forms an indication as to the meanings and values this culture supports. A 
cultural preference for games of chance (alea), for example, indicates a strong 
awareness of the limitations of the human will and of man's inability to realize 
his desires and fantasies all by himself. This type of society places a strong em-
19 Some computer game technologies require the player to move her body, which is registered by 
the computer as input and used in the virtual gaming environment. A well-known example is 
Konami's Dance Dance Revolution {1998} in which the player has to perform pre-choreographed 
series of movements on a platform with colored squares and arrows that indicate the move-
ments to make. In 2003, Sony launched the Eye Toy, a camera and microphone that registers 
the player's sound and movement which are used in the game on screen. Typical Eye Toy 
games involve dancing, singing or simple actions like catching virtual objects.
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phasis on the individual's dependence on her environment, on powers she can-
not control, and it is more inclined towards religious submission and accept-
ance of destiny (18).  Cultures which favor games of action and competition 
(agôn),  on the other hand,  believe in man's  will  to succeed.  These societies 
place more emphasis on personal responsibility and success, both of which are 
seen as a vindication and confirmation of cultural values. An individual growing 
up within an agôn-centered culture, although he may not be consciously aware, 
is imbued with an urge to respond to the pressure to compete, to prevail over 
other competitors and be successful both in play and in everyday life. Further in 
the book Caillois gives the example of a classification of cultures based on the 
type of games they play. Primitive Australian, American and African societies, 
for example, which Caillois refers to as 'dionysian' are societies ruled by masks 
and possession, i.e. by pretense (mimicry) and vertigo (ilinx). Societies closer to 
our own such as that of the Incas, Assyrians, Chinese or Romans are more or-
derly, more rationally organized according to systems of thought featuring of-
fices, careers, codes, with fixed and hierarchical privileges in which competition 
(agôn) and chance (alea) prevail (87). 
The main thesis of this study is that computer simulation and games are a 
cultural form and that, as such, they can tell us something about the culture in 
which we are living. In this section, I further elaborate on this claim and present 
a number of issues which will be further developed in later chapters. To begin 
with, I look at Neil Postman's dystopian view on the relation between culture 
and technology in the history of humanity. I comment upon this theory and de-
bunk it on the basis that it presupposes a strict separation between culture and 
technology and subscribes  to a  deterministic  view on development.  Next,  I 
present an alternative, constructivist perspective on the development of techno-
logy which is grounded on the observation that technology develops within so-
ciety and depends upon its structures and ways of understanding. Third, I re-
main within the same argumentation, but zoom in from technology at large to 
information technology,  confront Marshall  McLuhan's  deterministic  view on 
media evolution with more constructivist  analyses such as that  of Raymond 
Williams and Brian Winston, and give examples of what a constructivist analysis 
of computer simulation and games could look like. Finally, I tread on more hy-
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pothetical grounds and pose the question whether there are not more funda-
mental correspondences between computer games and contemporary western 
society than just the form of play. My argument is that computer games as real-
time state-machine simulations reflect our present-day obsession with control 
over the 'now'.
TECHNOLOGY GIVETH AND TECHNOLOGY TAKETH AWAY
In Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (1992), Neil Postman proposes 
a history of mankind in terms of the relation between culture and technology. 
Within this history he distinguishes between three phases in technological de-
velopment: tool-use, technocracy and technopoly. Tool-using cultures are charac-
terized by the fact that they produce tools for two reasons: to solve specific and 
urgent problems of physical life: e.g. water power, windmills, the heavy wheeled 
plow etc.; or to serve the symbolic world of art, politics, myth, ritual, and reli-
gion: e.g. castles,  cathedrals, books etc. (23).  In these cultures, technology is 
produced to serve the dignity and integrity of the culture in which it is used, 
and culture operates independently from technology basing itself on humanistic 
principle. In a technocracy, however, Postman's second stage, this is no longer so. 
In the Middle Ages a number of inventions emerged which tipped the power-
balance.  As  examples,  Postman  puts  forward  the  mechanical  clock,  which 
changed the human conception of time; the printing press with movable type, 
which reduced the importance of the oral tradition; and the telescope, which 
challenged  fundamental  propositions  of  Judeo-Christian  theology  (28-29). 
Whereas in tool-using cultures, technology was still subjected to cultural prin-
ciple, in a technocracy, it is beginning to define its own, independent role as a 
way of ameliorating the standard of living. Technological development moves 
from the periphery to the center of cultural life, increasingly subjecting the so-
cial and symbolic spheres to its requirements (28). In Postman's view, the ma-
jority of modern nations – most of Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia etc. – are 
technocracies.
The third and final stage in Postman's history is that of technopoly – a phase 
which, until now, has only been entered by one nation, i.e. the USA. In a tech-
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nopoly, human culture is definitively subordinated to the technological imperat-
ive (48); all systems of thought which present themselves as an alternative to 
the strictly rational pursuit for growth and efficiency are eliminated just as the 
World State eliminated all alternatives to itself in Aldous Huxley's  Brave New 
World {1932}. “It does not make them illegal. It does not make them immoral. 
It does not even make them unpopular. It makes them invisible and therefore 
irrelevant” (Postman 1992: 48).20 During the second half of the nineteenth and 
the twentieth century,  science and technology began to make progress at an 
ever increasing pace and traditional systems of thought came under siege. Karl 
Marx subjected free will to historical dialectics (1867); Friedrich Nietzsche de-
clared God dead (1885); Sigmund Freud claimed our conscious self to be only a 
thin layer on top of the larger subconscious (1899); Albert Einstein showed that 
even certainties like space and time are relative (1905); and John Watson ana-
lyzed human behavior in terms of stimulus - response (1913). Amidst this con-
ceptual  debris,  Postman  finds  man  looking  for  something  to  hold  on  to, 
something to believe in, and the only certainties left are science and technology 
in themselves. “Whatever else may be denied or compromised, it is clear that 
airplanes do fly, antibiotics do cure, radios do speak, and (...) computers do cal-
culate  and never  make mistakes”  (55).  Technopoly  is  the  final  stage  in the 
gradual  submission  of  culture  to  technology.  Technology  is  deified:  culture 
takes its orders, seeks its authorization and finds its satisfactions in technology. 
RESISTANCE IS FUTILE
Postman's theory is problematic in several respects however. A first weakness is 
the implicit belief that culture and technology are separate entities, that there is, 
on the one hand, human cultural development in literature, art, ethics, religion 
etc. and on the other, functioning from and within a different realm, technolo-
gical development in mechanics, electronics, computing, engineering, chemistry 
etc. Within this opposition, for Postman, technological development is the neg-
20 Arguably, Huxley's World State would do all of these things however. Giving birth to children, 
for example, is made illegal, immoral and unpopular through automated conditioning during 
sleep, and invisible by keeping 'savages' who still give birth to their children in reserves far away 
from the majority of World State citizens.
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atively marked term. Whereas culture is seen as a product of man, something 
created by and for him in order to find his way in life, technology is described 
as something alien to human culture, something that comes from outside only 
to force its will upon society. This differentiation, which is related to the histor-
ical  opposition  between subject  and object,  mind and body,  is  not  realistic 
however. First of all, culture is technical: it relies on technology for its creation, 
not just in terms of production and distribution, but also within its very struc-
tural  layout  consisting  of  complex systems of  codes,  conventions and tech-
niques. Art, literature, religion etc are elaborate structures of understanding and 
are as such rational constructions as are material technologies. Secondly, as is 
my main claim in this study, technology is also cultural, a product constrained 
by reality, but inherently a human creation only made possible by human under-
standing, effort and desire.
Furthermore, because he makes a strict separation between the cultural 
and  the  technological  sphere,  Postman  is  forced  to  posit  the  latter  as  an 
autonomous agent of transformation, a power which functions outside of soci-
ety and which responds only to its own inner laws. This makes Postman's the-
ory technologically deterministic. Technology is treated as a given, something of 
which the form and function cannot be questioned. Only its impact on society 
can be measured, the effects it has on the way man conducts his life. Technolo-
gical determinism is related to the religious idea of predestination. There is only 
one  direction  into  which  technology  can  develop  and  that  path  is  fixed. 
Whichever  decision  scientists  make,  the  course  of  science  is  determined. 
Moreover, inevitably, at the end of that course lies a final judgment, a verdict of 
the higher power which speaks to man through technology. This will either res-
ult in his salvation, a return to paradise or in damnation, everlasting hardship. 
Technology is either the right path or the wrong one. Either way, there is no es-
cape. Man is impotent and only at the very end of the road he will know his 
destination.  For this reason deterministic theories tend to be either utopian, 
seeing technology as a force of liberation, empowerment or both (cf. the Inter-
net hype of the late 1990s) or gravely dystopian, viewing technology as a 'malin 
génie', an evil genius feeding upon human invention and creativity in order to 
become stronger and eventually subordinate man to its will. Technology is seen 
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as something that must either be renounced or believed in, as if it were a reli-
gious revelation. Needless to say that I do not base my research on the determ-
inistic paradigm. In the next subsection, I deal with an alternative, i.e. a con-
structivist view on technological development.
Somewhat paradoxically, Postman's response to technopoly is heroic per-
sonal resistance. He summons those who still can, to become “loving resistance 
fighters” (182), and to spread opposition through education (185). What he fails 
to do, however, is offer a theoretical alternative to his own three-step evolution 
towards cultural self-annihilation. Man should resist the technological and eco-
nomic imperative, but there is no way that he can escape from it. Because tech-
nology is something that develops outside the grasp of culture, its course is un-
alterable and one can only declare war against it and fight it till the bitter end. 
This line of thought is based on false premises, however, and guided by fear in-
stead of rational understanding. Technology is a product of and for mankind 
and if at one point it fails to conform to this role, this is because man elevated it 
to a higher position. If indeed the economic imperative in the USA is becoming 
too poignant and technopoly is looming, this is not due to higher logic, but to 
social development. If American society is being organized so rationally that 
there is no more room for human intuition and culture, as Postman claims, this 
is not because of some inner technological law, but because man has pushed 
society in this direction believing it would benefit him. Economy is a human 
creation, a conglomerate of systems working together in order to solve a human 
problem, i.e. scarcity. If, at one point, this system derails and begins causing 
problems in itself, it is unhelpful either to uncritically accept this fact or blindly 
resist it. Rather, it would be the time to debunk the myth that technological de-
velopment is predestined and begin altering its course.
A CONSTRUCTIVIST ALTERNATIVE
Since the 1980s, a constructivist alternative to technological determinism has 
been gaining ground in the United Kingdom and Europe. Various schools such 
as 'Social Shaping of Technology' (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1985) and 'Social 
Construction Of Technology' (Pinch & Bijker 1987) challenge the privileged 
CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY          57
status often granted to technological development in social discourse. Instead 
of treating technology as a given, constructivist researchers analyze the various 
factors at work in its construction, revealing that technology is not so much a 
predestined path determined by objective reality as a social process constrained 
by it. Constructivist research rejects the post-enlightenment, deterministic tradi-
tion which does not problematize technological change, but limits the scope of 
inquiry to monitoring the social adjustments it entails (Williams & Edge 1996: 
866). It demonstrates that technology does not develop according to an inner 
technical logic, but is instead a social product, patterned by the conditions of its 
production  and use.  Technological  development  is  a  continuous  process  of 
variation and selection following multiple directions rather than one fixed path. 
Every stage in the creation and implementation of new technologies involves a 
set of choices between technical options (Pinch & Bijker 1987: 28). Apart from 
narrowly technical considerations, a range of social factors influence which op-
tions are selected and shape the content of the technology and its social implic-
ations (Williams & Edge 1996: 866). Technology never emerges from or into a 
vacuum. It develops the way it does because of its specific historical context, 
and it succeeds or fails in large part due to that same context (Williams 2003). 
Constructivism pushes  to  go beyond seeing technology as  a  reflection of  a 
single rationale like the economic or technological imperative and gives credit 
to technological development by recognizing it as the complex cultural dynamic 
it presents.
Constructivist studies restore the notion of intention. There are 'choices' 
(sometimes conscious, sometimes not) inherent in the design of individual arti-
facts and systems, and in the direction and trajectory of innovation programs. 
Technology does not emerge from the unfolding of a predetermined logic or a 
single determinant. It is a 'garden of forking paths' where different routes are 
available, potentially leading to different technological and cultural  outcomes 
(Williams & Edge 1996: 866). Innovation is a contradictory and uncertain pro-
cess which cannot be reduced to a rational/technical process of problem-solv-
ing. It involves economic processes and building alliances of interests among 
supplier firms, technologists, potential users, funding bodies and so forth with 
the necessary resources and technical expertise developing visions of as yet un-
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realized  technologies  (873).  The  constructivist  paradigm is  at  its  best  when 
aimed at specific fields or artifacts. Whereas deterministic theories are readily 
available when a broad, generalizing explanation is required, the constructivist 
framework is a powerful descriptive device which analyzes the impact of vari-
ous contextual factors on the development of concrete artifacts. To sum up, 
constructivist  research describes the ways  in which social,  institutional,  eco-
nomic and cultural factors shape the direction and rate of innovation, the form 
of a technology, and the outcomes of technological change for different groups 
in society (868).
Technological constructivism is united by an insistence that the black box 
of technology should be opened to allow social, economic and cultural patterns 
embedded in both the content of technologies and the processes of innovation 
to be exposed and analyzed (866). It stresses the negotiability of technology, 
highlighting how particular groups and forces shape technologies to meet their 
ends. This, in turn, raises questions about irreversibility, the extent to which 
technological choices may be foreclosed (867). Constructivism sets out to integ-
rate natural and social science concerns, describing the relationship between sci-
entific excellence, technological innovation and economic and social well-being. 
It aims to emancipate science and technology and dismantle their privileging as 
inevitable or standing outside or above society (867). Thus it aims to broaden 
the political agenda by making proposals regarding the promotion and manage-
ment of technological change (865). “No more mere tinkering at the margins of 
technology policy, seeking to grapple with its products but leaving unaltered the 
direction and goals of innovation” (868-869). Technology is neither an oppon-
ent to be fought nor a deity to be worshiped: it is a human creation which 
should be made to reflect human interest both in the short and the long term, 
helping man to live in harmony with his environment, not be a cause of disrup-
tion.21
21 An example of an international political agenda that is based on technological constructivist 
thought is the Kyoto protocol. Negotiations between more than 160 nations to reduce green-
house gas emissions started in 1992 on the Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
were agreed upon in Japan in 1997. An example of a concrete policy relating to energy saving is 
the European Union energy labeling  scheme. Since 1995, refrigerators and freezers and later 
washing machines, dryers and dish washers have to carry an energy label giving information 
about their performance and physical characteristics. The appliance's relative energy efficiency 
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MEDIA DETERMINISM
In 1964, Marshall McLuhan introduced the concept of 'media' and gave birth to 
the academic field of 'media studies' in his visionary work Understanding Media. 
As  a  reaction to the literary-historical  scholarship  that  dominated Toronto's 
graduate English department at  the time (Theall  1971),  McLuhan, himself  a 
schooled literary scholar, proclaimed the precedence of technology over its con-
tent in his famous aphorism 'the medium is the message' (7). In a period when 
information was increasingly being produced and received in visual, rather than 
written form, his theory filled an important gap legitimating the work of a fast-
growing group of advertisers, media directors, communication researchers and 
avant-garde artists. McLuhan succeeded in catching the optimism and spiritual 
vibe of the 1960s and translate it into vague yet suggestive theory. To him, me-
dia are extensions of the human senses: radio allows you to hear distant sound, 
television to see far-away events. As such, they are bionic prostheses for boost-
ing human perception. But it does not stop there. For McLuhan, many if not all 
technologies are fit to qualify as a medium: a shovel as an extension to the 
hand, a car as one to the feet etc. Telecommunications, for example, are seen as 
an extension to but also as an externalization of the human nervous system, 
turning the world into one large organism, a 'global village'. McLuhan sees tech-
nology as a way of extending man's abilities on the material and, as would be-
come increasingly clear later in his career, on the spiritual plane. In his work, 
media acquire a divine status. Electric light, the “purest medium of all” (1997: 
8), devoid of message, is identified as a godly light, technology as a force lead-
ing humanity to salvation.
In later years, McLuhan develops a more systematic basis for his media 
theory, which he terms the 'tetrad', and which consists of four laws framed as 
questions. “What does it (the medium or technology) extend?”; “What does it 
make obsolete?”; “What is retrieved?”; and “What does the technology reverse 
into if it is over-extended?” (McLuhan & Powers 1989). When fitting the inven-
tion of the automotive car into this framework, for example, one interpretation 
is indicated using a color scheme and a letter mark from A to G. By introducing this obligation, 
the constraints against which engineers develop their prototypes are altered and consumers are 
enabled to take the new variable into consideration when deciding which technology to buy.
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could be that it has extended the human ability to move from one place to an-
other, say the feet; that it has made the horse and carriage obsolete; that speed, 
endurance and ease of maintenance have been retrieved; and that, when over-
extended, it could reverse into something we can no longer live without, mak-
ing us unfit to organize our lives without it. Interesting enough, but where does 
man, as the inventor and creator of technology fit into this picture? In all four 
laws of the tetrad, the subject is technology. Every once in a while, a new tech-
nology introduces itself to mankind, shows them how it can extend their abilit-
ies, takes away their previous extensions, and makes them dependent on it. This 
is a fallacy however. Technology does not appear out of the blue. It is the res-
ult, usually of decades of cultural, social and technological developments in a 
certain direction guided by human needs and desires.  Technology is  not  an 
autonomous agent; it is cultural form.
MEDIA CONSTRUCTIVISM
In  Television: Technology and Cultural Form, Raymond Williams reacts against the 
McLuhan doctrine. He notes that media theorists invariably see technology as 
an autonomous agent in society and that they either defend a deterministic or a 
symptomatic view on technological development. Like determinism, the symp-
tomatic paradigm places technological development outside the socio-cultural 
sphere, although it does assign a minor, post factum, evaluative role to it. After 
a technology has been developed, it is introduced to the public, by whom it is 
evaluated and if it responds to a latent cultural or psychological inadequacy, it 
will be successful and the inadequacy will be alleviated (12). Despite it being 
more accurate as to the role of society in the development of technology, Willi-
ams rejects symptomatism on the basis that it fails to recognize the constructed 
nature of the technological artifact, the fact that it is a human creation brought 
forth as a response to human needs and wishes. For him, the debate between 
determinism and symptomatism is sterile as both positions, albeit in a different 
way, have abstracted technology from society. New technologies are claimed to 
be invented in a vacuum and then introduced into an alien and unsuspecting 
society. Williams rejects this abstraction and calls for the restoration of human 
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intention in the process of research and development so that technology can be 
described as a response to known social needs, purposes and practices (14).
In 1986, an even more violent attack on McLuhanism was staged by the 
historian Brian Winston and published with the difficult to misunderstand title 
Misunderstanding Media. In this extensive study of the socio-cultural factors in-
volved in the invention and marketing of the telephone, television, computer 
and satellite,  Winston rejects the idea of an 'information revolution'  and re-
places it with 'information evolution'. The blurb on the cover is clear enough: 
“[Winston] argues that  the information revolution is an illusion, a rhetorical 
gambit, an expression of profound historical ignorance, and a movement dedic-
ated to purveying misunderstanding and disseminating disinformation.” Win-
ston charges against what he calls a “profound tendency to historical amnesia,” 
which is often accompanied by the assertion that “the pace of change is now so 
fast as to be uncontrollable or that 'nobody could predict' this or that develop-
ment” (15). By minutely analyzing the historical context in which various tech-
nologies appeared, Winston describes how, for example, the possibilities of us-
ing electricity for signaling developed virtually hand-in-hand with the growth of 
scientific knowledge on the subject. Similarly, the development of photography 
has continuously reflected the understanding of the effects light has on various 
substances, an item which has been on the scientific agenda since the Middle 
Ages. Winston also notes that many inventions such as the telegraph, television 
and transistors have been thought of before they were actualized, from which 
He concludes that technological development is not so much an autonomous 
force as a response to human needs. Scientists and technologists depend on 
fundamental  understanding  of  both  general  and  scientific  matters  for  their 
work. They are exponents of both the general culture and the scientific tradi-
tion in which they were educated.
CONSTRUCTIVIST GAME STUDIES
In this study, I employ a constructivist framework for the description of com-
puter simulation and games whereby I take into account not just technological 
factors but also elements from the socio-historical and cultural context of their 
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development. Whilst I accept technological limitations as constraints in the de-
velopment process,  I do not see them as determining factors.  I reject Janet 
Murray and Lev Manovich's idea that the shaping of digital artifacts can be ana-
lyzed by looking at a strict number of technological principles such as discrete-
ness or interactivity. As I argue in the next chapter, it is correct that computer 
simulation is a form of discrete, mathematical modeling and as such favors the 
representation of elements of reality whose structure resembles its underlying 
technology most closely: spatial simulation and conflict rather than associative 
narrative development for example. This does not mean, however, that com-
puter simulation and games are determined by technology. On the lowest level, 
computer processing consists of machine code changing the state of endless ar-
rays of bits and bytes, but with each abstraction layer constructed on top of this 
binary core (programming languages, object definitions, scripting, graphical in-
terfaces, physical reality engines etc.) computer simulation moves further away 
from its machine nature into the realm of human representation. As I will show 
in the next chapter,  the basic characteristics of computing are never too far 
away when analyzing a simulation – just like one can see the lines on a painting 
and the letters in a book. The truly distinguishing characteristics of the form, 
however, can only be attributed to cultural factors.
A second group of elements that I take into account in my analysis are so-
cio-historical. Thereby both the context in which computer games are produced 
and that in which they are received or 'consumed' can be of significance. For 
example, Steve Russell's Space War (1962), the mainframe game usually appoin-
ted as the first computer game, was developed at the height of the Space Race 
between the USA and the Soviet Union at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, one of America's main research facilities not just for computing, but 
also space research. Hence it should not come as a surprise that Space War was 
set in outer space, using algorithms devised for simulating various physical phe-
nomena relevant to space faring. Space War's influence on computer simulation 
and games is difficult to overestimate. Not only did it introduce the space flight 
theme, but it also played a major role in the introduction of the more general 
spatial metaphor into computing, an idea which, decades later, would lead to 
the conception of ideas such as cyberspace, virtual reality, but also the graphical 
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desktop and the 'information highway'. Furthermore, the actual 'ludic' layout of 
Space  War lends  itself  to  analysis  against  its  historical  context.  The  game 
presents two spaceships, one lean and mean on the left (Needle or Pencil) and 
one large but somewhat unwieldy looking on the right (Wedge). In the middle 
of the screen, there is a small planet (sometimes referred to as a sun) which at-
tracts the spaceships who are to battle one another by turning, thrusting their 
engines  and  shooting  their  missiles.  Several  observers  have  suggested  that 
Needle is actually the American space effort and Wedge that of the Soviets, 
their  shape  metaphorically  representing  their  land  sizes.  The  planet  in  the 
middle is our own and the game as a whole a symbolical representation of the 
anxiety towards what the space race could turn out to be. 
An example of social context at the other end of the chain, i.e. that of re-
ception by the market place playing a role in the shaping of early computer 
games is the fact that, initially, they were placed in bars and amusement halls 
where they were influenced by the existing form of the already popular pinball 
machine. Nolan Bushnell, the man behind the first commercially successful ar-
cade game Pong {1972} and the founder of Atari, was an electrical engineering 
student when he took a summer job at a carnival. He had seen Space War at col-
lege and decided to build a cheaper version which could be fitted in an arcade 
cabinet. Computer Space {1971}, a Space War clone, was not a commercial success 
probably due to its complexity, but its successor  Pong became the father of a 
now multi-billion dollar industry. Early arcade game machines were placed in 
cafés and shopping malls next to pinball machines which had existed since the 
1930s {Raymond Maloney  1931}.  As  could  be  expected,  the  newly  arrived 
computer games were built in  such a way that they resembled the established 
form. They were meant to appeal to the same public, function in the same so-
cial context and collect comparable returns. Thus arcade game machines were 
fitted with the same quarter slots as pinball machines, inherited their reward 
system using points and high scores, their three-ball paradigm which became 
three lives and the possibility to gain extra ones by playing special levels or col-
lecting valuable items. Thus early computer games did not have the epic pro-
portions  which they would  require  a  decade  later  after  the  development  of 
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home computing, and, significantly, it was not due to technical restrictions but 
to the social and commercial context in which they were meant to operate.
CULTURAL CONTEXT
The main focus of this study is on the cultural factors which have influenced 
the shaping of computer simulation and games, however, the formal and func-
tional relations maintained by their technology and content with other cultural 
forms and practices. When looking at action computer game genres, for ex-
ample, obvious relations include various real-world action sports and games of 
skill in which agility and dexterity determine how successful the contestant is. 
When zooming in on specific genres such as racing and shooting games, there 
are also other relations that deserve mentioning. Racing games, for example, 
refer  to  the  sometimes  seemingly  endless  chasing  scenes  in  popular  action 
movies and can be seen as being announced by them. Similarly, shooting games 
resemble shootouts in Westerns, for example, presenting the player with large 
numbers of thugs with highly inadequate shooting skills and the remarkable fea-
ture of dropping dead on the spot after taking one bullet. The space ship theme 
was inspired by the actual Space Race against the Soviets. Later versions would 
incorporate various themes from popular science fiction such as alien attack 
and robot or more generally machine insurrection. A final influence, whose im-
portance is difficult to overestimate is Japanese popular culture. Since the de-
mise of Atari in the 1980s, the computer game industry has been dominated by 
Japanese corporations such as Nintendo, Sega and later Sony. One important 
tradition they brought to the table was martial arts, which was already a popular 
theme in Japanese action films and which would prosper in the so-called beat-
em-up computer game genre. Finally, it was also Japanese influence, via Ninten-
do's  Donkey Kong {Shigeru Miyamoto 1981} and offspring which would intro-
duce the first computer game characters, heavily stylized after manga and anime 
examples into the platform genre (see also chapter 4 on avatarial introjection).
Computer game genres such as text- action- and point 'n' click adventures 
are heavily influenced by the Western narrative tradition. They introduce char-
acters,  usually  through a background story,  a  narrative  conflict  between the 
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player-character and a dark force and propose an exit strategy, a way of lifting 
the conflict. Then the player is urged to step into the identity role prepared for 
him (see also chapter 4 on introjection) and resolve the main narrative conflict 
by engaging in a number of episodic subplots. Computer role-playing games on 
the other hand have their own cultural heritage in card and live role-playing 
games in which people would gather, take on the role of a mage, a rogue or a 
warrior and set out on a quest lead by the dungeon master and his rule-book, a 
quest of which the outcome would be determined by collecting valuables, learn-
ing skills and magic and long rounds of dice-throwing. The most important 
predecessor to computer role-playing was  Gary Gygax's  Dungeons and Dragons 
{1974}, whose quantitative approach to almost  every aspect of the fictional 
universe would have enormous influence on computer gaming. (I go deeper 
into this in the next chapter when discussing mathematical modeling.) The ori-
gins of strategy games, finally, can be traced over board games like Monopoly and 
Risk {Albert Lamorisse 1957} to war games (Kriegspiele) as they were played 
by Prussian officers in the nineteenth century. 
To conclude this discussion of the constructivist approach to game stud-
ies, I propose to illustrate it by way of a short exemplary analysis of a typical 
element of the computer game form, i.e. the existence of separations between 
playing subsessions usually referred to as rounds or levels. Of course computer 
games were not the first form to use rounds. Several sports, most notably box-
ing, are organized in stages. Why the technique was actually introduced in com-
puter games is difficult to ascertain, but the best explanation is probably the 
technological. Early computing systems had only very limited computing power 
and memory and could therefore interpret only a limited set of instructions in 
one go. Hence when all computer-controlled entities were killed by the player, 
the game designer was forced to present a new, even greater challenge. Because 
of  the technological  limitations  which he faced,  the  easiest  solution was  to 
simply reintroduce, sometimes in slightly altered form, the same game but at 
greater speed and therefore higher difficulty. This renewal would be preceded 
by a short break while the system would be reinitializing and then round or 
level two would start.  Later,  computer systems would not have such severe 
technological  restrictions  anymore.  Level  design  would  remain  popular, 
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however, largely because of the social  function it  acquired. Even more than 
points and high scores, levels were a clear indication of skill, a sign which could 
not only be used to set personal goals, but also to communicate past achieve-
ments. “I got to level eight yesterday.” This, like film montage,22 level design, 
which was initially a technological drawback became a cultural code and eventu-
ally a convention.
MIRROR, MIRROR, ON THE WALL
To conclude this chapter, I will consider the possibility of going one step fur-
ther in the analysis of computer simulation and games as a cultural form. That 
is, I would like to look at them as not just a typical product of their day and age, 
but also as a more fundamental 'sign o' the times', something bearing within its 
very structure the interests and preoccupations of the culture in which they de-
veloped. Tentatively, I start my discussion with the observation that the 20th 
century has been characterized by an important shift in our conception of time. 
While the 19th Century was still firmly tied to the historicist perspective, in the 
20th, inspired by the system of industrial production, the cultural focus moved 
from past to present. In 1916, Saussure proclaimed the prevalence of the syn-
chronic over the diachronic perspective. Language and culture were to be stud-
ied as a system functioning in the now, not as a result of yesteryear's changes. 
In structuralist terms, cultural interest shifted from the syntagmatic axis of con-
catenation to the paradigmatic axis of choice. Cultural expression was no longer 
to be seen as a product of tradition but as a sign deriving its meaning from its 
relation to other signs within a system of choice. In this way, it can be said that, 
increasingly, the way twentieth century man saw reality became determined by 
analysis of the different elements constituting the present rather than by narra-
tion of the past. As Jos de Mul observes (2002: 19), Western culture has been 
evolving towards a post-historical conception of time, no longer seeing it as a 
diachronic continuum, but more as a succession of synchronic  'nows'.  As a 
22 Due to the limited length of film strips, early film makers were forced to 'cut up' their film in 
different scenes. Gradually, however, cuts were more and more being used within one scene to 
add weight and meaning to certain events and images. Cutting thus evolved from a technolo-
gical constraint into a basic cinematographic technique: montage (cf. Manovich 2001: 144).
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state machine, the computer can be seen as an exteriorization of this interpreta-
tion and computer modeling as its connate form of representation.
Furthermore, it can be argued that, concomitantly, Western society has 
been organizing itself by issuing rules in the present in order to control the fu-
ture rather than by guaranteeing continuity with the past. Politically, judicially, 
socially, and economically, Western society has placed more and more emphasis 
on rational 'rule-government', on systemic organization of society. Whilst since 
the Enlightenment, society had been increasingly organized appealing to human 
judgment,  the Second World War has made it  clear that  that  would not be 
enough. Human society would be needing a powerful system of rules to fall 
back on in case human judgment would ever be clouded again, a structure not 
so much replacing man as helping him to keep control over himself and his fel-
low citizen. Computer simulation can be seen as a reflection of this view on 
reality and man's role within. As I further develop in the next chapter, com-
puter simulation is a quantitative, rule-based system of behavioral modeling. 
Unlike traditional, fixed, time-based narrative forms, it is a dynamic, spatially 
organized system of entities, each with their own set of quantitatively defined 
variables constantly regenerating and at all times controlling an endless succes-
sion of virtual 'nows'. As a player, you are offered an active role within this sys-
tem. You are urged to introject (cf. chapter 4) yourself into its fictional environ-
ment. At the same time, however, your role is reduced to that of a firmly en-
trenched, quantitatively defined entity. Within the simulated physical environ-
ment you can do anything your role allows you to, but there is no outside that 
role. There is no escape from the system of rules as it is constitutive of your 
very being there. In other words, you are free to push any button you like, but 
there is no way that you can add a new one.
A third and final typical element of twentieth century Western society that 
one can see reflected in computer games is its growing emphasis, not just on 
rule-based arbitration, but on the organization of competition between indi-
viduals and organizations so as to increase efficiency and productivity. An inter-
esting parallel can thereby be drawn between the market principle and com-
puter simulation. Both are quantitative models consisting of abstracted, discrete 
entities whose relations to one another are defined solely on the basis of quanti-
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fication. As such, both are an interpretation of reality, not in words or drawings, 
but in numbers and abstracted signs functioning within one large system of rel-
ative value. Moreover, both systems, because of their numerical and quantitat-
ive but also their reductive nature – their being based on exact rules and linked 
with clear goals – allow for the organization of competition whereby every con-
testant has, at least theoretically, an equal chance of winning. By abstracting 
reality away from the play dynamics, man is no longer impeded by his prudence 
and anxiety. There is no ethical responsibility in a game as there is none intrins-
ically for a for-profit corporation: the only goal is to realize growth, to become 
more efficient so as to outclass your opponents. Both the game's rules and its 
goals are defined by the system, delivering man from all responsibilities except 
the ones imposed by the game. As I argue in the third chapter on virtuality, 
rule-based modeling is very much an interpretation in itself, however, an inter-
esting technique which can have its uses in society, but which should not be 
mistaken for that which it is abstracted from, i.e. reality itself.
II
COMPUTER SIMULATION
“Only in mathematics will we find truth.”
Doctor Who, episode 88, Robert Holmes, 1975
Much has been written on the 'nature' of the shift from analog to digital media 
creation and preservation, but only few authors have succeeded in describing 
the transition in such clear, illustrative terms as Timothy Binkley in “Refiguring 
Culture” (1993) and “The Vitality of Digital Creation” (1997). Art, in the sense 
of creative expression, is  typically associated with the imprinting of timeless 
form in material substance, “legacies enshrined in material objects with more 
staying power than mortal flesh” (1993). Artistic creation enables man to imit-
ate  god and produce  artifacts  which exist  independently from their  creator. 
With the invention of the printing press (Laurens Coster early 15th C./Johann 
Gutenberg  1450s);  and  later  technologies  such  as  photography  (Nicéphore 
Niépce  1825/William  Talbot  1835/Louis  Daguerre  1839);  recorded  sound: 
gramophone (Thomas Edison 1877) / phonograph (Charles Cros 1877); film: 
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kinetoscope  (Thomas  Edison  1891)  /  cinématographe  (Lumière  Brothers 
1894);  radio  (Guglielmo  Marconi  1896/Nikola  Tesla  1897);  and  television 
(Philo Farnsworth 1927/Vladimir Zworykin 1929), art became mechanically re-
producible and lost its so-called aura of authenticity and uniqueness (cf. Walter 
Benjamin The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility [1938]). Cop-
ies of an original could be made mechanically by reading and imprinting the 
available information into different material substances, producing an analog 
(not an identical copy, hence these technologies would later be called analog 
media). Analog carriers copy information by transcribing it, by translating its 
image from one physical material onto another. When a picture is transcribed 
into an analog video signal, for example, a particular amount of light is matched 
to a particular amount of current.  Subsequently, when recording this analog 
video signal onto tape, the changing magnitude of the electric current is tran-
scribed into similar changes in the magnitude of a magnetic field.
Whereas analog media record impressions and make imprints in different 
material  carriers,  digital  technologies take measurements and store numerical 
entities.23 When a digital video system, for example, converts light into magnet-
ism, it strips the structure of the physical event away from its underlying sub-
stance and turns the incoming signal into a pure abstraction, a file of numbers 
unattached to any intrinsic material alliance. Digital media convert, rather than 
transcribe the information they preserve. Whilst analog media record informa-
tion in the material disposition of concrete objects, digital technology stores it 
as formal relationships in abstract structures. Copying information from one di-
gital carrier to another does not take place by transcription, by making imprints 
of imprints, but by reading and inscribing the same numerical data each time 
anew. Thus, each digital copy, even if it is many generations away from the ori-
ginal, is still its identical twin. “Once converted from percepts into concepts, 
from material into numbers, information is freed from the infinite regress of 
transcription” (1997: 111). The first sign type to make the move from analog to 
digital was text, which came with the first 'killer-application' for the home com-
23 Amy Divila notes that the move toward a digital ontology of measurement is not exclusively a 
technological matter, but could also be observed in other cultural manifestations such as con-
ceptual art, “an art practice which suggested that the art had traversed from object to idea, from 
a tangible thing to a 'system of thought'” (2002).
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puter next to computer games: text-processing. Later, rudimentary forms of im-
ages and music were introduced, and in the course of the 1990s the moving im-
age migrated. As computers and algorithms grew more powerful, by the turn of 
the millennium, the initially crude forms of digital media had surpassed their 
analog predecessors qualitatively in most areas, turning the computer from a 
dull number-crunching calculator into an almost universal media player. 
Once  digitized,  converted  from  material  representation  into  abstract 
structures and data, information becomes manipulable: it can be analyzed and 
modified virtually. A digital  photograph for example can be loaded into the 
computer's memory and then manipulated using manual tools or automatic fil-
ters. When changing the color balance of a photograph, for example, the com-
puter applies a mathematical algorithm to every element (pixel) in the file and 
then redraws the result on screen. Computer simulation and games are an ex-
treme application of the manipulability of digital information. They consist of 
large  numbers  of  predefined data-structures  (think  photographs)  and an  al-
gorithmic framework (think filters) determining how the entities of the simula-
tion should interact and how the game should evolve from one state to the 
next. In this chapter, I go deeper into the ontological foundations of computer 
simulation and describe how it can be seen as a response to the cultural desire 
for a more quantified and dynamic framework for understanding and represent-
ing reality. 
In the first  section,  I  deal  with the technological  principles underlying 
mathematical modeling, the way in which dynamic structures of quantified data 
are used to represent reality. I define computer simulation as an approximative 
model set in motion. I describe its internal structure as consisting of entities, 
states and events. I evaluate its specificity and limitations as a form of repres-
entation. And I identify the course of events in a computer simulation as an 
emergent phenomenon, a structure developing from the myriad of individual 
interactions of its components rather than from a fixed structure. The second 
section is a brief excursion into the field of artificial intelligence. I introduce 
Turing's imitation game, I evaluate Searle's refutation and I look at the systems 
approach, which in turn defies Searle's argument. The third section looks at the 
interpretation process when dealing with computer simulation. My claim is that, 
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despite it being a dynamic, changeable form, it is no more and no less than a 
form of representation and is therefore liable to interpretation. To illustrate this 
point  I  demonstrate  how  strategy  and  simulation  games  are  inevitably  the 
product of a specific, culturally determined world-view and look at propagand-
istic games advertising a political viewpoint. In the fourth and final section, I in-
vestigate how the idea of using measurement for representing reality accords 
with the society and culture in which we live. I look at Turkle's claim that com-
puting has gone through a transformation from calculation to simulation and 
evaluate the dangers of placing too much emphasis on modeling and quantifica-
tion by evaluating Baudrillard's claim that our society and culture are slowly 
turning into simulations themselves due to their reliance on modeling and rep-
resentation as opposed to actual reality. I reject this point of view, however, by 
pointing to the fact that a society in transformation is likely to develop new 
ways of representing the world and that they should be seen as an opportunity, 
not as a problem.
1. MATHEMATICAL MODELING
The word 'model' comes from Italian 'modello' (diminutive of 'modo':  form, 
shape) meaning 'smaller version' or 'smaller form of' as in 'model airplane'. A 
model of something is at the same time an autonomous object, e.g. a toy or an 
ornament, and a sign referring to its larger, real-world counterpart. It is an arti-
fact which, by having recognizable characteristics evokes a mental representa-
tion of something else. This effect is achieved by imitating certain traits from 
the original such as its proportions and physical abilities (e.g. a Matchbox car 
{Lesney Toys 1952} having the proportions of, say, a Ferrari and small wheels 
so that it can drive somewhat like the real thing). Modeling an object involves 
taking its measurements and recreating its proportions in another form. The 
same model can be drawn on paper, built in wood or simulated by a computer. 
There are several advantages to creating a computer model over a paper or a 
fixed material representation such as cost-effectiveness and manipulability. The 
most important advantage, however, is the fact that it allows for cheap dynamic 
modeling or simulation: the detailed imitation – not just of geometrical shape 
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and color – but also of an object's behavior in various circumstances. Because 
of its ability to calculate myriads of variables in real-time, the computer is the 
ideal tool for the generation and maintenance of mathematical models.
The complexity of a computer model can vary depending on the object or 
system that is represented and the behavioral aspects it is required to imitate. If 
we wanted to describe the constant movement of an object through time, for 
example, a simple equation like [distance = speed * time] would suffice. Real-
world systems, however, tend to be much more complex. In that case, the be-
havior must be estimated with an approximative mathematical model (cf. Smith 
1999: 2-3). When building a computer simulation, a designer selects a number 
of parameters which she believes are relevant in determining a system's behavi-
or, translates them into mathematical functions, programs them into a model 
and runs it. When the behavior of the model is insufficiently similar to that of 
the real-world system, the designer will start again and incorporate more para-
meters or implement them in higher detail. If the similarity is sufficient for the 
purpose of the simulation, the model is retained. Many complex real-world phe-
nomena are impossible to reduce to a finite number of parameters. Hence, like 
every other form of representation, simulations are approximations. First of all, 
they are selective in their representation of relevant factors from the real-world 
because of its complexity, due to practical or technological restrictions or be-
cause of the nature of the simulation which may be, for example, to entertain 
rather than to imitate in detail as is the case for computer games. Secondly, the 
selected parameters are abstractions, interpretations of phenomena of possibly 
ultimately ungraspable complexity usually in terms of linearly measured vari-
ables. And thirdly, simulation is always an imitation of the results of the pro-
cess, not of the process itself, it is a representation of the surface, not of its ac-
tual mechanics. The relation between a model and its actual counterpart is one 
of resemblance, not of identity.
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DEFINITION
A computer simulation is an implementation of a model over time,24 a repres-
entation of a system's behavior set in motion.  In a scientific context, simula-
tions are used for research into and optimization of complex systemic pro-
cesses. When designing a simulation, assumptions are made about various rel-
evant parameters of a system, from which algorithmic descriptions of relations 
between entities are derived and from which a virtual model is developed. This 
model is then set in motion and observed through various interfaces so that it 
can be evaluated by comparing the feedback from the model to the behavior of 
the real system. When the resemblance between the two is unsatisfactory, al-
gorithms can be refined and variables added until  the model  behaves suffi-
ciently similar to the original. Once this geometrical model is established, its 
variables can be altered and the simulation can be run again. In the strictest 
sense, from this moment on, it is no longer a simulation of a real system, but of 
one that exists only within the computer. Formula One engineers, for example 
may create a model of their latest design. They program it, evaluate it, and re-
fine it until it behaves almost like the real car. Once this is done, they can start 
experimenting with the simulation, change the shape of the tail, lower it, bend it 
or remove it entirely and watch their virtual prototype leave the race track and 
blow to pieces. Computer models allow for better understanding of the behavi-
or of complex systems and predict their movements. They are not copies of 
their real-world counterparts, however, and will almost certainly return distor-
ted results when presented with situations outside the realm of their intended 
application. 
Today, systems as diverse as factories, communication networks, traffic, 
space flight, economy and social interaction are being computer-modeled. For 
each of these, a simulation of the system has proved to be more cost-effective, 
safer, faster, or otherwise more practical than experimenting with a real system 
(Smith 1999: 2-3). Apart from that, simulations are increasingly being used for 
training when live training is too dangerous or costly, e.g. in the case of dis-
24 Ironically, time itself, or rather its registration, can be described as a simulation based on an on-
tology of measurement as clocks are fundamentally quantitative models of our planetary system 
(cf. Weizenbaum 1976: 24).
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aster- or military combat training. The form under which computer simulation 
is best-known, however, is interactive entertainment: i.e. computer games. Pur-
ists may say that computer games are not simulations of real-world processes, 
but neither are the majority of experimental or training simulations. Most of 
today's  computer  games  use  simulation  techniques  to  generate  participatory 
worlds, whereby, as in scientific or other types of simulation, there is at least a 
minimal resemblance between the model and reality. What differentiates a com-
puter game from a scientific simulation is its goal. Whereas scientific simula-
tions aim to imitate reality as closely as possible, game simulations have no such 
restrictions and allow their programmers  to create worlds restricted only by 
their imagination and the available computing power.
MECHANICS
Every computer simulation can be said to consist of entities, states and events 
(based on Smith 1999: 11). Entities are its basic constituents. A useful aid in un-
derstanding the functioning of a simulation is to think of it as a game of chess. 
The pieces would be the entities of the simulation, i.e. the elements that have a 
value and a meaning within the game system. This value is determined inde-
pendently from the physical shape of the pieces. You can play chess using beau-
tifully carved marble pieces or you can play it with seashells. The game itself 
would register no difference. It is the entity's role and position within the game 
that determines its value, not its shape or size. The state of a simulation consists 
of the collection of all its variables' values at a specific point in time. In chess, it 
would be the sum of the positions of all pieces at a specific point in the game 
(after one move and before the next). It is the game state which determines the 
power relations between the entities in the game and their possible next moves. 
Events, finally, are actions that change the state of the system. In chess, the only 
possible event within the system is the movement of one of the pieces (or sev-
eral in the case of a rocade). Players may scratch their head, go to the toilet, or 
fall  asleep for  all  that  matters,  the game of  chess  only records  moves,  and 
moves are the only events that change the state of the game. Events are the key 
items that make transformations in the model and drive it through its opera-
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tions. Different simulations implement different possible events, which can be 
actions performed by the user (as in chess) or events scheduled by the system 
(e.g. the arrival of an airplane in a simulation of an airport). The latter are typic-
ally managed by queues (lists, stacks) in the model. These queues identify which 
events are ready to be processed, which are waiting until a specified time, and 
which  must  be  triggered  by  specific  conditions.  There  are  several  types  of 
queues. The most common are first-in-first-out (fifo, e.g. trains in a railway sta-
tion), last-in-first-out (lifo, e.g. job turnover in a company), ordered (e.g. pre-
defined sequence of events), and random (12). 
There are two types of simulation based on the way in which they change 
from one state to the next: discrete event and continuous simulations. In a dis-
crete event (or event-stepped) simulation, state variables change only at distinct 
points in time (3). Most logic-test and fault-tree simulations are of this type. In 
discrete event simulation, the system manages a queue of events sorted by the 
order in which they are to occur. The simulation reads the queue and triggers 
new events sequentially. A discrete event simulation is not meant to run in real 
time, but is built to access the statistical data generated by the system to discov-
er logic defects in its design or to improve efficiency. My chess example would 
be a discrete event simulation since it only changes states when one of the two 
players makes a move. Games of chess can be played by email or post over a 
period of days, weeks or months. The system does not take into account or 
even register the intervals between moves (unless a timer subsystem is added 
for limiting playing time). Every move in the game is a discrete event changing 
the power relations between pieces and therefore the global system state. 
In a continuous (or time-stepped) simulation, variables change according to 
time. A continuous simulation uses differential equations, which are periodically 
solved (usually many times per second), and whose results are then used to 
change the state and output of the simulation. The majority of computer games 
function  in  real-time  and  are  therefore  continuous  simulations.25 Originally, 
continuous simulations were implemented on analog computers where the dif-
25 Turn-based strategy games such as Civilization {Sid Meier 1991}, for example, are not however. 
They are discrete state simulations only changing state when the human player or the computer 
makes a move.
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ferential equations were represented directly by various  electrical components. 
By the late 1980s, however, most 'analog' simulations were run on digital com-
puters emulating the behavior of analog equipment. A digital computer is a dis-
crete state machine, but it can simulate continuity by changing states at very 
short, regular intervals.  In practice, most simulations and games use both dis-
crete and continuous variables, but usually one of the two structures is predom-
inant (3). If we look at Pacman, for example, it would probably be classified as a 
continuous simulation: ghosts and Pac move independently and continuously, 
changing the state  of  the system at  regular  intervals.  When Pac-Man eats  a 
blinking pellet, however, a discrete event is triggered, causing the hunters to be-
come the hunted for a predefined period of time.
APPLICATION
Roughly speaking, computer simulation is used for modeling two types of phe-
nomena:  physical  and  behavioral.  Most  scientific  and  industrial  simulations 
model complex physical phenomena such as traffic flow, aerodynamics, factory 
throughput etc. These simulations are attempts at identifying the relevant entit-
ies, states and events in a physical process and create a model as granular, that 
is, as close to physical reality as possible. For example, we could try to build a 
simulation so as to determine the best position for a number of highway exits.26 
We could program a virtual highway, add the desired exits, moving vehicles, let 
the simulation run and collect statistics. We could do this a number of times 
with different parameters, compare throughput and determine which position 
would be best for the exits. We would not be sure of whether our exits were 
optimally implemented however. A real-world highway does not consist of uni-
form vehicles, moving at a constant speed over smooth, straight asphalt in op-
timal weather conditions. There are cars, trucks and buses driving at various 
distances. Highways climb and descend and are curved when they approach 
towns or cities (which is where exits are usually needed). There is night and day, 
different weather conditions etc. To take these extra factors into account, we 
could extend our physical simulation: make it more granular and precise. But 
26 Please note that my descriptions are not meant to be a realistic account of the creation of a 
simulation, but to explain its basic principles.
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even then we would not be sure whether we have identified the ideal positions 
for the exits. A simulation is an artifact meant to raise consciousness regarding 
a specific phenomenon (cf. Turkle 1995: 72). It is not the thing itself, however, 
and neither will it ever be.27
A second reason why our simulation does not reflect real circumstances is 
that real-world actors do not continually behave in the optimal way. Cars and 
trucks are not inanimate objects, but vehicles driven by humans who each react 
in their own specific way to environmental stimuli. When representing these 
'second order' phenomena, simulations use what is called behavioral modeling. As 
the use of simulation has extended beyond the modeling of complex physical 
phenomena, the need for a way to represent human and group behavior has 
been growing. To accommodate this need, simulation developers have turned 
toward artificial intelligence techniques. Although influenced by physical simu-
lation, these techniques are ontologically remote from the above highway ex-
ample. In the next section, I go deeper into the mechanics of artificial intelli-
gence, but for the moment it suffices to note that it does not model the func-
tioning of the brain itself, but rather (a tiny part of) its output. Most behavioral 
models are based on stochastic simulation, whereby the probability of a certain 
behavior is calculated rather than its actual cause. To return to our highway exit 
program, we could measure the number of accidents caused by cars attempting 
to overtake trucks, for example and then simulate what would happen if trucks 
were advised to take another route. Note that we do not know whether these 
accidents  are  caused  by  cars  overtaking  trucks,  however,  or  even  that  they 
would occur at all. They could be caused by a myriad of other factors such as 
blinding by the sun, bad road surface or UFO sightings for all that matters. 
Stochastic  modeling ignores all these factors and only registers the numbers. 
Hence it is highly dependent on the researcher's interpretation of a situation.
27 In an article titled “Playing to win” in  The Economist Technology Quarterly of 4 December 2004 
(18-19), the question is raised whether training simulations can be a faithful representation of 
real-world situations and whether skills translate as easily from the virtual to the real as vice 
versa. A case in point is that of Dwight Freeney, a professional football player who also won 
the (virtual) 2004 Madden {Electronic Arts Tiburon, 2003} Bowl, a computer football tourna-
ment. At one point Freeney played himself (all players in Madden have individualized character-
istics modeled after the real person). His comment on his virtual counterpart was careful yet 
brief. “It is not the total Dwight Freeney, but there are some similarities.”
COMPUTER SIMULATION          79
For the representation of statistical rather than deterministic interpreta-
tions of events, stochastic models use random number generators. These spe-
cial-purpose  programmatic  functions  can  be  instructed  to  return  a  random 
number within a certain range. These numbers can then be related to various 
events within the simulation which are only triggered when they equal specific 
values. For example, if we knew that, when it is raining, one car in a million that 
is overtaking a truck, would cause an accident, we could let the computer gener-
ate a random number between one and a million every time a car overtakes a 
truck. When the generated number is, say 'three', we could make the car cause 
an accident. There are two important remarks to be made about this example. 
First, within the simulation there is no intrinsic reason why the particular car 
number three would cause an accident. There is no modeled stress, road surface 
or alien invasion. There is only an author of the simulation who has observed a 
certain behavior in reality and imposes it top-down on the simulation. Secondly, 
and at first sight contradictorily to the previous, algorithms generating random 
numbers are not random. They are deterministic and merely provide the im-
pression of randomness by using the time and date from the computer's intern-
al clock and performing a series of calculations on them. Hence the generated 
number is no more than a calculated derivative of the time that the system is 
running. Thus our car number three neither causes an accident because of bad 
driving nor because of some divine intervention. It crashes because the person 
running the program decided to fire it up at a certain moment in time, a factor 
which is entirely external to the simulation's virtual ontology. Stochastic model-
ing is used to simulate phenomena as diverse as weather patterns, viral replica-
tion, the movement of a flock of birds or a school of fish being chased a pred-
ator, stock markets and human behavior.
DESIGN
Visually, the first instance of our highway exit simulation would probably have 
been a simple two-dimensional model using a birds-eye perspective. The high-
ways could be represented by two-dimensional coordinates drawing a long thin 
band on the screen. Vehicles could be simple rectangular blocks determined by 
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their  coordinates,  moving  across  the highway and every tenth vehicle or so 
could be programmed to try to leave the highway via our freshly implemented 
exit. When the lines between the coordinates of different vehicles would cross, 
this could be interpreted by the system as a collision and the animation of a 
road accident could be triggered. If we wanted to include height differences in 
our simulation, we could try to stick to our two-dimensional design and repres-
ent hills by causing the vehicles to slow down on certain strips of the highway 
(as if they were driving up-hill). This would not be sufficient, however, as it 
would be impossible to implement the driver's viewpoint. When you drive up a 
hill, you do not see what is behind the top. If we wanted to include this factor, 
we would have to move to a three-dimensional design, in which our highway 
could go up and down, and our vehicles are not just flat squares, but three-di-
mensional objects with a certain height and a driver point of view. This type of 
modeling is usually referred to as (3D-)geometrical, literally meaning 'measuring 
the world' in Old Greek.28 Again, it is important to note that a three-dimension-
al model is not a duplicate of reality. Geometrically modeled cars, for example, 
do not consist of atoms. They do not stretch and shrink with temperature vari-
ations unless we program them to. And the engine parts do not make noise un-
less we trigger the playback of a sound file.
The virtual objects in a three-dimensional geometrical simulation consist 
of polygons (from Old Greek poly, for 'many', and gonos, for 'angle'). Polygons 
are defined by Cartesian coordinates (x,y,z axes). Think of a transparent three-
dimensional cube defined by eight angles or vertices. These vertices are then 
connected by straight lines in the order that the coordinates are stored, drawing 
the edges and sides of the polygon. In the case of our cube we would have eight 
times three ordered coordinates connected by 12 edges surrounding six square 
planes. The sides of the polygon constitute the boundary of what is called the 
polygonal region. Where two planes of an object meet, a line is drawn, but the 
planes themselves have no actual surface. This method of programming virtual 
objects creates a skeleton also known as a wireframe. Once the object's shape is 
28 The idea of geometrical modeling can be traced back to Plato. In the Timaeus (360 BC), Plato's 
eponymous speaker reasons that the entire universe is made up of simple geometrical shapes 
that can be represented by the first four numbers: one is a point, two is a line, three is a triangle 
and four is the simplest non-spherical solid, a triangular pyramid (Poole 2000: 126).
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determined and implemented, the planes can be filled out. In the early days of 
three-dimensional simulation,  computers could barely keep up with continu-
ously calculating the different positions of all vertices so that the planes of the 
polygons were usually filled in just one color. As processors grew more power-
ful and hardware acceleration became more common, however, the desire for 
graphical realism drove designers to more sophisticated techniques for filling 
out planes. One such technique is  texture mapping, whereby a two dimensional 
graphic (sometimes called a skin) is drawn and then virtually wrapped around 
the polygon as you would wrap up a present. 
If we return to the highway example and we wanted to create a three-di-
mensional model of a car, we would first analyze its shape and identify the sep-
arately moving parts. We only need a simplified version of a car so we would 
probably only distinguish the body of the car, wheels, doors, trunk and wipers. 
Next, as described above, we would look at each part separately, describe its 
geometrical shape in coordinates, create a wireframe and assemble our virtual 
car. The next step, would be to think about animating it. One popular tech-
nique for animating objects is  inverse kinematics. First, the hierarchical relations 
between the different parts  of the object  are described.  For our car,  this  is 
simple since we want the different parts simply to remain together when mov-
ing. If we wanted to animate a waving arm through the window, however, we 
would have a much more complex relationship. Then we would have to divide 
hand and arm, and break the arm into two separately moving parts. Next, we 
would determine the relations between the objects (hand, arm1, arm2, car),29 
their hierarchy and geometrical relations. Then, in the case of inverse kinemat-
ics, we would order the child object (hand) to move sideways and the two sub-
sequent parent objects (arm below elbow and arm above) to follow. Another 
method which is becoming more and more popular is  motion capture.  In this 
case, actors are hired and asked to act out the different movements wearing a 
29 Again, I want to stress that these are simplified descriptions. Complex game objects like the 
cars in Gran Turismo 4 {Kazunori Yamauchi 2004} for PlayStation 2 consist of ten to twenty-
thousand polygons.  Increasingly,  computer  game  and  console  manufacturers  are  using  the 
number of polygons calculated per second as a measure of visual realism (which is of course a 
simplification since polygons can differ in complexity and other factors like design, texturing 
and shading).
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suit of sensors, transmitting series of coordinates to a central computer. These 
coordinates  are  then  mapped onto  the  skeleton of  the  game character  and 
translated into fluid, realistic motion. To conclude, I would like to stress once 
again that even realistic three-dimensional simulation is no more than a simpli-
fied representation. Our simulated car, for example, does not move because it 
has wheels or an engine. It moves because it is defined within the system as an 
object with certain qualities, one of which is moving across a highway. For the 
simulation, a car is only an animated moving polygonal area. If we changed its 
shape into that of an office building, we would have office buildings moving 
down the highway. Or if we programmed the cars to flap their doors as wings 
and define flying as one of the properties of the object 'car', they would fly.
EMERGENT PLAY
Complex behavioral simulations such as computer games do not consist of one 
top-down structured set of procedures and subprocedures which are executed 
sequentially. Rather, a number of object types are created (e.g.  highway, car, 
truck), to which properties are attributed (e.g. shape, possible position, ability to 
move, distance to be kept from other objects etc.). Then, within the simulation, 
a number of instances of these types are generated: sometimes directly by the 
author (e.g.  position of highway and exits),  or according to a predefined al-
gorithm (e.g. number of cars and trucks according to time of day, weather etc.). 
All these different objects have their own set of variables which change state 
constantly according to their own internal structure and design, but also accord-
ing to the behavior of other objects in their vicinity. When an instance of an 
object car observes that the object truck in front is slowing down to leave the 
highway, it may likewise slow down and adjust its own state according to the 
other vehicles. Hence, the global state of the simulation is not so much the res-
ult of one centralized analytical structure, but rather of the sum of the behaviors 
of all its objects. As mentioned previously, simulations are often built precisely 
to map behavior that is impossible to describe in one structured analytical mod-
el because of the high number of parameters or their complexity. As such, a 
simulation is built to analyze a certain behavior that is impossible to explain 
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from any of its parameters or separate parts alone. This type of structured be-
havior of a complex system that is impossible to reduce to the behavior of any 
of its separate parts is usually referred to as emergent behavior.30
Emergence (from Latin emergere: to come forth, come up, extricate one-
self) refers to the development of properties, behavior patterns or structures in 
a complex system due to the interactions of its elements over time. An ant 
colony, for example, emerges from a large number of rule-based actions carried 
out by the separate ants. Emergent phenomena are unexpected, nontrivial res-
ults of relatively simple interactions of relatively simple components. The ques-
tion of whether our highway exits are placed correctly does not depend on just 
the geography, just the number or type of vehicles, or just the weather; it de-
pends on the interplay between all these and other factors. It is the emergent 
dance of interactions between different entities within the simulation that de-
termines what would be the best location for the exits and the more parameters 
that are taken into account, the more granular the simulation is, the more reli-
able the obtained results will be. A second implicit requirement for a behavior 
to classify as emergent is that it must display a certain structure, an unexpected 
pattern as if the system as a whole were guided by a higher level of intelligence. 
A classical example of emergent behavior in nature is the movement of a flock 
of birds or a school of fish. Each individual bird or fish only reacts to the beha-
vior of its neighbor, yet the flock or school as a whole moves as if according to 
a  predefined  choreography.  Emergent  structures  are  the  bottom-up,  de-
centered, adaptive structure par excellence. With every move the entire system 
is regenerated, taking into account different environmental factors. Its stability 
is assured by its complexity, not by any single crucial part. When one or a few 
fish in the school are eaten by an orca, the rest continues its evasive moves dis-
regarding. Finally, system redundancy is low because of the simplicity of the in-
dividual behaviors of its parts. All these qualities can be said to have contrib-
uted, for example, to the success of market economies, which rely on emer-
gence,  as  opposed  to  plan  economies  which  are  top-down  centralized  and 
therefore tend to create a high level of redundancy.
30 For a more general description of emergence, see Steven Johnson's book on the subject (2001).
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The concept of emergence is used to describe properties, behaviors and 
structures.  In  physics,  for  example,  emergence  is  used  to  describe  properties 
which occur at a macroscopic, but not at a microscopic level, despite the fact 
that the macroscopic system is only an ensemble of microscopic entities. One 
example is temperature. Individual particles can have energy, momentum, and 
velocity, but not temperature. Temperature only emerges when considering an 
ensemble of particles large enough for the laws of thermodynamics to apply. 
Another example is color. Elementary particles like protons or electrons have 
no color. It is only when they are arranged in atoms that they absorb and reflect 
specific wavelengths of light and display a color. Other examples of emergent 
physical  phenomena  include  friction,  viscosity,  elasticity  etc.  In  biology,  the 
concept of emergent behavior is used to describe the structured behavior of large 
groups of organisms. Examples include the behavior of flocks of birds, schools 
of  fish,  but  the  most  fascinating  is  the  organization  of  ant  colonies.  Each 
colony sends out members to find food, clean up waste material, dispose of 
dead corpses, and drive away invaders. Yet, there is no centralized leadership 
organizing these tasks or giving assignments to the individual members of the 
group. Ants 'decide' what functions they need to carry out by interacting with 
one another and by sensing the pheromones secreted by other members. Each 
ant is an autonomous unit that reacts depending on its local environment and a 
number of genetically encoded rules. Interestingly, researchers have discovered 
changes in the behavior of ant colonies over time, showing what could classify 
as  learning behavior.  For  example,  a  colony can learn about  the  geography 
around the ant hill.  Emergent structures, finally, are best described as a result of 
emergent behavior. Typical examples are the design of naturally grown cities, 
the shape of galaxies, and the long-term behavior of the stock market. Signific-
antly, these structures are not created by any single event or rule. There is no 
higher intelligence commanding the system to form a pattern, but instead it is 
the interactions of its parts with their immediate surroundings which produces 
the complex process that leads to order.
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EMERGENT NARRATIVE
Computer games are simulations consisting of virtual entities interacting on the 
basis of rules. Every object is defined by variables determining what it can and 
cannot do within the virtual environment. In a racing game, for example, you 
have a number of different types of cars, each with their stronger and weaker 
points. Advantages and disadvantages are distributed according to a paper-scis-
sors-rock pattern. One type of car has the highest top-speed, but the other ac-
celerates  faster,  and a third has  better  road-holding.  All  these cars  are  pro-
grammed to perform certain actions: accelerate, change gears, slow down, turn 
etc. Apart from these physical properties, each car is given certain behavioral 
traits. All cars in the race are programmed to finish the race as fast as possible, 
but their strategies may vary. One may drive offensively, trying to overtake at 
every possibility (using more gas, going faster through tires etc.). Another may 
drive defensively, waiting for the perfect opportunity to overtake. A third may 
be  programmed to drive maliciously and block the cars behind him (with the 
risk of causing an accident or being disqualified) etc. The behavior of at least 
one car is linked with the input of the player. Each possible action by the object 
is mapped onto a number of clicks and/or key-presses by the player (e.g. joy-
stick up/accelerate, click/change gear). Significantly, in computer games there is 
no all-encompassing script or scenario.31 All entities (including those controlled 
by the player) perform a high number of relatively simple actions on the basis 
of environmental factors within the virtual world (slow down when approach-
ing curve, overtake opponent on straight strip). Hence computer game play is 
often described as an emergent phenomenon (e.g. Aarseth 1997: 29; Juul 2005). 
There is no 'author' determining the course of action in a top-down imposed 
script. Rather, it is the myriad of different actions and decisions made by play-
ers and system that determine both the course and the outcome of events.
Emergent play refers to the fact that in each instance of game play, from a 
limited number of possible actions defined by the system rules a higher struc-
ture emerges. Both computer simulation and games are meant to be repeated 
and varied,  allowing the  user/player  to  learn  from variation.  The  system is 
31 In most computer games, there is a global scenario, but it functions more as a goal within the 
game, determining the order of the action rather than the action itself.
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pushed to its limits producing variation after variation of related situations and 
the player is invited to experiment with different strategies. Thereby, it is often 
the case that both system and player behave in ways unforeseen by designers 
and programmers. A straightforward example is a chess program which plays 
better than all of its programmers combined, and which may win from Grand-
masters, they could not have dreamed of competing with (cf. Aarseth 1997: 27). 
Similarly, players in complex virtual worlds can behave in ways unforeseen in 
the design of the simulation. In Quake, for example, players discovered that it 
was possible to jump unnaturally high by launching a rocket downward when 
jumping. Following the laws of action/reaction the players body was thrust up-
ward at the launch (Kücklich 2004). Sometimes, players push the limits of the 
simulation so far that its artificiality is exposed. At one point in Deus Ex, for ex-
ample, a first-person action adventure, the player is provided with attachable 
bombs  ('LAMS')  to  blow her  way  past  a  number  of  obstacles.  Players  dis-
covered that they could climb the walls of buildings using these bombs. They 
would attach a bomb, jump on it, attach one higher etc. In this way, players 
reached places they were never meant to explore (Aarseth 2004b: 371). 
Sometimes, game designers are forced to break physical laws so as to keep 
game play interesting. In the multi-player version of  Return to Castle Wolfenstein 
{John Romero & John Carmack 2001}, for example, players who are revived 
by a medic are programmed to be invulnerable for a brief moment in time so 
that they can seek cover safely and avoid being shot again and again. Aarseth 
reports,  however, that this 'quirk' in the physical simulation was quickly dis-
covered to be exploitable to jump over walls.  Players would commit suicide 
next to the wall and make sure that they are revived next to an exploding gren-
ade. The power of the explosion would then catapult them over the wall and 
permit them to attack the defenders from behind (2003: 3-4). Finally, whereas 
the above examples consist  of isolated instances of game play, in persistent 
worlds in which thousands of players take part in games which last months if 
not years (see also next chapter), emergent behavior can have even more pro-
found consequences. Will Wright, the designer of games like  SimCity {1989} 
and SimAnt {1991} reports about how surprised he was about the directions in 
which his Sims Online {2002} evolved. Particularly, the sexual dynamics between 
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players (several instances of prostitution have been recorded, some in which 
minors were involved, see Manjoo 2003) and the development of power struc-
tures within the virtual world were unexpected. Wright observes, for example, 
that, although the game was designed so that characters could not hurt or in-
hibit one another, quickly a kind of organized crime developed. Players found 
ways to annoy others and used these to wield their 'mob power' and go after 
what they called 'the  griefers',  people who played the game in a (from their 
point of view) inferior way (Wright 2005).
For some researchers such as Espen Aarseth (2001b, 2003, 2004a, 2004b) 
and Jesper Juul (1998, 2001, 2005), emergent structures are not just radically dif-
ferent from traditional storytelling, but also incompatible with the very notion 
of narrative. Like with 'ergodics', Aarseth opposes the idea of emergence to that 
of narrative development. “Simulation is the hermeneutic other of narratives; 
the alternative mode of discourse, bottom-up and emergent where stories are 
top-down and preplanned” (Aarseth 2004a). I tend to take a more moderate 
point of view however. Aarseth and Juul are correct in saying that simulation is 
fundamentally different from traditional storytelling. In a novel or a film, an au-
thor presents one fixed sequence of events, whereas in a simulation not only 
the sequence is not fixed, but the very nature of every event is explorable and 
alterable within the limits of its representation. It is not because there is a dif-
ference, however, that they are opposites. It is not because events are dynamic-
ally generated that the player of a computer game can not experience his adven-
tures in a virtual world as a meaningful emergent narrative. Moreover, a simula-
tion is an approximation, a representation of a set of qualities selected by its de-
signers in order to have a certain effect. Hence, although the events occurring 
in a game are in themselves emergent, they are neither spontaneous nor object-
ive. They are an anticipated effect of what could be called the simulation's 'intel-
ligent design'. Computer games are representational systems built with a certain 
purpose in mind. They are authorial in that they represent some elements and 
not others, and structure them to achieve certain results and not others. Cut 
scenes and background stories are only the most blatant examples of authorial 
meddling in simulated representation. The true authorial hand is below the sur-
face, in the simulation's mechanics (see also section 3).
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2. MODELING THOUGHT
In 1946, just after the Second World War, John Presper Eckert and John Willi-
am Mauchly  presented  the  Electronic  Numerical  Integrator  And  Computer 
(ENIAC), the first general-purpose electronic computer. For the first time in 
history, a machine was able to perform complex logical operations and calcula-
tions, not just independently from man, but in many cases more efficiently than 
him. For the first time, a machine was able to take over complex logical and 
mathematical tasks which, until then, had been restricted to the realm of human 
thought. Hence, the step toward positing the computer as a thinking machine 
was only small and quickly the idea of developing machine 'intelligence' gained 
influence, a system that could not only make calculations, but also make de-
cisions about real-world problems. The research discipline of artificial intelli-
gence was born. A.I. research is often subdivided into weak and strong A.I. 
Weak A.I. is the moderate branch aiming to develop computer-based systems 
that can grasp and solve problems within a limited domain. A weakly artificially 
intelligent machine is able to make decisions independently, but only in a re-
stricted number of cases. Weak A.I. systems are used in machines from cars to 
space shuttles.32 Strong artificial intelligence research, on the other hand, aims 
to create computer-based systems that can make decisions, not just in strictly 
defined areas, but which can reason and solve general, unexpected problems, 
i.e.  machines that have a mind (which is how John Searle originally defined 
strong A.I.). In the coming subsections, I tackle the theoretical possibility of 
such strong artificial intelligence using the framework of simulation and emer-
gence that I have sketched in the previous section. First, I briefly present Alan 
Turing's famous test and John Searle's equally famous Chinese Room counter-
argument.  Next,  I  consider  the  possibility  of  emergent  A.I.,  and  analyze  it 
against Hubert Dreyfus's critique of the possibility of machine intelligence.
32 It should be noted that, strictly speaking, weak artificial intelligence is not restricted to digital 
computing. Thermostats in refrigerators or automatic gears in cars can be considered weak A.I. 
on the basis that they make decisions (turn off cooling, change gear) within a limited real-world 
domain.
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THE IMITATION GAME
Already during the Second World War, Alan Turing, a British mathematician, 
saw a  great  future  for  machine intelligence,  and he wanted to devise  a  test 
against which to measure the progress of the field. In 1950, he proposed what 
he called the 'imitation game', but which came to be known as the Turing test. 
The imitation game is a test in which a person (the interrogator) is separated in 
a room where she only has a computer displaying what we would today call a 
chat box. Via this computer she can send and receive text messages from two 
other 'chatters', which she only knows by the names of x and y. The interrogat-
or knows, however, that one of the two is a machine and the other a person. 
The aim of the game for the interrogator is to correctly determine who is the 
machine and who is the person after five minutes of questioning. The aim for 
the (programmers of) the machine is to try to make the interrogator conclude 
that the other person is the machine, and the object of the other person is to 
help the interrogator to correctly identify the machine. Turing believed that by 
the turn of the millennium, computers would have grown so powerful that an 
interrogator would at least three times out of ten wrongly identify man and ma-
chine. Turing also believed that, around the year 2000, “general educated opin-
ion” would have changed so much that we would speak of thinking machines 
without expecting to be contradicted. There is little doubt that he would have 
been disappointed by the achievements of today's computers in the imitation 
game. Every year, there is a Loebner Prize Competition in which computer pro-
grammers submit their creations to a limited Turing Test.  They never come 
near the standard that Turing envisaged, however, as the success rate of the in-
terrogator is still one hundred percent (Oppy & Dowe 2003).
Over the years, Turing's claims have unleashed both storms of protest 
and fits of enthusiasm. After the appearance of Eliza (Weizenbaum 1966), the 
realization of Turing's dream of creating a thinking machine suddenly felt dan-
gerously/wonderfully close. As Weizenbaum reports: when chatting with Eliza, 
people started attributing intelligence and even an identity to what was basically 
only a rudimentary behavioral simulation. Blind enthusiasm led people to see 
understanding where there was none. Even schooled psychiatrists considered 
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the possibility to fill the therapeutic needs of the people by Eliza-like machines. 
This enthusiastic outcry led Weizenbaum to write his plea for the revaluation of 
the uniqueness of human intelligence  Computer Power and Human Reason: From 
Judgement to Calculation (1976). In defense of Turing, some thinkers put forward 
that he never meant for the imitation game to be both a logically necessary and 
sufficient condition for the attribution of intelligence. Indeed, when we look at 
the initial formulation of the game, Turing believed that the passing of the test 
would  only  provide  probabilistic  support  for  the  hypothesis  of  intelligence 
(Oppy & Dowe 2003). On the other hand, it is not just Turing's words that are 
interpreted, but also the implicit message within the setup of the test itself. Fact 
is that the (human) interrogator has to choose between a person and a machine, 
which is the more 'human'. Moreover, the connection between interrogator and 
participants is very limited, suggesting that humans are nothing more to one an-
other than distant exchangers of abstract symbols, and that being able to give 
acceptable answers over a chatline is sufficient to be classified as an intelligent 
human being. Arguably, Turing's predictions were not so much an overestima-
tion of machine intelligence as an underestimation of human complexity. Tur-
ing was correct in prophesying a great future for logic machines in the second 
half of the twentieth century (which was not obvious in 1950). What he failed 
to see, however, was the distance lying between logic and human thought.
THE CHINESE ROOM
The best known argument against Turing's hypothesis that a machine passing 
his test is intelligent (in the Latin sense of 'understanding') is the Chinese room 
argument. This argument was first pronounced in 1980 by John Searle, a lan-
guage philosopher of the American pragmatist school and it triggered a discus-
sion between himself and the artificial intelligence research community, which 
still continues today. The gist of Searle's argument is that even if we created 
very sophisticated information processors which would be able to pass the Tur-
ing test, they would not be intelligent in the human sense of the term. They 
would not possess a mind or display so-called intentionality (know what they 
are thinking  about). They would only be able to shuffle abstract signs without 
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understanding them. To illustrate his claim, Searle proposes to imagine a situ-
ation in which a person simulates the operation of an artificially intelligent com-
puter, which he calls the 'Chinese Room Experiment'. In the experiment, a man 
(Searle proposes himself) who does not know Chinese is locked in a room with 
a book containing a story in Chinese. The man does not know the story in the 
book, and neither is he able to read it. During the experiment, he is passed slips 
of paper containing questions about the story, again in Chinese so he does not 
understand the questions either. However, clever programmers have given him 
a set of rules for determining which signs he should copy from the book as an 
'answer' to which slips of paper, which are then passed back. The rules merely 
consist of logical operators and references to the signs. “If sign x is followed by 
sign y, then return sign u.” Searle, proposes to imagine that the person in the 
Chinese room becomes extremely proficient at applying the rules and returning 
the slips of paper at the same rate a Chinese person would answer to questions 
about the story in the book. Even then, however, even when all questions are 
correctly answered within the appropriate timespan, the man in the room does 
not  understand  Chinese  and  neither  does  he  know the  story  in  the  book. 
Hence, for Searle, it is theoretically impossible to create an information pro-
cessor that is intelligent in the human sense of the term. 
When Searle published his argument, the strong A.I. research community 
replied with more than a dozen attempts to refute him. The most common ar-
gument for denying the validity of the Chinese Room argument was what Searle 
himself termed 'the systems reply'. Essentially, it says that, although it is true 
that the man in the room does not understand the story, there is no reason to 
believe that the room as a whole does not understand it. Systems are more than 
the sum of their parts, and it may be that the person in the room does not un-
derstand, like a processor in a computer does not know what is displayed on 
the screen, but the system as a whole shows understanding. One could make an 
analogy with the human brain,  which consists  of  different  interacting parts, 
whereby one single part probably cannot understand, but the brain as a whole 
can. Similarly if we regard the Chinese room as a brain consisting of the man, 
the book and the rules, none of the three parts would 'understand' the story, 
but the room/brain as a whole would. Searle's response is simple. If the room 
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as a whole understands, as the systems reply people argue, then make the room 
part of the man. Imagine that the man is able to internalize the entire system. 
He learns all the signs in the story book and all the logical rules by heart and 
processes  the  questions  entirely  in  his  head.  Now,  Searle  claims,  the  whole 
room, the whole system that is believed to be understanding is in the head of 
the man, yet everyone will agree that he still does not understand (cf.  Turkle 
1984:  266). This is where the Chinese Room discussion ends (or should have 
ended) and Searle is right when he claims that a system that does no more than 
shuffling signs, that is a processor of information which carries no reference to 
the objects it describes, strictly speaking does not know what it is talking about 
and therefore does not understand. Hence, Searle is right in claiming that the 
Turing  test  is  no  solid  basis  for  identifying  intelligence.  In  their  answers, 
however, the systems reply people are not referring to the system which Searle 
has in mind, but to a form of intelligence which emerges from the interaction 
of a complex system with reality: a form of emergent intelligence.
EMERGENT INTELLIGENCE
One of the oldest objections against the possibility of creating a thinking ma-
chine  was  formulated  in  Ada  Lovelace's  memoir  (1843)  when  discussing 
Charles Babbage's Analytical Engine {1833-1842}, the first design for a universal 
(mechanical) computer. She observed that the Analytical Engine had no preten-
sions to originate anything, that it could do only what we can order it to do 
(Oppy & Dowe 2003). A computer is in itself a dumb machine, which, on a ba-
sic level, is merely able to switch circuits and nothing more. It is only when it is 
programmed, when its circuits are made to behave according to certain pat-
terns, that it can be made to speak and these patterns are fixed by the program-
mer. But what would happen if we were able to make the circuits in a computer 
respond to patterns of input more or less independently? What would happen if 
we were able to teach a computer to learn from the evolution of phenomena 
and change its own setup? In other words, what would happen if we could 
make a form of emergent intelligence? Traditional artificial intelligence is con-
cerned with the manipulation of symbols and natural language through top-
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down rules created by a programmer. There, the idea is that man is a logical be-
ing that can be caught within logico-mathematical structures, if we only make 
them sufficiently granular. Emotions, creativity, play can all in some way be re-
duced to one logical framework that is man, and that can be programmed to 
run on a computer. Emergent intelligence, on the other hand, has a much nar-
rower scope and a fundamentally different methodology. Whereas traditional 
A.I. subsumed that the world, including man, must intrinsically be logical and 
therefore programmable, emergent A.I. takes the opposite perspective and lets 
structure come forth from a possibly endlessly complex reality to form inter-
pretable patterns. Whereas in traditional strong A.I. programming is used to im-
pose top-down rules on the interpretation of reality, in emergent A.I. it is used 
to create a sort of heuristic basis for interpreting and interacting with external 
stimuli.
One experimental technique for the creation of emergent intelligence is 
neural networking: a software architecture which tries to imitate the working of 
a brain's neural system. Neural networks are simulations of the behavior of high 
numbers of interconnected neurons, usually running on top of conventional di-
gital computing systems. Whereas the underlying computer functions top-down 
logically, the simulated collection of neurons can be made to interact with dif-
ferent phenomena and, when programmed with a certain goal, they can devise a 
strategy for meaningful interaction. Neural networks simulate the brain's capa-
city to distill patterns and learn from trial and error by analyzing and interpret-
ing the data which are subjected to it. Each neuron within the network receives 
various  inputs  from neighboring neurons and sends an output  back on the 
basis of different weighting factors. In itself, each simulated neuron is a relat-
ively simple entity functioning according to logical rules. The neural network as 
a whole, however, can display a wide variety of gradually differing 'interpreta-
tions' of phenomena and produce not top-down imposed but bottom-up emer-
gent strategies for interaction. A neural network 'learns' when it is able to exper-
iment, when it is presented with examples and given feedback on its analysis 
and strategy. This feedback allows the network to adjust its different weighting 
factors to bring its final output closer to the desired result. It could even be ar-
gued that in this way it displays a form of intentionality, not just processing 
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symbolic representations, but actual information about the world. Present-day 
neural networks are not intelligent in the sense that Turing wanted his machine 
to be intelligent, but are used to analyze very specific situations and data in-
volving pattern recognition, machine learning and prediction of the behavior of 
complex systems. They are used for tasks such as as voice and handwriting re-
cognition, economic data analysis, gaming A.I. and for mimicking human de-
cision-making, e.g. for filtering email.
If we return to the Chinese room discussion with an emergent A.I. system 
in mind, rather than a top-down structured information processor, the situation 
is different. Although the basis of the emergent system is logical, its functioning 
is more complex. First of all, there is no longer the objection that it functions 
separate from reality, i.e.  its decisions are not made on the basis of prepro-
grammed rules, but are able to incorporate feedback from the phenomenon it is 
confronted with. Its reactions are not based on arbitrary rules but on the feed-
back it receives and stores in the weighting factors of its neurons. Like the hu-
man brain, which is partly hardwired through its genetic structures (which could 
be described as being 'programmed' by many thousands of years of evolution), 
and partly defined by culture, this emergent intelligence could be partly hard-
coded and partly left to emerge from observations.33 Secondly, internally, this 
emergent  system would no longer be a  natural  language processor  applying 
grammatical  rules to linguistic  structures,  but  rather a  continuous system of 
evaluation  of  various  linguistic  strategies.  One  could  even imagine  complex 
neural systems to display a form of creativity or even an emotional preference 
for certain strategies, based on past experience. In this way, the fallacy of seeing 
(human) intelligence as a top-down logical system can be avoided. Although 
fundamentally based on binary logic, the simulation on top would not necessar-
ily behave logically, but according to patterns observed in the data it is fed. 
When we more specifically look at Searle's analogy between the Chinese room 
and the Turing test, we see that it no longer applies. In an emergent Chinese 
room there would not be one Searle, but thousands, possibly millions of him, 
33 Of course the analogy with the human brain is limited, since the basic structures of most emer-
gent systems do not change, do not permute like the human brain from one generation to the 
next. Neural networks are programmed to change the interrelations of its neurons according to 
feedback, but not their being a neural network itself.
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and there would not be any logical rule-book, but complex interpretive interac-
tion and decision-making on the basis of input from neighboring Searles and 
adjusting weighting factors. Searle would be right in saying that the people in 
the room still would not understand either the story or the Chinese language, 
but that would be beside the point. The weighting system as a whole (operated 
by thousands of Searles) would be able to devise intelligent strategies for dis-
cussing the story in Chinese and could therefore be said to understand it. Think 
of a Mexican wave in which each person does nothing but raise their arms 
when their neighbor just has, yet a complex visual pattern emerges. Just like no 
one in the public controls the wave, no one in the Chinese room would under-
stand Chinese, but the room would.
DEUS EX MACHINA
Like top-down rule-based processing, emergent intelligence still  faces several 
practical  and theoretical problems however. The above description is only a 
thought experiment whereby a number of fundamental objections are tempor-
arily put aside. The main objection against the possibility of emergent strong 
A.I. is that, even as an emergent structure, system A.I. would still be subject to 
the limitations of simulation. As described in the previous section, a simulation 
is a surface representation, a process mimicking the behavior of a phenomenon, 
not its duplication. The similarity between a simulation and an original is only 
skin-deep. If we were to make a computer simulation of the sound of a Stradi-
varius  violin,  for example,  we could (again theoretically)  create an emergent 
simulation listening to a Stradivarius playing dozens of pieces and make it inter-
iorize the instrument's behavior. Let's imagine that, when finished, our emer-
gent system is able to reproduce the sound of a  Stradivarius.  Even then, it 
would not be one however. The simulated Stradivarius will, because of its very 
design, always remain only an approximation of a real one. It can learn to imit-
ate the Stradivarius sound in dozens of pieces.  When confronted with an un-
known piece, however, there is no guarantee that it will react as the real violin 
would. A simulation is an imitation of a limited set of qualities, not a copy of 
the original artifact.
96         UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER GAME CULTURE
In a similar way, emergent strong artificial intelligence will always remain 
an imitation and not a duplication of human intelligence, and, like the Stradi-
varius example, it will always be subject  to its 'ontological' limitations. Hubert 
Dreyfus was one of the first philosophers to point out the inherent limitations 
of the artificial intelligence dream in What Computers Can't Do (1972), 20 years 
later republished as What Computers “Still” Can't Do. Dreyfus' arguments against 
strong A.I. are based on the phenomenological tradition, especially the work of 
Martin Heidegger. He stresses the fact that our understanding of the world, like 
our being, is highly context-bound and that our behavior cannot be reduced to 
objective,  logical  rules.  From this  position,  Dreyfus  criticizes  the  cognitivist 
view of human understanding on which strong A.I. is based, and which presup-
poses a rational,  to a  large extent  logical,  context-free cognition and under-
standing. More precisely, he focuses on what he considers the four primary (un-
proved) assumptions of strong A.I. research, one biological, one psychological, 
one epistemological and one ontological  assumption.  According to Dreyfus, 
strong A.I. makes the implicit (a) biological assumption that the brain is analogous 
to computer hardware and the mind to software. While this presupposition ap-
plies to early top-down conceptions of A.I., it is less true of the emergent type. 
As I have described above, early artificial intelligence research (of the top-down 
information processing type) presupposed that  the human mind was a  pro-
cessor of logical rules and its thinking similar to applying those rules to binary 
data. Dreyfus correctly argues that there is no conclusive biological or empirical 
evidence for this assumption, so it must be false. Emergent systems, however, 
do not make this assumption. Emergent A.I. uses computer hardware and soft-
ware only to make a simulation of a real-world phenomenon, e.g. a neural net-
work. Logical rules are being processed by the computer only to generate large 
collections of data used to base interaction on. Thus, Dreyfus's biological as-
sumption applies only partly since one can accept that, through its being a sim-
ulation, emergent A.I. may be able to partly overcome the dissimilarity between 
computer hardware and the human brain.
The (b) psychological assumption consists of the fact that strong A.I. research-
ers believe that the mind works by performing discrete computations based on 
algorithmic rules on discrete representations in the form of signs and language. 
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Again, this criticism primarily applies to the earlier, non-emergent type of A.I. 
For Dreyfus this psychological assumption rests on two others: one epistemo-
logical and one ontological assumption. The (c) epistemological assumption refers to 
the belief that all activity can be formalized logically and mathematically as pre-
dictive rules or laws. Dreyfus contests this assumption, based on the observa-
tion that human beings are highly context-bound creatures, which do not be-
have according to universal laws governing in- and output. In other words, for 
every context, specific rules would have to be created and the number of vari-
ables in each case would be near infinite. Again, however, one could claim that 
emergent A.I. could at least partly overcome these differences, because of its in-
herently  context-bound,  bottom-up  nature.  One  should  ask,  however,  how 
complex an emergent system would have to be in order to approximate human 
behavior in different contexts and how much of human behavior it would have 
to interiorize, even to pass the Turing test. The fourth and final assumption 
which strong A.I. research implicitly makes is the (d)  ontological assumption, the 
idea that it is an objective fact that reality in its entirety consists of a set of mu-
tually independent, indivisible facts. In other words, Dreyfus points to the dis-
crepancy between computer processing, which consists of discrete states of dis-
crete data, and reality, which is continuous. Being a discrete state machine, a 
computer may well be unable to interact with the world as a continuous human 
brain  would.  Again,  however,  one  could  point  to  the  fact  that,  although it 
works with discrete states, a computer is able to simulate continuity very closely 
by working with extremely short  constant  intervals.  Thus,  although Dreyfus 
successfully points out the weak spots in A.I. theory, one could still claim that 
the emergent system approach will eventually be able to overcome all four lim-
itations. 
There is, however, a fifth assumption which not so much applies to tradi-
tional (logical, top-down) strong A.I., but all the more to the emergent variety. 
This assumption, which could be called the cultural assumption, has been impli-
citly referred to both  by Dreyfus and by the A.I. research community, more 
precisely  by proponents of robotics. Indeed, one could imagine an extremely 
powerful, emergent A.I. system running on future supercomputers, simulating 
zillions of neurons constantly adjusting weighting factors in a way similar to 
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how the human brain functions. By means of extremely granular simulation of 
the brain's functioning, the biological dissimilarity of brain and computer could 
become irrelevant. One could imagine this future system to develop a psycho-
logy largely unencumbered by the basic epistemology and ontology of digital 
computing. However, even when all these difficulties would be overcome, one 
still has to ask why this complex system would start to behave like a human be-
ing. While growing up, every child goes through a complex process of explora-
tion of its own self and its environment. It has certain genetically encoded char-
acter traits, but they develop dependent on its self-image, that of its family and 
its culture. In other words, one should ask why an emergent intelligence would 
start to behave like a human if it was not one in the first place. For example, 
why would it want to develop natural language abilities if it does not recognize 
itself as a human and if it does not feel the need to take its place within the hu-
man community. Why would it attempt to find meaning in life if it has no no-
tion of a future death? Even if this system could become self-aware, would this 
self-awareness be that of a living being? Man is an extremely complex, context-
bound 'machine', which develops in a specific socio-cultural context. It is highly 
unlikely that even emergent A.I. would ever be able to incorporate these cultur-
al factors, and, until it can, it is equally unlikely, that it will pass the Turing test.
3. MODELING AND INTERPRETATION
As discussed earlier, a computer simulation is an implementation of a mathem-
atical model over time. This model is not a replication of reality, but an approx-
imation in several respects. First and foremost, only a portion of reality is selec-
ted to be represented within the model. A real-world phenomenon is analyzed 
and, depending on the purpose of the simulation, a number of relevant proper-
ties are isolated. When creating a racing simulation, for example, acceleration, 
velocity and road-holding will be implemented, but the convenience of the seat 
and  helmet  will  probably  not.  Secondly,  these  properties  are  measured  and 
combined into a model using calculable quantified relations between compon-
ents. These relations are not exact representations of real-world relations, but, 
again, approximations. In most racing simulations, there is no actual simulation 
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of an engine, only a calculation of its power which is then converted real-time 
into acceleration and speed. Thus, if the virtual engine blows up, it is not be-
cause of cracking valves or breaking shafts; it is because the simulation is imple-
mented in such a way that when driving at speed x in gear y the probability of 
the engine blowing up is larger than the probability of it not blowing up. Partic-
ularly in the case of complex behavioral phenomena, probabilistic rather than 
analytical algorithms are used. Computer-guided opponents do not attempt to 
overtake you because there is an artificially intelligent driver deciding to do so in a 
way similar to how a human driver would. Rather he makes his move because 
the simulation stipulates that when close enough to the car in front, no curves, 
no rain, enough fuel, and so forth a driver is more likely to try to overtake than 
not. Thirdly and finally, a computer is a discrete state machine, which means 
that a digital bit is either 0 or 1 and there is no in-between. In order to represent 
motion, the computer is programmed to simulate time by changing (discrete) 
states at short regular intervals, which makes it approximative in yet a third way. 
Simulated movement is not continuous, but in fact consists of very fast jolts at 
regular  intervals.  Whereas  real-world  phenomena  are  complex,  material  and 
continuous processes, simulations are abstract, quantified and discrete approx-
imations.
Simulations are idealized abstractions of real-world phenomena. Like oth-
er forms of representation, they are abstracted with a purpose in mind. They are 
meant to produce an effect and be interpreted in a certain way. Every simula-
tion is a 'simplified' version of reality, and, as such, it is based on the concep-
tions and beliefs of its designers. In other words, some facets of reality are rep-
resented and others are not. For example, when simulating water in a primarily 
visual simulation, it could suffice to algorithmically mimic the flickering of its 
surface. Apart from its looks this simulated water would have nothing in com-
mon with the physical phenomenon. A simulation is a slice of reality, selected 
for a specific reason (to analyze a physical phenomenon, to streamline work-
flow, to create suspense etc.) and it is modeled to express this specific view on 
the world.  Like all  cultural  representations,  simulations are inevitably biased, 
representing some elements of physical reality and neglecting others, presenting 
one subjective view and ignoring others. Hence it is best to approach a simula-
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tion as a form of representation, a constructed interpretation and manipulation 
of elements from the real world. In the rest of this section, I go deeper into the 
'constructedness' of simulation and analyze the politics of its functioning. First, 
I develop the idea of simulation politics itself and describe its functioning in 
computer games. Then I look at a number of concrete examples of covert sim-
ulation politics  in  strategy and simulation games.  And thirdly,  I  look at  ex-
amples where simulation is used to propagate real-world political views, and ar-
gue that it is time to get past the Manichean discussion of whether computer 
games as a whole are good or bad, and begin analyzing their functioning.
FICTIONAL SIMULATION
In 1984, Chris Crawford described simulation as “a serious attempt to accur-
ately represent a real phenomenon in another,  more malleable form,” and a 
computer game as an “artistically simplified representation” (8). Both computer 
simulation and game designers find themselves forced to simplify and abstract 
reality, but whereas simulation designers only reluctantly make simplifications as 
a concession to material and intellectual limitations, computer game designers 
do so deliberately in order to guide the player to those elements they deem im-
portant and entertaining. For Crawford, simulation designers are mere techno-
logists  attempting  to  imitate  reality.  Computer  game  designers  are  artists 
however. They make creative interpretations of the world and translate them 
into  simulation.  Simulations  are  a  product  of  technological  ingenuity  while 
computer games are the result of a creative process. “A simulation bears the 
same relationship to a game that a technical drawing bears to a painting” (9).
Crawford's distinction is far from new. In his  Poetics (ca. 350 BC), Aris-
totle notes that “it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, 
but what may happen—what is possible according to the law of probability or 
necessity” (9, 2). Similarly, computer games are not built to reproduce reality, 
but that which would or could have been. As Steven Poole notes, computer 
games'  “somewhat  paradoxical  fate  is  the  ever  more  accurate  modeling  of 
things that don't, and couldn't, exist: a car that grips the road like Superglue, 
which bounces uncrumpled off roadside barriers; a massive spacecraft with the 
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maneuverability of a bumblebee; a human being who can survive, bones intact, 
a three-hundred-foot fall into water. We don't want absolutely real situations in 
videogames. We can get that at home” (2000: 50). Computer games are imita-
tions of a reality that does not exist and that in some respect is more attractive 
than our own. “Remember, you don't want boring, invisible lasers; you don't 
want a Formula One car that takes years of training to drive; and you don't 
want to die after taking just one bullet. You don't want it to be too real” (63). 
Computer games are reconstructions of an imaginary reality, one that can only 
exist  in a player's  imagination.  Hence the imagination plays a crucial role in 
filling in the gaps of the simulation (see also next chapter). Will Wright, maker 
of The Sims, describes how his Sims do not speak English, but instead commu-
nicate using icons in text balloons, and some sort of gibberish language. “In 
fact, when you're playing the game, and you hear them speak this language, you 
do get emotional intonations from them. Most people are basically filling in the 
blanks, and imagining the conversation in their head” (Wright 2005). By their 
very nature, simulations are constructions, and, computer games take advantage 
of this to create worlds it is pleasant escaping to.
MESSAGE IN A THROTTLE
Ironically, while computer games are a means of escape, a way to be temporar-
ily free from the shackles of the here and now, they are also a place of seem-
ingly absolute and transparent control. In a simulation, all relevant properties in 
the virtual world are represented by variables which are usually simple and nu-
merical, i.e. quantitative and linear. In real life, when chopping wood, you may 
get tired in your back. When this is the case, you may want to take a break or 
try to collect some smaller pieces of wood further away as your legs have not 
suffered from the chopping. In a computer game, however, when tiredness is 
represented by a single linear variable, you can only be a value between fresh 
and eager, over somewhat worn, to tired and all relevant steps in between. In a 
linear representation of tiredness, you cannot be tired in your back and not tired 
in your legs for example. You can only be one number on a linear scale reach-
ing from zero to maximum. Virtual environments are composed of dozens or 
102         UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER GAME CULTURE
even hundreds of these variables which are sometimes accessible as so-called 
augmenting indicators on the side of the screen. The interaction between the 
entities of a virtual world is governed by the values of its variables which consti-
tute its underlying 'matrix'. The screen graphics and animations are only deriva-
tions of the absolute quantified reality that lies beneath. For example, if your 
character grows tired (variable 'agility' below x), the designers may have imple-
mented a visual indication of this fact, making the character walk stooped for-
ward for example.  This visual  clue is  managed by an algorithm determining 
that, when endurance is below, say, twenty percent, the stooping animation is 
started. In other words, the indicators (variables) in a simulation are not indicat-
ors,  but facts within the virtual world.  Simulations and computer games are 
governed by the constant interaction and auto-updating of hundreds or even 
thousands  of  variables  creating  an  absolutely  determined  and  quantitatively 
controlled universe.
Simulations and computer games are not the first cultural forms to imple-
ment this quantified view on reality. In fact, all rule-based games are to some 
extent based on quantified relations between entities. Think of chess, for ex-
ample, where each piece is determined by its possible moves, which is in turn 
determined  by  its  type  and  position.  Or  Stratego {Milton  Bradley  1961},  in 
which each piece is determined by its relative position on the hierarchical lad-
der, and so forth. The most extreme pre-computing implementation of quanti-
fiable reality can be found in role-playing games. Unsurprisingly, one specific 
variety, i.e. Dungeons & Dragons {Gary Gygax 1974} was tremendously popular 
among computer  science students  in  the  1970s,  when computer  games  ap-
peared. In  Dungeons & Dragons,  each player (except for the dungeon master, 
who takes the role of a conductor and a referee) chooses his character's gender, 
race (elf, dwarf, human, halfling etc.), class (fighter, sorcerer, cleric, thief etc.) 
and generates on the basis of these elements the character's basic characteristics 
(strength, dexterity, constitution, wisdom, intelligence and charisma) which are 
represented by numerical values and 'levels'. These qualities determine what the 
character is able to do in the game world, and how it evolves with experience. 
All character traits are represented in precise values and determined by other 
traits and experience. For example, humans may be good fighters and they may 
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develop high levels of strength and constitution. Elves are proficient sorcerers, 
may become wise and intelligent and quickly learn new magical spells. Halflings 
are  small,  but  cunning and make excellent thieves  and so  on.  David Myers 
notes that in this type of quantified ontology, everything is shaped after Newto-
nian physics and randomness (luck, dice-throwing), even complex psychological 
and social realities. “By simulating the self as mass, the game designer is able to 
apply the empirical generalizations of classical physics to the actions of human 
characters. Complex social systems are modeled as vast collections of character 
molecules in some advanced, gaseous state of agitated motion” (1992: 424). 
This quantified linear representation creates an illusion of transparency 
and control by reducing complex phenomena to a number of readily under-
standable  and  assessable  linear  variables.  In  a  simulated  environment, 
everything is graspable and all  players have an equal chance of winning the 
game as the entire game universe is based on exact rules. This transparency and 
control do not apply to the rules themselves however. Every computer game is 
built of rules mimicking a number of complex phenomena, and these rules are 
in themselves unchangeable. The player only has control over the play gener-
ated by the rules,  not  over the rules themselves.  “Making decisions  doesn't 
change the system. It just allows you to see how it responds” (Will Wright in 
Herz 1997: 220). Within the virtual environment, the rules are both fixed and 
unavoidable. Or as J.C. Herz herself puts it “You can gain or lose weight, but 
you can't get away from gravity” (1997: 223). Every simulation is bound by its 
own format, which requires a reduction of a possibly endlessly complex reality 
to a fixed number of changeable variables. Within this reduction, through its 
embedded bias  and assumptions,  a  simulation shows  its  politics  and its  in-
debtedness to the culture in which it was created. 
SimCity, for example, has been criticized both from left and right because 
of its preference for low taxes (higher taxes can cause recession), investments in 
public transport (as opposed to building more roads), and its discouragement 
of nuclear power (whose implementation leads to accidents and nuclear fallout). 
In other words, the basic rules of the game world, its ontology, stipulates that 
to make your city more thrifty, you have to lower your taxes, build railroads and 
avoid nuclear energy. For the player, there is simply no way to control these ba-
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sic facts; the only option is to subject to them. As Ted Friedman observes, this 
type of 'preference' is not a flaw in the game, but one of its founding principles. 
Its principles “can be engaged and debated, and other computer games can be 
written following different principles. But there could never be an 'objective' 
simulation free from 'bias'.  Computer programs, like all texts,  will always be 
ideological constructions” (1999). Significantly, this ideology is not part of the 
basic story of the game, which for SimCity is simply to build a city of your own 
design, but of its 'play mechanics', the inner workings that shape the game's be-
havior. In a simulation like  SimCity, a complex dynamic such as city develop-
ment is abstracted, quantified and represented as if it were objective reality. It is 
no more than one possible interpretation, however, and that is both its strength 
and its weakness.
WAR IS PEACE
Whereas SimCity is concerned with simulating the construction and expansion 
of a city, the Civilization series (Sid Meier 1991, 1996, 2001) is even more ambi-
tious in that it aims not only to represent the birth and growth of a nation, but 
also its cultural history and geopolitical struggle. In Civilization, the player starts 
out as a settler in a wild, unexplored area, where she has to build settlements, 
roads, irrigation, develop science, build an army and expand your power (which 
is rewarded with a higher score). Like SimCity, Civilization has been criticized for 
its implicit assumptions and its political statements  about globalization.34 His-
tory is depicted as a “succession of conflicts or contests over land and other re-
sources” (Jenkins & Squire 2002), whereby the only way to overcome struggle is 
to become the strongest nation and control or even conquer all others, which 
can only be achieved by being more efficient economically than others. “[T]he 
best player is the one who is the best manager, who can attain his or her goals 
in the most efficient way, increase the productivity (military, cultural, scientific, 
etc.) and still guard the social order.” (Poblocki 2002: 168).  Civilization was re-
34 By this critique I do not want to attack Civilization as a game, nor its makers, but merely demon-
strate that simulations are texts which are built on human conceptions and assumptions. They 
are not objective replications of reality, but subjective, partial and interpreted representations.
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leased in 1991 and is still strongly influenced by cold war military thinking.35 In 
the game, history ends around 2050 (which can be interpreted as a statement in 
itself), but if you want to achieve a higher score, you should try to end the game 
earlier,  which is only possible by annihilating all  enemies or by winning the 
Space Race, i.e. by building a space ship and by sending it to Alpha Centauri 
first (169).36 Janet Murray notes that the goals of the game are not presented as 
an interpretive choice. “Why should global domination rather than, say, univer-
sal housing and education define the civilization that wins the game? Why not 
make an end to world hunger the winning condition? Why is the object of the 
game to compete with other leaders instead of to cooperate for the benefit of 
all  the  civilizations  without  jeopardizing  any  one country's  security?”  (1997: 
89).37
Apart from the objective of the game and the reward structure,  game 
mechanics can carry significant implicit messages. Because of its very ontology 
of measurement, simulation can only represent part of reality, and even less can 
be made interactive. In Civilization, it is interesting to analyze which parts of the 
game can be influenced by the players and which parts cannot. Because Civiliza-
tion is an attempt to simulate or represent the workings behind cultural, eco-
nomic and geopolitical history, its design decisions are also statements about 
the course of history and the influence man has on it. Like most of its prede-
cessors, going back to  Dungeons & Dragons and nineteenth century war games 
35 A rather amusing example of cultural preconceptions in Civilization is its choice of leaders for 
the different peoples. Poblocki notes that, for example, Abraham Lincoln manages to stay in 
power throughout Civilization II and III, but that Stalin has been replaced by Lenin and then by 
Catherine the Great (2002: 170).
36 In later versions of Civilization, other winning conditions are added, such as a diplomatic vic-
tory, which requires finishing the United Nations Wonder, and a cultural victory, which occurs 
when a certain number of culture points are gained. It should be noted, however, that, despite 
the seeming message of collaboration and cultural sophistication, both of these victory condi-
tions can only be attained through economic growth and keeping competing civilizations at 
bay.
37 Some eight years after Murray's plea, the United Nations World Food Program released Food 
Force {2005}, a computer game aiming “to educate youngsters about hunger and the work of 
the aid agency.” The aim of the game is to complete a series of missions, guided by a team of 
World Food Program characters. The missions range from dropping food parcels from the air 
to a sim-game in which players use food aid to rebuild a country's economy. At the end of each 
mission, players are shown a short video explaining how the aid agency would have dealt with 
the situation (BBC 2005).
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before that,  Civilization adopts the three-part representation of power, sharing 
decision making between world, man and chance, in that order. The very basis 
of cultural development is fixed. You first have to develop alphabet, then writ-
ing and only then philosophy. This 'scientific' development is fixed in a 'know-
ledge tree' which is strictly hierarchical and in which choice is limited and no 
steps can be skipped. It is impossible, for example, to avoid developing sophist-
icated military technology if you want to become a modern nation. Secondly, 
on top of this deterministic foundation, the player can make her own decisions. 
She can decide where to build her settlements, which buildings to develop, how 
much  to  spend  on  science,  and  when  to  attack  other  civilizations.  Note, 
however, that she cannot invent her own buildings, write out a research pro-
gram for, say, a universal love drug or found a United Nations global govern-
ment. There is no outside the rules of the game. Finally, random factors and 
chance come into play when conflict arises with other civilizations. Like in Dun-
geons & Dragons, military units are determined by numerical values which differ 
according to terrain, strategic position, health, stamina etc., and the battle is 
based on virtual  dice-throwing,  i.e.  random number generation by the com-
puter.  This  can theoretically  lead to unexpected outcomes,  e.g.  tanks  losing 
from phalanges, but this is only seldom so. Technology rules, man executes, 
and chance is there to be eliminated by predominance.
A MATERIAL WORLD
Most so-called 'god games', which include simulation games such as SimCity and 
strategy games such as  Civilization, position the player outside the ongoing ac-
tion, giving her a managerial role, building cities, preparing for war, but not ac-
tually living in the city or wielding a sword (see also chapter 4 on transcendental 
and avatarial introjection). The  player manages the material conditions, clears, 
builds, attacks, and the inhabitants behave accordingly. Their lives and thoughts 
are not directly controlled by the player, but  indirectly by how she organizes 
their world. In this sense, these god games are technologically deterministic but 
not socially. Their virtual inhabitants can only live according to what is given to 
them by an invisible hand, but their actual lives are hidden from the player. The 
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highly successful social simulation game The Sims {Will Wright 2000}, goes one 
step further in that it depicts its virtual inhabitants not only as living in a tech-
nologically determined universe, but also as being socially determined. Sims (the 
inhabitants of the simulation) live their lives doing their daily tasks of working, 
cleaning and going to the bathroom, but the player can make them change their 
course of action and take various initiatives.38 The implicit aim of the game is to 
improve your character's living  standard and lifestyle by working on material 
well-being and social position. This can be done by making the house more 
comfortable, by going out, making friends, finding a partner, having children 
etc. Expansion packs give Sims the opportunity to go on holiday, keep pets, vis-
it all kinds of exotic locations and take part in social activities. If the Sims' basic 
needs are not met, they become unhappy, unpopular and may eventually die. 
Whereas in traditional god games, the player controls only the virtual world, in 
The Sims, she has access to the individual's character and lifestyle. For Nutt and 
Railton, the move from traditional god games to The Sims should be seen as a 
reflection of the individualization of contemporary society (2003: 583).
Ever since it came out, The Sims has been a subject of contention between 
cultural critics who interpret its game mechanics in highly diverse – sometimes 
even contradictory – fashions. Nutt and Railton see it as a confirmation of tra-
ditional capitalist and patriarchal values because social relationships in the game 
are made subject to material concerns. “Relationships can be one of the ‘tools’ 
in the game for enhancing career opportunities and increasing income, which 
then makes it possible for the player to enhance the ‘lifestyle’ of the characters, 
and households” (586). They see the necessary instrumentality of Sims' relation-
ships as a reflection of “the intense speed of life in late modernity,” but ascribe 
this  to  the  computer  game  format  (587).  Celia  Pearce,  on  the  other  hand, 
stresses  the  artificial  nature  of  the  game,  which  she  describes  as  a  “cross 
38 In  The Sims, intelligence is not programmed top-down rationally, but distributed through the 
environment.  Will  Wright based  its simulation on earlier work done for  SimAnt {1991} in 
which, for the first time, he used a form of “distributed environmental intelligence” for simu-
lating the behavior of ants interacting with pheromone trails. It turned out that the simulation 
of the ants was more intelligent than that of a human character, also programmed for SimAnt, 
but using traditional A.I. techniques. This made Wright decide to engage in creating a simula-
tion of human behavior using distributed intelligence rather than decision trees (cf.  Wright 
2005).
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between a dollhouse, a  Tamagotchi [{Aki Maita 1996}], and the television pro-
gram Big Brother [{John de Mol 1999}]” (2004). She also observes a strong anti-
consumerist satirical subtext in the game consisting in the fact that characters 
need material goods “to make them happy, but over time, the things begin to 
own them. A larger house requires more cleaning time. You can hire a maid, 
but  the higher expenses require  that  you maintain a  certain earning power” 
(ibid.).39 Gonzalo Frasca, finally, does not see The Sims as a vanguard work be-
cause of the way it simulates life, but because, by attempting to simulate it, it is 
affirming that human life can be simulated, that man can be modeled as a less 
complex system. (2001: 52).
PLAYING PROPAGANDA
The term serious games is sometimes used to designate computer games that are 
meant to train or educate players in certain areas. By introducing game elements 
into more or less realistic simulations, educators try to make use of the autopoi-
etic (self-generating) and the autotelic (self-motivating) quality of games. The 
main purpose of serious games is not to entertain, but to communicate or teach 
through play. They are used for training in a growing number of sectors such as 
the  military,  medicine,  government  and  commerce.  Advergames are  serious 
games which advertise a product, an organization or a viewpoint and they are 
sometimes used to create sensitizing political art by, for example, creating tra-
gic, unwinnable games. In New York Defender {Stef & Phil 2002}, for example, 
no matter how successful the player is at shooting down airplanes heading for 
the twin towers, she is doomed to fail. Every time she manages to shoot one 
down, multiple others appear. Shuen-Shing Lee (2003) interprets New York De-
fender as a symbolical representation of the trauma of 9-11 “which projects a tra-
gic sense of powerlessness and hopelessness in confronting terrorism.”40 An-
39 If there is such a subtext, it would be interesting to know if it was deliberately planted by the 
game designers or the result of trying to simulate a certain way of life popular at the beginning 
of the 21st century. In the latter case, the satirical subtext can be seen as an emergent phe-
nomenon produced by the simulation itself. From an entertainment point of view, the game 
designers have then been too successful in simulating everyday life, in that not only its pleas-
ures and minor challenges emerge from the simulation, but also its more basic problems.
40 Lee probably bases her semantic analysis on the text that is shown on the opening screen of the 
game . “Utilisez votre souris pour combattre le sentiment d'impuissance” (Use your mouse to 
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other example is Gonzalo Frasca's  Kabul Kaboom {2002}, which is a comment 
upon the military operations by the USA against the Taliban regime in Afgh-
anistan. For weeks, the US air force bombed the Taliban infrastructure from 
the air while at the same time air-dropping food to show the civilians their good 
intentions. “Frasca illustrates this moment of moral contradiction in an inter-
active  environment  by  juxtaposing  two  symbols,  bombs  and  hamburgers, 
swooping down from the sky. The avatar is meant to grab as many hamburgers 
as she can while avoiding the pouring rain of bombs” (Lee S. 2003).
Whilst games such as  New York Defender and Kabul Kaboom are meant to 
sensitize  the  player  or  to  playfully  point  to  an  inherent  paradox,  other  ad-
vergames more firmly impose a particular world-view upon the player. A well-
known example is  America's  Army,  which has been developed by the United 
States Army in 2002 in order to increase the number of recruitments which had 
dropped to a historic low. According to the game's official website,  America's  
Army “provides civilians with an inside perspective and a virtual role in today's 
premier land force: the U.S. Army. The game is designed to provide an accurate 
portrayal of soldier experiences across a number of occupations.” The game is a 
team-based war game and first-person tactical shooter. Each player is assigned 
to fight in a band of American soldiers against a team of 'opposing forces', 
which are described as insurgents, enemy forces or terrorists. The goal of the 
game is to complete the mission's objectives, e.g. capture or kill an important 
terrorist, or kill all members of the opposing force within a certain period of 
time. In the past few years, there  has been a lively debate over the usefulness 
and desirability of a government institution like the military using computer 
games for advertising. This is not the only problem with  the game however. 
America's Army is presented as a message about the actual world from an actual 
institution run by the actual government. Whereas the large majority of shoot-
ing games are instances of fantasy play set  in grotesque,  unrealistic settings, 
fight your sense of impotence). Many American players failed to see that message, however, 
and interpreted the game as mockery (partly because it was made by French designers, and the 
French refused to support the invasion of Iraq in the United Nations Council in 2003). I also 
came across  Watch out behind you hunter, another game by Uzinagaz (Jay, Phil & Stef), on the 
website of the White Aryan Resistance with the caption “Shoot the fags before they rape you.” 
As I was saying, the meaning of computer games is open to interpretation.
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America's Army situates the player in war, in most cases against Arabs, claiming 
that it is a depiction of the real world. America's Army is not meant as a piece of 
fiction or a form of entertainment. It is meant as a piece of propaganda in order 
to advertise the greatness of the American army, justify conscription and fund-
ing, and convince the public of the necessity and glory of armed conflict.
One step further down the ladder are what is sometimes referred to as 
agitprop games, which are not just meant to advertise a point of view, but to incite 
violent action.  One year after the appearance of  America's Army,  the Lebanese 
organization Hizbullah created  Special Force,  a radical agitprop game in which 
the player is to take the role of a  Hizbullah warrior and conduct operations 
against the Israeli army in South Lebanon. One of its features is a training simu-
lation in which players can practice their shooting skills on targets such as the 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The text on the game's box reads like an 
echo of the description of America's Army quoted earlier: “The designers of Spe-
cial Force are very proud to provide you with this special product, which embod-
ies objectively the defeat of the Israeli enemy and the heroic actions taken by 
heroes of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.” Special Force is meant as a reaction 
to America's Army. As Mahmoud Rayya, a Hizbullah official explained in a tele-
phone interview with the  Daily Star: “Special Force was designed to compete 
against foreign computer games that depict Arabs as enemies and Americans as 
the heroes that defeat them.” (WND 2003). Of course, neither America's Army 
nor  Special Force are anywhere near an objective representation, even if such a 
thing were possible. They may have been programmed using 'objective' math-
ematical and logical formulas. Their design is all the more subjective however. 
Just as you can use brush strokes or words to depict situations more or less 
realistically, mathematics can be used as a form of representation subject to ma-
nipulation. 
The bottom rung of the agitprop ladder is occupied by so-called 'white-
power'-games created by organizations such as the National Alliance neo-Nazi 
group. Titles include  Shoot the Blacks {ASA productions 2000},  KZ-Rattenjagd 
{'Concentration Camp Rat Hunt', NSDAP/AO 2000}, and the most technolo-
gically advanced  Ethnic Cleansing {Resistance Records  2003}. The premise of 
Ethnic Cleansing is that New York has been destroyed by gangs of 'sub-humans' 
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controlled by Jews who plan world domination. The aim for the player, who 
can dress in Ku Klux Klan robes or as a Skinhead, is to clean the streets and 
subways of Blacks, Latinos and Jews which, when they are killed, produce ape 
sounds or shout “I'll take a siesta now!” or “Oy vey!” The soundtrack of the 
game consists of racist songs and in the game world, National Alliance signs 
and posters are there to support the player in her quest. At the end of the game, 
the player is faced with the 'end boss' who is a rocket launcher-wielding Ariel 
Sharon who shouts lines like “We have destroyed your culture!”; and “We si-
lenced Henry Ford” and when he dies “Filthy White dog, you have destroyed 
thousands of years of planning.” Abraham Foxman, the national director of the 
American Anti-Defamation League notes that organizations like the National 
Alliance “use modern technology to seduce young people who are attracted and 
addicted to games,  into bigotry, prejudice and anti-Semitism”. As such, they 
“piggyback on the popularity of games and are a perversion of a well-meaning 
entertainment vehicle” (Scheeres 2002). Computer simulation is a form of rep-
resentation. As such, it is neither good nor bad intrinsically. Hence it is not the 
medium or the technology as a whole that needs to be evaluated, as is all too 
often done in public debate; it is the message it carries. Instead of inducing fear 
of new technology and new forms of entertainment, children should be edu-
cated about what computer games are, how they function, and how their rep-
resentation of events can be manipulated. It is only when everyone realizes that 
they are just another form of depiction, like painting, literature, photography, 
film etc. and knows how they are subject to interpretation, that we can live in a 
healthy relationship with this new system for representing reality.
4. MODELING AND CULTURE
In Life on the Screen (1995), Sherry Turkle identifies  and describes what she sees 
as a fundamental shift in the way in which we see and use computers. During 
the Second World War, the computer was developed as a number-cruncher for 
code-breaking and impact calculation. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, as an 
increasing number of computer games and graphical applications appeared, de-
signers began to realize that the true power of a computer does not lie in pure 
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calculation, but in the fact that real-time calculation can be used to simulate the 
effects of certain real-world phenomena. In other words, it was only when soft-
ware developers realized that computing was not just a matter of analytical un-
derstanding, but also of creative inspiration, of imitating real-world phenomena, 
that the computer managed to rid itself of its image of being a giant calculator. 
While, for programmers and system analysts, the computer has always remained 
an information processing device, for the average user, today, the logical and 
mathematical processing is hidden behind colorful interfaces. Computer lessons 
longer deal with calculation and rules, but rather simulation, navigation and in-
teraction (19). Today, the role of the computer in people's lives is very different 
from what most expected in the late 1970s. Early personal computers such as 
the IBM PC, presented themselves as “open, transparent, potentially reducible 
to their underlying mechanisms” (23). With the introduction of the Macintosh 
by Apple in 1984, however, a second, more closed paradigm appeared.  The 
Macintosh boasted a graphical user interface (desktop, icons, windows, folders, 
trash can etc.) which did not reflect its underlying structure. Instead, it created a 
simplified interface for  the  user  based  on familiar  real-world  situations  and 
tools. Turkle sees the movement from calculation to simulation as a correlative 
of a broader cultural move in the second half of the twentieth century. “There 
was IBM reductionism vs. Macintosh simulation and surface: an icon of the 
modernist  technological  utopia vs.  an  icon of  post-modern reverie” (Turkle 
1995: 36).41
As simulation apparatuses, computers are extremely versatile and malle-
able machines which can be used to mimic the behavior of  a broad array of 
natural phenomena and tools. Just like the shift from analog to digital storage 
introduced an additional layer of mathematical abstraction between carrier and 
form, the shift from calculation to simulation allowed computing to shake loose 
its ontology of number-crunching and replace it with one of representation and 
41 Microsoft Windows came out one year after the Macintosh and combined the MS-DOS com-
mand-line operating system with the feel of the Macintosh interface, thus the “modern and 
postmodern aesthetics of computing became curiously entwined” (Turkle 1995: 37). In 2001, 
Apple released OS X, which is based on the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) and which 
combines a polished user interface with extensive command-line and scripting capabilities so 
today both paradigms have become hybrids favoring the graphic layer, but also providing more 
direct access to its underlying mechanics through a command line interface. 
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virtuality. Simulation introduced a separation between the computer's surface 
structure and its underlying mechanics. This, in turn, allowed it to become a 
creative environment, one that can be used for creative expression. In a sense, 
the largest innovation spurred by computers is not computing, but the realiza-
tion that,  by combining large amounts of data in logical structures, dynamic 
real-world phenomena can be mimicked. Simulation gave computing its own 
form of representation. Regarding computers as mere calculators today – which 
from a purist point of view, they are – is as reductive as speaking of literature in 
terms of paper and ink. Computing has acquired the role of a facilitator rather 
than a final goal for the majority of users. In computing, the (modernist) illusive 
dream of finding a computable essence of the universe through analytical calcu-
lation has been pushed aside. There is a reality and we are part of it, but it can-
not be caught as a whole in any form of representation, be it in words, images 
or logic. When simulating the real, choices have to be made, and trade-offs ac-
cepted. A computer simulation does not logically deduct a solution to a prob-
lem, but by approximating a phenomenon, by showing a slice of reality, it can 
raise consciousness regarding the matter.
MEASURING THE WORLD
As a framework for understanding and representing reality, computer simula-
tion can be seen as part of a broader cultural move to increasingly interpret the 
world in terms of quantity and measurement. This move from a more language-
based analysis and depiction of reality to one in numbers, scales and vectors 
goes hand in hand with the development and success of statistical methods in 
science and government and with the introduction of the market principle and 
competition in more and more sectors of society. As for computer simulation, 
ironically, it was only when mathematics was subjected to an ontology of meas-
urement that it was able to fulfill its role in cultural understanding. It was only 
when it ceased to attempt to grasp the essence of the world, and restricted itself 
to superficial modeling, that it was able to become a form of representation. 
Turkle cites Rafe, a forty-six-year-old video editor as an illustration of the ra-
tionale of the move toward simulation: “Simulation offers us the greatest hope 
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of understanding. When a world, our world, is far too complex to be under-
stood in terms of first principles, that is to say, when the world is too complex 
for the human mind to build it as a mental construct from first principles, then 
it defies human intellect to define its truth. When we reach that point we must 
navigate within the world, learning its rules by the seat of our pants, feeling it, 
sharing it, using it. By getting our analytic intelligence out of the way, we can 
sometimes more efficiently negotiate that world” (1995: 46). It was only by ac-
cepting the limitations of quantitative modeling as a sign system, that comput-
ing was able to overcome its own theoretical limitations and become a cultural 
tool for analyzing and interpreting the world. For Ted Friedman, this makes 
simulation the perfect form of expression for the postmodern age. “Escaping 
the prison-house of language which seems so inadequate for holding together 
the disparate strands that construct postmodern subjectivity, computer simula-
tions provide a radically new quasi-narrative form through which to communic-
ate structures of interconnection” (1999).
Computer simulation was not the first cultural form to use a complex 
framework of quantified relations between elements for the representation of 
reality.  One highly  influential  implementation of  quantified  thinking  in  pre-
computer games can be found in tabletop role-playing games such as Dungeons  
& Dragons {Gary Gygax 1974}. In RPGs, characters, challenges, actions and 
story are based on quantified relations between elements. The player's charac-
ter, for example, is determined by its gender, race and class and is defined by 
some six characteristics: strength, dexterity, constitution, wisdom, intelligence 
and charisma. In the game, a dungeon master presents opponents and obstacles 
to the players loosely following a rule-book. These obstacles can consist of dan-
gerous monsters or deadly puzzles. As the players progress through the game, 
killing enemies and collecting loot, their character increases in power, a process 
generally referred to as 'leveling'. After defeating a band of orcs, for example, 
their strength and dexterity may improve and by solving puzzles they may reach 
a higher level of intelligence or wisdom. Significantly, not only physical qualities 
such as strength are quantified on a linear scale, but also complex psychological 
traits such as wisdom, intelligence and charisma. This type of analysis of human 
psychology is of course reductive as a person can, for example, react intelli-
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gently in one situation, but not in another, or can be deemed wise by one and 
arrogant by another. Even magical power – whose very essence implies that it 
cannot be understood – is defined by objectified and quantified mental charac-
teristics. Even the secret foundations of sorcery are unveiled, counted, quanti-
fied and interwoven in one large interconnected system of relative value. 
A similar logic of quantification is present in computer games. Characters 
in The Sims, for example, are defined by five main characteristics: neat, outgo-
ing, active, playful and nice. These characteristics are seen as virtues and the un-
derlying aim of the game is to increase them by climbing the social hierarchy. In 
this way, The Sims implicitly claims that to be neat, outgoing, active, playful and 
nice is the main recipe for leading a successful and fulfilling life. Being creative, 
critical, intelligent and sexy does not help you as a Sim. There are only five 
characteristics that matter. “Not ten thousand nor three: the Sims have five” 
(Frasca 2001: 46). There are also exactly three modes of playing in The Sims, i.e. 
'building',  'buying'  and 'living'.  When moving into  a  Sim neighborhood,  the 
player receives an amount of money with which to build a house (walls, floor, 
windows, garden etc.) in 'building' mode; furnish it in 'buying' mode; and only 
then do interesting things in 'living' mode. Again, a familiar interpretation of life 
today. In The Sims, life is a matter of material well-being. You have to be finan-
cially independent, build a house, make it a nice place and then you are able to 
lead a fulfilling life. The virtual life of a Sim is not divided in learning, caring 
and  helping,  for  example,  but  in  building,  buying  and  living.  Everything  is 
already there in the catalog. It only needs to be bought. The highest goal in the 
game is to become successful, earn more money so that you can move to a lar-
ger house and buy more expensive goods. It is not to be there for your family, 
to lead a truthful life in the face of a god or to realize yourself creatively. It is to 
function within and contribute to the economic system. Computer games are a 
construction, a cultural form which reflects the meanings, understanding and 
preoccupations of the culture in which it was developed. In itself, measurement 
and modeling are a perfectly legitimate and powerful new means of understand-
ing and representing the world. What should not be forgotten, however, is that 
they are just that: quantifications of qualitative judgments which are part of a 
cultural construction.  The Sims is a reflection of the contemporary lifestyle of 
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the American middle-class (who are also its primary target audience). As such, it 
is only one, very narrow interpretation of how one can lead a fulfilling life. It is 
a partial representation of a cultural image, not an analytical fact.
THE PRISON HOUSE OF QUANTIFICATION
In 1976, ten years after he had programmed  Eliza,  Joseph  Weizenbaum pub-
lished Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgement to Calculation, a defense 
of the power and uniqueness of human judgment and the necessity to distin-
guish  it  from mechanical  rule-based thinking.  In his  book,  Weizenbaum  la-
ments the invention of the intelligence quotient by the French psychologist Al-
fred Binet in 1905. “Few 'scientific' concepts have so thoroughly muddled the 
thinking of both scientists and the general public as that of the 'intelligence 
quotient'  or  'I.Q.'  The  idea  that  intelligence  can  be  quantitatively  measured 
along a simple linear scale has caused untold harm to our society in general, and 
to education in particular” (1976: 203). As is the case for many measuring sys-
tems, uninformed observers tend to interpret their approximative model as an 
objective truth, or even worse, as a reality of its own. Measurements such as IQ 
testing are a relative indicator in more than one way however. First of all, they 
are not objective. When evaluating a thought, this is always done in relation to 
other thoughts and not to some kind of objective fact. IQ testing, although it 
can provide regular and to an extent culturally independent results, has been de-
signed by psychologists with specific problems and tasks in mind which are far 
from absolute indicators of the problems one is faced with during one's life-
time. Secondly, IQ testing reduces a non-linear phenomenon to a linear scale. A 
person may be good in logical thinking, but not so good in linguistic tests, for 
example. When these separate results are reduced to a linear scale, the maker of 
the test has to decide how she will represent them proportionally, which adds 
another subjective layer to the testing. Third and finally, intelligence is not a 
physical phenomenon which can be measured in the same way as distance or 
mass. It is not the number of neural connections which determine the quality of 
a thought, but its socio-cultural impact. In a sense, measurement and quantific-
ation of complex psychological phenomena are a form of metaphorical repres-
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entation. Man is highly competent in judging and comparing phenomena ex-
pressed in quantitative terms (distance, price etc.). Hence it is useful to refer 
even to more complex realities in numerical terms. It should be remembered, 
however, that these measurements are simplifications and do not correspond to 
the phenomenon itself.
An often heard counterargument to this line of argumentation is that the 
proposed tests are not yet perfect, but that they will become more granular and 
objective in the future. This is a fallacy however. Making a subjective measure 
more complex does not result in objectivity. It may obfuscate its own subjective 
ontology, but it will never result in an objective truth. As an illustration of the 
fact that strengthening a technique does not necessarily contribute to its valid-
ity,  Weizenbaum refers  to  computer horoscopes.  “There are  computer  pro-
grams that can carry out with great precision all the calculations required to cast 
the horoscope of an individual whose time and place of birth are known. Be-
cause the computer does all  the tedious  symbol manipulations,  they can be 
done much more quickly and in much more detail than is normally possible for 
a human astrologer. However, such an improvement in the technique of horo-
scope casting is irrelevant to the validity of astrological forecasting. If astrology 
is nonsense, then computerized astrology is just as surely nonsense” (1976: 34). 
Quantification does not make a proposition impervious to qualitative criticism, 
nor does it make it objective; it only renders it more precise in its subjectivity. 
The quantitative view on reality opens interesting perspectives for new ways of 
cultural understanding, but it also inheres a fundamental danger. Quantitative 
systems are always based on qualitative judgments, yet they tend to emphasize 
the  results  of  their  measurements  and  hide  their  qualitative  underpinnings. 
Hence there is an imminent danger that the model will increasingly be seen as 
an objective fact or even a replication of the phenomenon that is measured. 
Like most forms of fundamentalism, this allows to trade the daunting complex-
ity of reality for the seemingly safe and trusted familiarity of a single principle. 
At the same time this trade is illusive however. A model is no more than a rep-
resentation and measurement only a tiny slice of the cake that is reality.
118         UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER GAME CULTURE
HYPERREALITY
In  the  1980s,  French  cultural  philosopher  Jean  Baudrillard  pointed  at  the 
danger that too many of our interpretations and decisions are based on models 
rather than reality itself. By way of example, Baudrillard refers to mass media 
and the capitalist economic system. His ideas are primarily a semiotic theory of 
representation and the role played by signs and values in our society.42 Due to 
our extensive exposure to media, especially media images, in our everyday lives, 
these images have begun to play a major role in our understanding of the world. 
For Baudrillard, these images are gradually replacing reality as our basic frame 
of reference. When we are today confronted with a sign or a representation, we 
no longer base our understanding of it on our own experience of reality, but on 
other signs and images. For Baudrillard, this means that signs increasingly de-
rive their meaning from one another and are losing their referential link with 
reality. As our experiential horizon is built of media representations, the signs 
we ourselves create no longer refer to a reality we know, but to other signs and 
representations.43 Thus we are creating a layer of images between ourselves and 
the world. and these images, as they refer only to other images, slowly develop 
their own alternative reality: “the generation by models of a real without origin 
or reality: a hyperreal” (Baudrillard 1988). Images are being created increasingly 
on the basis of other images, rather than on reality. For Baudrillard, they no 
42 Baudrillard's philosophy of the hyperreal is a semiotic theory of representation, but it has often 
been mistaken for a theory of perception or even an ontology. One often heard criticism, for 
example, is the fact that his theory is contradictory because he laments the disappearance of 
reality, but how can something disappear which he claims never existed in the first place? This 
seeming contradiction is based on a misunderstanding. When Baudrillard writes about the hy-
perreal that is replacing the real, he is talking about the role signs and signification play in our 
culture, not about the non-existence of an empirical reality. He is simply describing the fact that 
due to the ever larger role media play in our lives, these media are becoming the basis of our 
understanding of the world rather than the world itself.
43 In 1991, Baudrillard provocatively claimed that the (first) Gulf War never took place. Many 
critics of poststructuralist thinking took this example as the proof of poststructuralism's relativ-
ism or even cynicism. What they failed to see was that Baudrillard's statement was not about 
perception or the world, but about the statement itself. What he meant was that when we use 
the term 'Gulf War', it refers to something to which both speaker and listener can relate, but 
which they only know from media images and subjective analyses. Of course there have been 
terrible bombardments, man to man fighting, thousands of dead etc., but this is not what the 
word 'Gulf War' refers to for Baudrillard. 'Gulf War' refers to media images of SCUD rockets 
being launched against Israel, precision bombardments and a fast and clean victory of the allied 
forces.
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longer function as representation as they do not re-present something in the 
world. Rather, these hyperreal images are the result of a process of what he calls 
simulation,44 the creation of an image to be an alternative to reality rather than 
represent it. Images have become simulacra, copies of originals that never exis-
ted, e.g. Disneyland's Main Street.45
Baudrillard situates the appearance of the mechanism of simulation in our 
culture with the crash of the stock markets in 1929 and the collapse of a whole 
range of national currencies in the 1920s and 1930s (1993: 21). To him, this 
marked the beginning of the acceptance that the economic model is not a deriv-
ation of reality,  but that  reality is  dependent on it.  The loss  of the Bretton 
Woods gold standard in 1971, he sees as the definitive loss of any possible ref-
erence for economic value, turning our economy into one large relative system 
of belief without a referential link with reality. The economy has become a sim-
ulation,  a  quantitative  model  based  solely  on  exchange  value,  which,  for 
Baudrillard, does not mask or hide use value, but replaces it. “[Simulation] is no 
longer a question of imitation, nor of reduplication, nor even of parody. It is 
rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself; that is, an 
operation to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, 
programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the 
real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes” (1988). This leads to the removal of 
significance from production and the installation of the 'economic' as its ra-
tionale. Production is no longer seen as a meaningful activity in relation to oth-
er ideas or activities, but rather for the sake of production and growth itself 
44 Baudrillard opposes simulation to representation, whereby representation is seen as carrying 
reference to reality and simulation as only referring to itself, “the sign as reversion and death 
sentence of every reference” (Baudrillard 1988).  In this study,  I use 'simulation'  not in the 
philosophical sense, but to refer to a specific type of dynamic representation, i.e. computer sim-
ulation.
45 Baudrillard's theory can be seen as a manifestation of a deeper cultural fear of technology and 
its control over man. Many cultural representations of technology refer to this conflict between 
man and machine (see also chapter 5 on the purpose of play). The entire dystopian tradition 
can be seen as an expression of the fear that technology is taking over our daily existence and 
that the world is slowly being dominated by models instead of the other way round. This onto-
logical fear is based on a misunderstanding, however, as technology is a tool and simulation a 
form of representation created by man. Hence, if there is a problem, it should be formulated in 
epistemological terms. It is because in many cases models are mistakenly presented as a form of 
über-reality, that this fear of technology and feeling of loss of control increases.
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(1993: 33). Whilst I do not agree with Baudrillard's fatalistic perspective, I tend 
to agree at least partly with his observation that modeling and measurement 
have in some parts of our society transcended their own role of being a repres-
entation. What Baudrillard sees as a loss of reality, a definitive ontological fact, 
however, I tend to see as a basic epistemological misunderstanding. Like all 
forms of representation, models are human creations for understanding com-
plex dynamic processes. They are not, nor will they ever be the processes them-
selves. Economic simulation is a window onto the world and when making de-
cisions, it should be taken into account, but only as that which it is: an approx-
imative constructed model of one specific aspect of a possibly endlessly com-
plex reality.
In conclusion, what I object to most strongly in Baudrillard's analysis is its 
undertone of inevitability.  Baudrillard regards the ubiquity of media imagery 
and the growth of the capitalist economic system as inevitably resulting in the 
definitive replacement of reality by the model. Like Neil Postman, he describes 
the cultural history (of the image) as a succession of stages induced by techno-
logical development, without questioning this development or the role that man 
plays in it. As I have argued before, this is a naive and reductive view on devel-
opment. Technology is not something that develops outside and independent 
from society. If media have acquired a more prominent place in everyday life in 
the second half of the twentieth century, this is not because we are all sheep 
and some evil genius wants us to watch television commercials. Rather, it is the 
result of a complex cultural dynamic dealing with a world continuously growing 
larger and more complex.46 Our cultural horizon broadens as our planet devel-
ops toward a globalized  society, and our knowledge about the world deepens 
with scientific progress. The growth of technological imagery and the develop-
ment of dynamic modeling are part of this process. Ironically, technology and 
46 One instance of a geopolitical strategy in which computer simulation played an important role 
was the Cold War military doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). This strategy was 
based on the theory of deterrence and stipulated that, to prevent an enemy to launch a nuclear 
attack, it would suffice to preserve so-called second strike capability, the force to retaliate even 
after a first strike, e.g. from ballistic missile submarines. Simulations allowed to calculate all 
possible outcomes of a global nuclear war and thus helped to support the MAD doctrine and 
prevent this war from actually taking place. In this example the model did not obscure the view 
on reality, but rather allowed to see it at all without endangering the entire human species. 
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representation are  a prerequisite for a global society based on empirical fact. 
Simulation is a powerful form of representing the world and can help organize 
a complex global society. If some try to push the model to become a reality of 
its own, this is not due to some inherent logic of the model itself, but to a mis-
understanding or to political motivations. A simulation is an instrument, not a 
god. It is a form of dynamic representation created by man to assist him in in-
terpreting the world, not to replace the process of human interpretation.

III
VIRTUAL ONTOLOGY
The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he 
knows appearances only.
Plato, The Republic, book 10, 360 BC
In 1984, William Gibson published Neuromancer,  a science fiction novel telling 
the story of computer hacker Case who is approached by Wintermute, an artifi-
cial intelligence program which is assembling a team to raid Tessier-Ashpool's 
headquarters and liberate Neuromancer, another A.I. The novel is set in the 
near future when the world has been devastated by nuclear warfare and ecolo-
gical disaster. Technology has come to dominate life on earth. Electronic gad-
gets and implants have turned man into a cyborg, chemical treatments keep him 
young and healthy, and synthetic drugs help him cope. People have cranial jacks 
installed in their skulls which allows their brain and nervous system to access 
microsofts  (powerful  memory chips),  Simstim units  (a  sort  of  virtual  reality 
whereby the spectator is cast into the role of one of the actors: viewing, hearing 
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and feeling what they do), and most importantly the matrix, a digital space con-
nected to all  computer systems in the world.47 Despite its  gravely dystopian 
theme and overall grim outlook on the future of man, Neuromancer has been re-
ceived with great enthusiasm, triggering the cyberpunk movement, popularizing 
the idea of artificial intelligence, and most of all paving the path for the pop-
ularization of the Internet. Whilst the idea of a virtual space was not new – it 
had previously popped up in various other science fiction novels and films – 
Gibson was the first to describe it in such compelling, illustrative terms and at-
tach a name to it: cyberspace. The term 'cyberspace' is derived from the word 
'cybernetics', which refers to the scientific study of communication processes 
between man and machine. 'Cyberspace' filled a cultural and semantic gap while 
at the same time strongly appealing to the imagination. In no time, it lost its 
biological connotations and came to refer to any computer-generated virtual 
space. As such, it was picked up by marketeers and played a primary role in the 
hype surrounding the Internet and in the steep rise and consequent downfall of 
the dotcom economy.
Meanwhile, since the 1970s, researchers and artists had been experiment-
ing with three-dimensional virtual environments such as the  Aspen Movie Map 
{Andrew Lippman 1977} which takes the user on a virtual tour through the 
city of Aspen, Colorado. Myron Krueger was an artist who aimed to create vir-
tual immersive environments referred to as 'artificial  realities'.  The definitive 
breakthrough of the idea of a simulated environment in which the user is cast 
appeared in 1989, when musician and visual artist Jaron Lanier boldly replaced 
Krueger's accurate but somewhat dry modifier 'artificial' by the more suggestive 
'virtual' thus coining the now commonplace notion of 'virtual reality'. While the 
term 'artificial' referred to the constructedness of the space generated by the 
computer, the term 'virtual' implicates its almost being real. Etymologically (see 
also below) the term 'virtual' is related to the idea of potentiality, referring to an 
inherent capacity of it coming into being. This permitted Lanier's concept to 
jump on the cyberspace bandwagon launched five years earlier. The fact that 
47 The term 'matrix',  which was also used in  Doctor Who, The Deadly Assassin {Robert Holmes 
1975} and Tron {Steven Lisberger 1982}, was derived from the mathematical notion referring 
to 'a rectangular array of elements organized in rows and columns'. Fifteen years after  Neur-
omancer, it inspired the Wachowski brothers to make the Matrix film trilogy.
VIRTUAL ONTOLOGY          125
virtual reality technology was (and still is) nowhere near its implicit goal of po-
tentially replacing actual reality was not a problem. The mythical potential and 
theoretical attraction that emanated from the notion were more than enough to 
catch the public ear and eye and to enter the collective imagination. Two years 
after Lanier's coinage, journalist Howard Rheingold published Virtual Reality, an 
imaginative contemplation of the possibility of man building his own perceptual 
worlds.  Rheingold's  book was  absorbed  in  the  Internet  frenzy  of  the  early 
1990s, received much critical and academic attention and managed to further 
popularize the term. Since that time, virtual reality technology has not made 
that much progress, yet the idea of virtuality in relation to three dimensional 
computer simulation has become so common that it is most likely here to stay.
1. ANALYZING THE VIRTUAL
The term 'virtual' means something like 'potential', 'almost real', 'being such in 
appearance or effect though not in actual fact'. Etymologically, it is related to 
ancient Latin 'virtus' meaning 'manliness', 'power', 'virtue' (cf. by virtue of: on 
the strength of). In medieval scholastic philosophy, a more ontological notion 
was derived referred to as 'virtualis' and used to designate that which lies within 
the power of the world (God) to become actual. It was derived from Aristotle's 
metaphysical theory which makes a distinction between potential and actual ex-
istence (in potentia vs. in actu) whereby the potential refers to that which could 
exist, the only obstacle being that it is not yet actualized, created if you like. A 
classical example is that of the acorn and the oak. While an acorn is not a tree, it 
has been blessed with the ability to become one. Godly providence has fore-
seen that an oak can be present in every acorn. Every acorn has the potential to 
actualize into an oak tree. It is important, however, not to mistake the Aris-
totelian and Scholastic notion of virtual for a scientific concept. It is a general, 
metaphysical idea and thus it does not just apply to natural phenomena such as 
the growth of a fruit, but to any object with certain applications or abilities. 
Hence it could be used with regard to man who has the potential to become a 
carpenter for example, but also to iron which can become a sword, grain which 
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can become bread and a brick which can become a house. In  Scholastic theory, 
a brick could be referred to as a virtual, a potential house.
Around the eighteenth century, the concept of virtuality was introduced 
to natural science to describe the optical phenomenon of virtual focus. Lenses 
and mirrors are artifacts crafted to shape an image of an object by modifying 
the path of its light rays. Thereby images can be real or virtual, enlarged or re-
duced in size, and erect or inverted. Whereas the latter categories are straight-
forward enough, the former merit some more attention. A real image of a scene 
is one formed by rays of light actually passing through the image point, conver-
ging to a focus there. This type of image can be projected on a screen placed at 
the image location. A virtual image, on the other hand, consists of diverging rays 
of light which appear to come from a point within or behind the mirror or lens. 
As the rays are diverging, they cannot be focused at any point making it im-
possible to project the image on a screen. Significantly, the image reflected by 
an ordinary mirror is virtual.48 Marie-Laure Ryan (2001a: 27) notes that, with its 
use in optics, the term 'virtual' at the same time lost its metaphysical connota-
tions and moved further away from the idea of 'potentiality' to also come to 
mean 'real in appearance but not actually so'. 
In the early days of computing, the term 'virtual' was picked up by com-
puter scientists to refer to that which the machine thinks it is dealing with, but 
with which it is not actually dealing. In this sense it was used for example in the 
compound 'virtual machine'  where it  refers to the intermediate layer created 
between  human  programmer  and  machine.  Because  low-level  computing  is 
concerned with the switching of bits and bytes, it is almost impossible to pro-
gram complex routines in low-level machine code. For this reason, higher-level 
programming languages have been created which are easier to deal with for 
programmers and which are themselves translated to low-level instructions by 
automatic interpreters and compilers. A virtual machine is an apparatus with 
which programmers pretend or imagine to be communicating while in reality it 
exists only as a programmatic construct, an intermediate software layer. In a 
48 The image formed by a concave mirror (as in a reflecting telescope) is real while a magnifying 
glass can form either a real or a virtual image depending on how far it is held from the object in 
point. When held close, the image is virtual and erect. When held further away, it is real and in-
verted.
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similar sense, the term 'virtual' is used to describe other computer phenomena 
whereby  it  invariably  refers  to  constructs  which  pretend  to  be  something 
without actually being so. A virtual disc, for example, is a portion of random ac-
cess memory used for high-speed storage and retrieval but which presents itself 
to the computer as a hard-disc. Virtual memory, inversely, refers to a software 
construct which reserves a part of the hard drive to function as memory in case 
all actual ram memory is used up. It is here that Jaron Lanier in 1989 picked up 
the idea of referring to digital constructs as 'virtual' and generalized it to refer to 
any simulation of a real-world object by a computer: a virtual home, a virtual 
car, a virtual character and so forth.
BECOMING VIRTUAL
In 1998, the French philosopher and multi-media theorist  Pierre Lévy pub-
lished Qu'est-ce que le virtuel? (Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age), a philo-
sophical exploration of the ontological nature of the digital age. Lévy's main 
claim is that, with the advent of information technology, we are increasingly be-
ing faced with the limitations of the traditional opposition between real and 
possible reality, the former referring to that which surrounds us and the latter 
to that which is not there but could be. For Lévy, this opposition has been su-
perseded by a new one which is beginning to dominate our lives: the opposition 
between the potential and the actual, whereby, increasingly, we are seeing the 
world not in terms of distant possibility, but as nearby potential. The main dif-
ference, for Lévy, is that the potential is not just a question of logical possibility, 
but that it is in fact part of reality. One can stand on a hill and imagine the pos-
sibility of building a house there. When looking at a brick, however, one can see 
its potential to become one. Whereas, both the possible and the real are so-called 
ontologically complete – they are fixed in their either being or not being – the 
actual and the virtual are not ready-mades. The virtual is a solution to a ques-
tion that poses itself, and the actual is the result of a complex interactive pro-
cess of development, not of binary creation. Hence, when looking at virtual ob-
jects generated by a computer, they should neither be seen as possible nor as 
real creations, but as a sort of in-between category: objects which have not yet 
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been actualized, but which have the potential to become so. For Lévy, this is 
the essence of the information age in which no longer the object alone has 
value, but also its analysis and description.
According to Lévy, our culture and society are reorienting from the op-
position between real and possible to that between the actual and the virtual. 
Whereas previously the world was interpreted as a collection of givens, now the 
emphasis is increasingly on the changeability and potential present in the world. 
This move can be observed in, for example, the virtualization of communica-
tion, economy and identity at the end of the twentieth century. To Lévy, the 
virtualization of our culture is part of our “poursuite d'une hominisation con-
tinuée,” our continuous pursuit to become more human(e). For Lévy, there are 
at least three virtualization processes that have helped the human species to 
break loose from its natural condition: the development of language, that of 
technology and that of institutionalization (69). The development of language 
allowed for the virtualization of time in that it enabled man to gain control over 
his own development in time by handing him a tool for referring to past and 
future events. Technology, which is seen in a McLuhanesque light, has allowed 
man to virtualize his actions (for example by planning), his body by extending it 
(the car extends the feet, an excavator the hands), and his physical environment 
(global telecommunications abstract physical location). Finally, institutionaliza-
tion – the way in which man organizes himself in political, economic and social 
entities – is for Lévy a way for man to virtualize violence (75).
In the second half of the 1990s, utopian claims such as Lévy's regarding 
the potential of information technology to deliver man from his restrictions as a 
physical being were the rule rather than an exception. During the Internet hype, 
in a sort of inverse fin-de-millénaire frenzy, it was believed that, now that the 
Cold War had ended, technology would be there to empower and unite man to 
form one 'global village'. The primacy of the real would be broken. Virtual eco-
nomies, cut loose from the restrictions and boundaries of the real, would com-
pete and eventually replace real-world economies. And the world as a whole 
would become a more humane, democratic and free place to live in. It is also in 
this light that the dotcom boom is to be understood. Companies with ambi-
tious (virtual) plans, but few (real) achievements were catapulted towards soar-
VIRTUAL ONTOLOGY          129
ing stock prices. When this news was picked up by the media and the public, 
they, in turn, began to believe the hype and contributed to it by buying their 
share. At the end of the 1990s, when the problems and limitations of the Inter-
net began to sink in and it became clear that the dream had been only that: a 
dream, the virtual economy was in no time reduced to its real proportions. The 
dotcom hype became a nightmare,  stocks plummeted and large numbers of 
well-meaning utopianists lost many years of savings. Today, the utopian calls 
for a new virtual world have largely disappeared except in one area, that of per-
sistent  world  games,  also  referred  to  as  massive  multiplayer  online  games 
(mmogs).
PERSISTENT WORLDS
Since their inception, computer games have been accessible to multiple players 
at once. Space War {Steve Russell 1962}, for example, was made for two play-
ers; there was no computer opponent. And Pong {Nolan Bushnell 1972} could 
be played against the computer, but the two-player version was more engaging 
and more popular. Experiments with so-called networked gaming with multiple 
players each sitting at their own computer terminal followed not much later. 
Already in 1969, Rick Blomme programmed a networked two-player version of 
Space War for Plato, a distant forerunner of today's Internet. A second import-
ant  milestone in networked computer gaming was  Maze War,  a  multi-player 
maze game developed around 1974  at  the NASA Ames Research Center in 
California. As the name suggests, Maze War is a combat game set in a labyrinth 
of which a small map is displayed at the bottom of the screen. The player is 
represented in the virtual world by something that looks like an eyeball and 
which can move around and shoot in a rudimentary but coherent three-dimen-
sional setting. The aim of the game is to steer your avatar through the maze 
chasing and shooting other players. 
Maze War was what could be called a sessional multi-player game. As with 
most computer games which are played over the Internet today, a number of 
players would log on to a central computer and a game session would start. 
Some time later, when a winner has been appointed, the game session would 
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end, players would log off, and the game software would be reset to its initial 
state or wiped from memory entirely. Hence, apart from being accessible over a 
network, games such as Maze War are not so different from earlier multi-player 
games like  Space War. All through the seventies,  Maze War was a hit in com-
puter laboratories all over the USA just like Space War had been in the 1960s. 
Interestingly,  Maze War still has its influence on the gaming scene today. Be-
cause it was developed in the public domain, no company that came after it has 
been able to claim ownership of the rights to the invention of multi-user, net-
worked, three-dimensional computer games.
A rather different type of multi-player game is that of so-called persistent 
environments. Whereas in sessional multi-player games, every time a game is 
played, a new virtual game world is generated, persistent environments exist in-
dependently from any player's game session. Whereas in sessional games the 
virtual  world is  dedicated to the players temporarily  entering it,  a  persistent 
world is always already there and continues to evolve even when all players have 
logged  off.  An  early  example  of  a  persistent  multi-player  environment  was 
Multi-User Dungeon or MUD, developed in 1978 by Roy Trubshaw and Richard 
Bartle at Essex University, England. It was a text-based dungeon-crawling game 
which could be accessed simultaneously by multiple players,  who each con-
trolled their own character. When the player is logged on, she can move around 
in the virtual environment by typing commands such as 'go north' and carry out 
actions like 'open door' or 'hit troll with ax'. When she logs off, her avatar will 
temporarily refrain from taking action, but other players will come and go and 
computer characters will make sure that the virtual environment continues to 
evolve. The game usually referred to as the first graphical persistent game world 
was Neverwinter Nights, designed by Don Daglow and Cathryn Mataga. It was a 
fantasy  role-playing game which was accessible on America Online between 
1991 and 1997.
THE QUEST FOR GROWTH
The fantasy role-playing game genre can be traced back almost in a straight line 
to  Gary  Gygax  and  David  Arneson's  Dungeons  & Dragons,  a  tabletop  game 
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played with several players and a Dungeon Master who orchestrates and refer-
ees game-play based on a rule- and a story book. Thematically, the Dungeons & 
Dragons universe goes back to J.R.R. Tolkien's Middle-Earth as it was described 
in the  Lord of  the Rings trilogy (1954-1955).  It  is  a fantasy universe in which 
peoples such as hobbits, dwarves and elves live in a land roamed by wonderful 
magical creatures and dangerous monsters  such as orcs and trolls.  Tolkien's 
world stems from Celtic and Germanic legend with medieval elements added, 
from Arthurian legend for example.  The power of the fantasy universe and 
theme lies neither in intrinsic refinement nor in an ingenious plot, but in its 
imaginative  power  and  its  flexibility.  Because  of  the  distance  between  the 
fantasy story world and our own, an almost infinite number of possible magical 
spells, weapons and monsters can be introduced to resolve a plot-level problem 
or create suspense without leading to anomalies. Typically, fantasy stories are 
driven by the quest topos whereby a hero sets out to retrieve a valuable object 
or rescue a damsel in distress. This topos which sports at the same time move-
ment, exploration and narrative development is ideally suited to support the 
episodic nature of gaming in which the player moves, fights, moves, puzzles, 
moves, rescues and so forth. Finally, the fantasy theme allows for the thematic 
representation of the gaming experience itself. As its name suggests,  Dungeons  
& Dragons is for the larger part set in an underground environment inspired by 
Tolkien's descriptions of the passage of Frodo, Sam and others through the 
dark caves of Moria in  The Fellowship of the Ring {1954}. This type of descent 
into a dark and dangerous depth can be seen as a metaphorical reflection of the 
gaming experience itself, whereby the player is cast into the game world and 
descends to the heart of the system so as to master it (see also next chapter on 
introjection).
A  second,  arguably  even more  fundamental  influence  on  Dungeons  & 
Dragons were tabletop war games, from which the role-playing genre is essen-
tially a derivation with story and fantasy elements added. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, one typical element of both war and role-playing games is 
their quantitative and mathematical setup. Every element in the gaming uni-
verse is defined by a number of characteristics and numerical properties which 
determine  its  role  in  the  game  world.  In  Dungeons  & Dragons,  each  player 
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chooses  her  game  character  by  selecting  her  race  (human,  elf,  dwarf  etc.), 
gender and class (fighter, mage, thief etc.) and by throwing dice in order to gen-
erate numerical values for her basic properties (strength, dexterity, constitution, 
wisdom, intelligence and charisma). The progression in the game is driven by a 
growth topos, a desire to increase the strength and abilities  of one's character 
by gaining experience points. Killing monsters and solving puzzles yields exper-
ience and goods, which leads to more powerful weapons and magical spells, 
which in turn allows to go on more dangerous quests, kill even more frightful 
monsters and gain even more experience. One strong point of this type of or-
ganization is its extremely long tension span. The ultimate goal of the game is 
almost infinitely far away, but nonetheless, as the player solves subplot after 
subplot, she always has the feeling that she is working toward it by increasing 
her character's skills. Hence, in a role-playing game, an obstacle is never just an 
obstacle, but also an opportunity to reach a higher level or find a magical sword 
which will later serve to finish the ultimate quest. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that, whereas in fantasy literature the growth topos is still subjected to the quest 
topos – Frodo and Sam go on a quest to destroy the Ring and in the process 
accidentally gain experience and become men – in role-playing games it is the 
inverse: the player wants to gain experience and in the process accidentally goes 
on a quest.  The essence of game play is quantitative progression, qualitative 
progression in the form of the story being only of secondary importance.49
When the growth topos is implemented in a multi-player game, this gen-
erally leads to an interesting economic dynamics  whereby players try to ex-
change those assets and goods of which they have ample for others of which 
they have too little. In a persistent game world, one could, for example, become 
a blacksmith and start forging tools, which would lead to more forging experi-
ence points, which in turn allows to produce higher level weapons and armor. 
These goods can be collected, taken to the market, sold either to other players 
or merchant bots, and the acquired money can be used to buy other goods or 
pay for learning new skills in a university for example. Another player may de-
49 It is difficult not to note the parallel between this switch and the movement to prominence of 
quantitative arguments to the detriment of qualitative (ideological) ones in everyday social and 
political discussions in the second half of the twentieth century.
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cide to become a soldier and buy weapons from the above blacksmith. She may 
venture out and attempt to kill small vermin just outside the safe walls of the 
city. This will make her gain experience and loot which she can sell on the mar-
ket where she can buy better weapons and so forth. Persistent worlds can ac-
commodate thousands or even tens of thousands of such characters. The result 
of the sum of all their decisions and market transactions is an emergent virtual 
economic system, which in certain respects behaves not unlike an actual eco-
nomy. Virtual goods are produced, traded, used and replaced and their prices 
rise and fall when either demand or production increases. When there are too 
many fighters in comparison to the number of blacksmiths, for example, the 
price of weapons will rise steeply. Such inflation is scarce however. More com-
mon is the inverse case whereby more and more players reach high experience 
levels which allows them to forge higher quality and more expensive weapons 
and bring back more valuable loot. This results in a devaluation of the virtual 
currency  and  causes  massive  inflation  of  goods  in  the  game world,  a  phe-
nomenon sometimes referred to as 'mudflation'. 
LAND OF MILK AND HONEY
In the USA, persistent gaming was popularized by Ultima Online {1997}, a role-
playing game based on Richard Garriot's  Ultima heritage {1981-}.50 At the be-
ginning of the game, each player defines her avatar's characteristics and is cast 
into a virtual world called Norrath. The aim of the game is to increase your 
character's stats while protecting a number of chivalric values. This is done by 
going on quests, killing monsters, gaining experience points and bringing back 
loot. This loot can then be brought to the market and sold to merchant bots or 
to the highest bidder for Norrathian platinum pieces. Around 1999, however, 
Ultima's game makers began to notice that some trades of highly valuable items 
and gaming accounts no longer took place on the internal game market, but on 
real-world online auction sites such as eBay for up to one thousand real US dol-
50 In South Korea,  Nexus: The Kingdom of the Winds, which was designed by Jake Song, was pub-
lished in 1996, one year before Ultima Online, and eventually reached over one million paying 
subscribers. Its successor Lineage, which was published two years later, became an even larger 
success.
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lars (Castronova 2001: 32). Money would be transferred via real-world bank ac-
counts and virtual items would be exchanged at an agreed-upon location in the 
game world.  Electronic Arts,  the publisher of  Ultima did not  intervene, but 
Sony Online Entertainment  cracked down on the  practice  of  selling virtual 
game items for real money in Everquest by changing the end user license agree-
ment in April 2000. In the agreement, it was stipulated that it would be forbid-
den for players to buy or sell in-game characters,  items or currency for real 
money. One year later, this was followed by an action by Sony to have all Ever-
quest virtual  items  removed  from  eBay.  The  intervention  had  little  effect, 
however, and only led to the launch of auction sites dedicated to virtual trading 
such as Player Auctions and Gaming Open Market where hundreds of items change 
hands every day for real money. Moreover, companies such as Internet Gaming  
Entertainment appeared, which are dedicated to buying and selling virtual items 
to players in various  persistent worlds where they sometimes even have their 
own stalls where your avatar can buy or sell virtual items for real money or 
transfer virtual into real-world currency and vice versa. In early 2005, Sony gave 
in to the trend and announced  Station Exchange,  their own secure service for 
trading virtual goods between players for real money.51
Recently, a number of online meeting spaces such as Second Life {Linden 
Lab 2003},  There {Will Harvey & Jeffrey  Ventrella 1998} and  Project Entropia 
{MindArk 2003} have jumped on  the virtual market bandwagon by allowing 
their visitors to create and sell virtual goods for real money and by presenting 
themselves as a virtual investment. Second Life, for example, describes itself as a 
land of opportunity. “Make real money in a virtual world—but not through any 
gray market  'harvesting'  of  currency or scavenging for artificially  rare items. 
Second Life is a fully-integrated economy designed to  reward risk, innovation, 
and craftsmanship.” Visitors of  Second Life can build their own virtual goods 
51 In the summer of 2003, new media journalist Julian Dibbell announced that he would attempt 
to earn a living from buying and selling virtual goods for a year and try to convince the Internal 
Revenue Service that his primary source of income came from the trading of imaginary goods. 
For months, Dibbell has been 'working' in  Ultima Online, buying and selling virtual weapons, 
suits of armor and gold pieces to live up to his self-imposed challenge. At one point he decided 
that he would measure his success or failure by comparing his monthly income as a broker of 
virtual goods to his best month as a writer. In the end, Dibbell did not make it, but he only fell 
short some $683 and turned a profit of around $3,917 in the last month (Terdiman 2004).
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and sell  them in the game for  Linden dollars,  Second  Life's  virtual  currency. 
These Linden dollars can then be exchanged for real ones on third-party web 
sites where they are bought by other investors in the virtual world. The virtual 
meeting place There does not require the visitor to take this detour and permits 
her  to  transfer  money  directly  from  her  real-world  credit  card  into  virtual 
Therebucks. Project Entropia, finally, flirts with the idea of migration to the virtu-
al. It is set on a planet called Calypso – named after the nymph who offered 
Odysseus immortality in the Homer's Odyssey {8th century BC} – and does not 
charge any monthly fees. It is entirely funded by money that is transferred into 
the game. In August 2004, MindArk, the maker of  Project Entropia announced 
the sale of a virtual treasure island on Calypso. For several months,  players 
could visit and bid for the virtual estate, which was eventually sold to an Aus-
tralian gamer for $26,500 US.
Economist Edward Castronova (2001, 2003) sees great economic oppor-
tunity for persistent world economies. In his 2001 working paper, he notes for 
example that the value of Norrathian platinum pieces exceeds that of the Japan-
ese Yen and the Italian Lira. He further observes that the “creation of dollar-
valued items in Norrath occurs at a rate such that Norrath's  [gross national 
product] per capita easily exceeds that of dozens of countries, including India 
and China” (2001: 2). From Castronova's perspective, virtual economies are a 
logical  development.  “Value  is  subjective,  wholly  created  in  the  minds  of 
people. If people in free markets determine that a shiny crystal called 'diamond' 
is worth $100,000, economists basically accept the reality of that valuation. If 
the object in question is not a shiny crystal called 'diamond' but is rather a ma-
gic  sword called 'Excalibur',  that  exists  only in an  online game,  economists 
would still put the value of the item at $100,000.” For Castronova, if Earth eco-
nomies suffer as people spend more time in cyberspace, this does not imply 
that anyone is worse off. “The fact that labour hours that were once producing 
automobiles are now producing avatars does not mean anything about the level 
of wealth in society. The basket of produced goods is simply changing. A prop-
er accounting would show, in fact, that the actual production of well-being per 
capita is rising” (Ibid.).
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In the upcoming sections, I develop my own perspective on the ontolo-
gical nature of the virtual based on the simulation framework sketched in the 
previous chapter. First I look into possible-worlds semantics as a possible the-
oretical basis for my discussion. I lay out its basics, what is required from a 
world to qualify as a logically possible one and what it could mean if it does. 
Next, I look at the proposal to regard fiction as a world-creating activity. I point 
towards a number of advantages, for example when dealing with linguistic ref-
erence to fictional entities or when explaining emotional response to fiction. I 
also point out two theoretical objections against the use of possible-worlds se-
mantics for fiction, however, i.e. the problem of superposition and that of con-
tradiction. Finally, I look more closely at the application of possible-worlds the-
ory to virtual environments and reject it on the basis that they are not inde-
pendent logical constructions and are hence subject to contagion from the real 
world. In the third and final section, I explore Kendall Walton's theory of rep-
resentation as a game of make-believe. I first describe the Ancient notion of 
mimesis and then zoom in on Walton's approach to its description. I lay out his 
framework and point to a number of useful applications both when dealing 
with representation in the more traditional sense of the term and with play. I 
criticize his views on the relation between representation and truth, however, 
and reject his attempt to describe the difference between fiction and non-fic-
tion as a binary opposition.  Finally,  I  return to the issue of the ontological 
status of virtual economies as discussed earlier in this section and point to their 
being an imitation rather than a form of possible reality. Hence I reject the the-
oretical possibility of long-term value creation in persistent environments as it is 
sometimes put forward by virtual economy proponents.
2. THE VIRTUAL AS A POSSIBLE WORLD
Saul Kripke's theory of possible worlds (1963) is a logical model devised for the 
semantic description of modal operators such as possibility and necessity. In 
traditional, truth-functional logic, it is impossible to assess the truth-value of a 
counterfactual statement such as “If you had put one more folder into that cab-
inet, everything would have fallen out.” The listener did not put another folder 
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in the cabinet and therefore, in traditional logic, the statement would be judged 
wrong on the basis of the falseness of the proposition (from a false proposition 
anything follows). This is counterintuitive, however, as one can imagine a case 
in which the statement would be correct. It is true that the listener did not put 
another folder in the cabinet, but that does not mean that it would not have 
emptied itself if she had. Kripke realized this problem and proposed to con-
sider the first part of the proposition “If you had put one more folder into that 
cabinet,”  as  a  sort  of  world-creating  speech-act,  placing  the  second  part 
“everything would have fallen out” in a projected possible world. Because of 
the counterfactual nature of the if-clause, the rest of the proposition is projec-
ted into a theoretically constructed world which is identical to the real one, ex-
cept for the fact that the listener did try to cram another folder into the cabinet. 
Possible-worlds theory is a useful framework for gaining insight into how we 
construct  our  conditional  and  counterfactual  opinions  about  the  world.  It 
should be noted, however, that it is not a litmus test for measuring the correct-
ness of a statement. It can serve as a basis for discussion, but it is not a formula 
for calculating the probability of whether the folders would have dropped.
The modal relationships between the actual and possible worlds are ex-
pressed using operators ranging from impossibility to absolute certainty. A pos-
sible world is logically acceptable when it satisfies the laws of non-contradiction 
and excluded middle. The  law of non-contradiction states that something cannot 
simultaneously be true and false (for proposition P, it is impossible for both P 
and not P to be true). The law of excluded middle states that something is either 
true or false (either P is true or ‘not P’, one of both). These logical restrictions 
imply  that  a  possible  world  must  be  both  possible  (non-contradictory)  and 
complete and transparent (excluded middle).52 In the possible world created by 
the cabinet statement, for example, either the contents have fallen out or they 
have not. It cannot be both at the same time (law of non-contradiction) and it 
52 There is much to say for the fact that the actual world itself does not satisfy the law of excluded 
middle by not being transparent. When I say that the car is the fastest means of transportation, 
for example, this can be deemed correct or incorrect depending on the situation and the inter-
pretation of the listener. In this section, I do not pursue this issue any further. Rather, I assess 
the application of possible-worlds semantics to fiction on its own terms and formulate my criti-
cism from within.
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must be one of the two (excluded middle). You cannot say, for example, that in 
the proposed possible world there is no cabinet and that hence the contents 
have neither fallen out nor remained put. Possible worlds must be theoretical 
duplicates of the real world except for that which is stipulated by the counter-
factual. What it means to be a 'theoretical' duplicate has been the subject of 
much contention however. Marie-Laure Ryan (1991: 23) distinguishes between 
two major positions. On one side there is David Lewis who  professes  modal  
realism. For him, possible worlds are what they are and there is no ontological 
difference between actual and possible worlds. The actual world is just the real-
ization of one possible world among many.53 On the other side, there is the 
modal fictionalism or anti-realism of thinkers such as Gideon Rosen and Nicholas 
Rescher. For them, possible worlds are constructs of the mind rather than ab-
solute entities. They equate actuality with reality, restoring the uniqueness of the 
actual world. 
FICTION AS POSSIBILITY
Marie-Laure Ryan notes that one of the first philosophers to approach fiction 
as a logical issue was Gottlob Frege. For Frege, a statement about an imaginary 
object, place or time is not automatically false, but because one or more entities 
do not exist  in reality,  it  cannot  be referential.  “Sherlock Holmes smokes a 
pipe,” for example, is not a false statement for Frege, but it is not true either as 
Sherlock Holmes cannot be referred to as you would refer to an actual person. 
“Margaret Thatcher smokes a pipe,” on the other hand, is a product of either 
error or lying on the part of the speaker. For Marie-Laure Ryan, Frege's ap-
proach becomes problematic, however, when mixing real-world and fictional 
entities in one statement, e.g. “Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes.” For 
Frege, this statement would not be false, but it could not be true either as Sher-
lock Holmes cannot be referred to.54 Conan Doyle is the author of the Sherlock 
53 Lewis' position is close to the original Leibnizian concept of possible worlds (17th century) on 
which the modern notion is based. According to Leibniz, an infinity of possible worlds exist as 
thoughts in the mind of God and only one is actual: the best of them all, chosen by the divine 
mind to be instantiated.
54 It can be argued that Frege would reject this argumentation on the basis that, of course, Doyle 
created the fictional character Holmes to which can be referred as such, but not Holmes the 
detective.
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Holmes detective novels and he has created the fictional character of Sherlock 
Holmes. Therefore, the statement should be deemed correct. In a similar way, 
Ryan notes that the statement “Sherlock Holmes created Conan Doyle” cannot 
be rejected on the basis of Frege's theory and would remain in a logical twilight 
being neither true nor false, but unreferential.  In order to solve this dilemma, 
Ryan refers to David Lewis' (1978) proposal to regard fictionality as a type of 
possibility and fit  fictional worlds  within the logical  framework of  possible-
worlds logic. Fictional worlds then become possible worlds existing in a modal 
constellation with the real allowing for the separation of reference and exist-
ence. Within the possible worlds theoretical framework it is perfectly acceptable 
that language crosses borders between worlds and allows to formulate fully ref-
erential statements about fictional entities.
Aside from explaining the complex intertwinings of linguistic reference 
between real and fictional situations, possible worlds logic can help to evaluate 
interpretative statements about fictional worlds. Marie-Laure Ryan notes that 
“[o]ne of the greatest theoretical advantages of the possible-worlds approach to 
fiction is that it provides a convenient method for assessing the truth value of 
statements  describing  or  interpreting  the  universe  of  a  fictional  text”  (Ryan 
1991: 48). The concrete method she proposes is based on David Lewis' theory 
to determine truth conditions for counterfactuals and is based on the intuitive 
evaluation of modal distance (i.e. degree of possibility) between possible fiction-
al worlds. For example, if I were to claim that Sherlock Holmes wears a base-
ball cap in his spare time, Ryan proposes to imagine two worlds – one in which 
Holmes wears a baseball cap and one in which he does not – and evaluate the 
modal distance between these worlds and our own system of reality. As Conan 
Doyle set  his  Sherlock Holmes stories  in late  19th century London,  and we 
know that the British played little baseball at the time, it is highly unlikely that 
there would be baseball caps. We also know that Holmes is a somewhat eccent-
ric, not so young anymore detective gentleman, which does not make it any 
more likely, even if there had been baseball caps, that he would have worn one. 
Hence the world in which Holmes wears a baseball cap is significantly more re-
mote, more modally distant from our own system of reality (i.e. less likely) than 
the world in which he would keep to his deerstalker hat.
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A third way of using possible-worlds semantics is to describe how differ-
ent fictional layers are embedded in a story. It allows, for example, to analyze 
and describe the various strategies employed by a text in order to be able to 
make covert statements about the actual world. One technique often used for 
blurring modal relations between the real and the fictional is to frame the main 
story within another. Imagine a frame story in which people are sitting around a 
campfire when a mysterious stranger joins the group. Later at night, after he has 
drunk more than is good for him, he begins to tell a mysterious tale... Apart 
from various stylistic advantages such as the possibility to temporarily pause the 
embedded tale and have other characters comment upon it, this technique also 
allows the author to pass on responsibility over style and ethical issues to the 
character telling the story. In other words, the author (or his substitute narrator) 
creates a fictional world in which a number of people are sitting together, listen-
ing to the story of a mysterious stranger who creates another possible/fictional 
world within the first, and it is only in this second, embedded world that the 
more sensitive events take place. Hence, when they are in some way unlikely, 
morally dubious or politically sensitive, the author can ascribe it to the opinions 
or style of the fictional character, passing on responsibility over the main story 
to the fictional world. 
Fourth and finally, the possible worlds approach can be used to resolve 
the so-called 'paradox of emotional response to fiction', formulated by Colin 
Radford in the 1970s. This alleged paradox consists of the fact that readers ex-
perience  actual engagement or even emotionally respond when reading about 
non-actual fictional characters and events. For Radford, this implies that the hu-
man capacity for emotional response to fiction is irrational: “our being moved 
in certain ways by works of art, though very ‘natural’ to us and in that way only 
too  intelligible,  involves  us  in  inconsistency  and  so  incoherence”  (cited  in 
Schneider 2002). Basing his argumentation on a strictly binary system of truth 
evaluation, the issue is simple for Radford: fictional worlds are untrue; readers 
respond to them emotionally as if they were true; therefore readers are irration-
al. If we take possible-worlds logic as a basis for discussion, however, the situ-
ation is different. Fictionality is then no longer a question of truth or falsity, but 
one of possibility. When responding emotionally to a story, a reader is not irra-
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tionally losing herself into believing that the events actually happened, but she is 
considering the possibility that they could happen.  When a character dies, for 
example, the reader may be confronted with the future probability of her own 
death or that of a member of the family and react accordingly. Hence, Rad-
ford's  paradox no longer stands as no one should find it  contradictory that 
people feel involved when considering a possible reality. In fact, it can be ar-
gued that emotionally assessing different possible scenarios lies at the very basis 
of decision-making. Fiction can then be seen as an exploration of these fac-
ulties.55
HAVE THEORY, WILL TRAVEL
The use of possible-worlds  semantics as  a theoretical  framework for fiction 
analysis is not unproblematic however. In order to qualify as being possible, a 
world is required to be fully accessible by a speaker at all times, i.e. to satisfy the 
laws of non-contradiction and that of excluded middle. The law of non-contra-
diction states that propositions about possible worlds can never be both true 
and false at the same time. It is impossible that the contents of the cabinet both 
remain in place and fall down in one and the same possible world. The law of 
excluded middle, on the other hand, states that every proposition about a pos-
sible world must be either true or false, one or the other, there is no third pos-
sibility. Either it is true that the contents of the cabinet fell out or it is not and 
they remained in place. There is no other way. Fictional worlds and virtual en-
vironments do not meet these two requirements however. Representations are 
partial  sketches  approximating  situations  and  events  rather  than  duplicating 
their every aspect. It is the reader or viewer who completes the picture by filling 
in the gaps in the representation if needed. In fiction theory, this phenomenon 
is referred to by the notion of 'Leerstellen' (omissions, Wolfgang Iser 1970), 
gaps in the story which are filled in by the reader. Without the possibility to 
omit certain elements, it would be impossible to represent anything. It is only 
55 The active creation and emotional assessment of possible realities by the reader can in fact ex-
plain the functioning of fiction and media as means of coping with various emotions and situ-
ations without actually being exposed to them. I explore this idea further in chapter 5 where I 
describe game play as a form of coping with reality.
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because of the human faculty to 'complete the picture' that man is able to com-
municate, using partial sketches referring to their real-world counterparts rather 
than duplicating them.
The inability of a representation to fulfill the laws of non-contradiction 
and that of excluded middle is a direct consequence of its incomplete, approx-
imative nature. It is impossible for a text, a drawing, a film, a simulation etc. to 
depict every aspect of a given phenomenon. A text can (and should) never de-
scribe every scratch on the table, every speck of dust on the cupboard. A paint-
ing can never show every angle, every light ray reflected by a church. And a 
computer simulation can never imitate the behavior of every subatomic particle 
of a system. For this reason, there will always be statements about any instance 
of representation which simply cannot be verified. Objectively, these proposi-
tions will forever remain in what could be called a logical superposition being 
neither true nor false and both at the same time. If, for example, the color of 
Sherlock Holmes' socks is not explicitly mentioned in the text, the proposition 
that he is wearing white socks is neither true nor false. There is no objective in-
formation regarding the matter so the logical status of the statement remains 
superposed. Objectively, Holmes does not wear white socks and neither does 
he not wear them. The law of excluded middle states that every proposition 
about a possible world should be either true or not true. Hence the Holmes fic-
tional world violates the law of excluded middle and does not qualify as a pos-
sible world.
Representations are not meant to be objective. They are partial depictions 
which only come to life in the subjective imagination of the reader or viewer. 
When reading a text, viewing an image or playing a game, a person automatic-
ally fills  in those elements which are not objectively present,  but which she 
needs so as to make sense of the representation. A reader of a short story about 
a young man assumes that he has a head even if it is not explicitly mentioned in 
the text. She may even imagine him handsome with steel-blue eyes while the au-
thor had a plain, brown-eyed midget in mind. One person may see Holmes as a 
nerdy type and imagine him wearing white tennis socks. Another may place 
more emphasis on his being a gentleman and a respected detective and imagine 
no such a thing. Hence the claim that Holmes wears white socks may at the 
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same time be true to one reader and false to another thus violating the law of 
non-contradiction. With a few words or lines, a gifted artist may conjure up an 
entire universe for the onlooker to step into. This is what makes representation 
so powerful  and communication so complex.  From a logical  point of view, 
however, it is representation's most severe weakness. Representation is never 
complete. It is a translation of a limited set of qualities of a phenomenon to an-
other format, not its duplication. Hence only those readers or viewers who are 
familiar with the depicted events are able to complete the picture more or less 
correctly. And even to them, it will never be fully complete. Representation is a 
way of making reality accessible to man by omitting the trivial. Hence superpos-
itions and contradictions with regard to interpretative statements are to be ac-
cepted as part of their nature. 
SIMULATION AS POSSIBILITY
When applying the possible-worlds semantic framework to the analysis of virtu-
al environments, we note that there are a number of similarities with the more 
general fictional framework sketched above. Like their fictional counterparts, 
virtual items can be referred to by natural language as if they were actual ob-
jects. 'Mario is a plumber' is a correct proposition although Mario is a computer 
game character. Apart from that, possible world semantics can also help avoid 
the pitfall of rejecting mixed-world statements between the actual and the virtu-
al simply on the basis that they mix worlds. 'Shigeru Miyamoto created Mario' is 
a correct statement and 'Mario created Shigeru Miyamoto' is a false one because 
Shigeru Miyamoto is the designer of Donkey Kong {Nintendo 1981} which de-
picts a virtual world in which Mario the plumber first appeared. Similarly, the 
possible world framework can be used to map embedded worlds within a com-
puter game environment. In the first-person adventure game Myst, for example, 
you, as a player, have to deliver a number of virtual worlds designed by the vir-
tual character Atrus. In this way the actual game designers are able to attribute 
the puzzles and designs of the different worlds to the mastermind of a charac-
ter by presenting them as worlds within worlds. Moreover, the idea of possible 
worlds can help to describe the evaluation of cognitive strategies by the player. 
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When confronted with a problem generated by the simulated environment, the 
player evaluates the desirability of a number of future game states, picks the 
most favorable possible virtual world and works toward it. Finally, viewing vir-
tuality as a form of possible reality can explain the fact that players respond 
emotionally to virtual happenings, be excited when they find a solution to a 
problem or sad when they do not.
Apart from these merits, a possible-worlds interpretation of virtuality also 
inherits the theoretical problems of the framework for fiction. As described in 
the previous chapter, like other forms of representation, computer simulations 
and  games  are  incomplete  depictions,  approximations  of  phenomena  rather 
than their actual duplication. Hence, only a limited set of qualities are explicitly 
represented in the virtual environment evoking thoughts and perceptions and 
not reproducing objects.  It  is the player who is free to fill  in the omissions 
made by the representation or leave them in an interpretative superposition. 
What is in the barrels that Kong is throwing down and Mario is trying to avoid 
is not described in Donkey Kong because it is irrelevant to the game. Hence, the 
proposition that they are oil barrels is in an interpretative superposition – it is 
neither true nor false objectively – which is a violation of the principle of ex-
cluded middle and would cause Donkey Kong to fail as a logically possible world. 
Furthermore, equally due to the incompleteness of the simulated environment, 
some omissions may be filled in differently in different playing sessions or by 
different players.  One player may imagine that Kong is going to do terrible 
things to Pauline, if Mario does not succeed in delivering her in time. Another 
may imagine Kong to be in love with Pauline and wanting to take her with him 
to live together on a tropical island. Hence, for one player, the proposition that 
Kong is going to kill Pauline is true, while for another it is false. This is a viola-
tion of the law of non-contradiction, which again underlines that a fictional en-
vironment cannot qualify as a logically possible world.
MULTIPLICITY AND INTROJECTION
Apart from the problem of superposition and that of contradiction, when mak-
ing a statement about a virtual entity, there are at least two additional fields of 
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problems when we try to describe virtual environments as  logically possible 
worlds. First of all, when reading a book or viewing a film more than once, a 
reader or viewer is given access to the same fictional world in which the same 
fictitious events take place. Her interpretation of what happens may differ but 
the events and characters portrayed remain the same. Even across episodes or 
books, fictional characters remain unique. There is only one Sherlock Holmes. 
All Conan Doyle's adventures happen to the same person living 221B Baker 
Street. Virtual characters, however, have a more ambiguous status. On the one 
hand, there is only one virtual character Mario in, for example, Donkey Kong and 
Mario Bros {Shigeru Miyamoto 1983}. On the other, each time you play a game 
of Donkey Kong, a slightly different series of events takes place within the virtual 
world. On one occasion you (Mario) are bitten by a crocodile, and on another 
you successfully pass the crocodiles, but are hit by one of the boulders Kong is 
aiming at you. Each game generates a different life course for Mario. But then 
how can it be the same Mario living in the same possible world? Imagine Sher-
lock Holmes in one version of a story revealing that the baroness is the killer 
and in another the butler. Could these events coexist in one and the same ac-
cessible possible world? They could not. One possible, if not very clean, solu-
tion is to accept that, with every game that is played, a new instance of a virtual 
world is generated in which unique events take place, which happen to unique 
characters (bearing generic names). Every time a game is loaded, a new Pauline 
is abducted and a new Mario the plumber has three chances to try and rescue 
her. According to this scenario, virtual entities could be seen as unique, but ex-
isting in multiple differing instances. A good analogy to go with here, is that of 
toys like Barbie dolls {Ruth Handler 1959}. There is only one Barbara Millicent 
Roberts, but there are many instances of her in different outfits and settings for 
sale at the same time. Similarly, there is only one Mario, but every time a game 
of Donkey Kong or Mario Bros is played a unique instance of Mario is generated. 
This solution would make it impossible to state a proposition about  anything 
larger than one playing session, however, which would preclude the analysis of 
a simulation as a whole and would lead to analytical solipsism.
A second additional problem which occurs when analyzing virtual envir-
onments from the perspective of possible-worlds semantic theory is the am-
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biguous status of the avatar or rather the introjected I more generally (see also 
next chapter). Whereas in traditional fiction, the reader or viewer remains a dis-
tant onlooker, in a computer simulation or game, the player steps into the virtu-
al world and takes part in the ongoing action. In hyperfiction and interactive 
cinema,  although  the  participator  or  interactor  can  choose  her  own  path 
through the material and can steer the action within the fictional world, she 
does not actually step into it. A computer game player, on the other hand, as-
sumes an identity within the game world which can be that of a character that 
of a more abstract presence like a mayor, a general or a king guiding and order-
ing large  numbers  of  semi-independent  units.  Anyhow,  the player does  not 
merely feel present like a reader or a spectator could, but she acts as if she were 
present. This can be observed, for example, in the fact that a player refers to in-
dexical clues within the game world as if they were her real-world environment. 
Whereas a reader or a spectator does not refer to the main protagonist using 
the first person pronoun even if the novel is written in the I-person or the film 
recorded from a personal perspective, a player unproblematically refers to her 
avatar as 'I' and to that of her fellow player as 'you'. “I ran into a transporter 
right after I saw you running down the corridor.” Thus, if we want to evaluate 
statements about virtual worlds using a possible-worlds framework, we have to 
take into account that they are not strictly separated theoretical constructions. 
Computer  game  players  or  visitors  of  a  simulation  can  cross  the  border 
between the real and the virtual and a statement like “I was killed by Sub-Zero” 
can be perfectly true whereas “I met Sherlock Holmes on Baker Street” can 
only be false.
CONTAGION
The phenomena of introjection and the double status of personal pronouns can 
be related to the more general process of contagion: the fact that dynamic mod-
els like simulations and computer games are subject to real-world influences. 
Simulations are representations which are dynamically generated by real-world 
software programs. These programs are not logico-theoretical constructs cre-
ated to make counterfactual statements about the actual world, but they are arti-
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facts devised with a specific purpose in mind. This purpose can be tied to in-
trinsically semantic or aesthetic motives, but it can also be blatantly pragmatic 
with regard to real-world material gain. A first example of contagion of the real 
into the virtual is that of commercial product placement: a technique which has 
been popular with film makers and television series directors since the early 
1990s. Product placement is an advertising technique whereby companies pay, 
not to have their products presented and praised in separately marked advert-
isements before or after a film or series, but to have them quietly yet observably 
inserted into the fictional world. Close-ups of cereal boxes, accidentally men-
tioned car brands, seconds of typing fingers on a branded mobile phone and so 
forth have all helped to finance productions.  In the mid-1990s,  when game 
characters like Tomb Raider's {Toby Gard 1996} Lara Croft became virtual stars, 
marketeers came to realize their potential marketing value. In True Crime: Streets  
of LA {Luxoflux 2003}, for example, Nick Kang, the player's avatar, is dressed 
in hip and trendy Puma clothing. Players are expected to identify with Kang's 
personality when playing the game and marketeers hope that this will influence 
their real-world buying habits. Other campaigns introduce their product as an 
in-game object with which the player must become familiar in order to continue 
the game. Splinter Cell: Pandora Tomorrow {Tom Clancy 2004}, for example, fea-
tures two types of Sony Ericsson cell phones and when the player fails to mas-
ter them, she will not be able to advance any further into the game. Again, mar-
keteers hope that virtual acquaintance with the product will stir real-world in-
terest in the brand. Finally, there are companies delivering in-game dynamic ad-
vertising over the Internet, whereby, for example, advertising panels are placed 
in sports stadiums or on billboards along the road in a virtual world. These pan-
els are real-world advertisements mostly for products which do not even exist 
in the game world.
A second example of contagion from the real into the virtual does not so 
much evolve from the influence game makers and marketeers have on game 
mechanics, but from the input produced by players. Game environments are 
participatory in that they allow the player to project her wishes, fantasies and 
aberrations into the game world irrespective of whether they are logically ap-
propriate or anticipated by the game designers. Nutt and Railton, for example, 
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report on one Cyncla, a vivid fan of The Sims, who describes how she uses pic-
tures of her ex-boyfriend to create a Sim character, and then proceeds to tor-
ment him by forcing him to take a horrible job which makes him unhappy, and 
by not giving him a bed to sleep in, which tires him out. Apart from that, she 
also makes him live in a house without a toilet so that he is constantly wetting 
himself which is not only degrading, but also forces the character to do per-
petual washing and cleaning in order to raise his health points (2003: 589). Cyn-
cla is not the only example of a Sims player who enjoys moving to the dark side. 
In fact,  torturing Sims seems to have become a rather popular practice and 
when new torments are discovered, they are proudly posted on dedicated dis-
cussion forums. As one sadistic Evergrey testifies: “I guess people actually play 
this game to make their little sims happy. I'll admit that i did that for awhile, but 
to be honest, it just got boring. So of course I reverted to my typical gaming 
pattern of torturing innocents to death.” After which he proudly describes how 
he created a random couple, built them a tiny room, made them go inside and 
then removed the door. His poor Sims would wet themselves, become hungry 
and thirsty, get depressed, but they would not die of natural causes fast enough 
for Evergrey, after which s/he set everything on fire (Nematoddity 2004).
CHEATING AND HACKING
The third and probably most significant form of interference from the real in 
the game world is cheating. Roger Caillois observes that one of the basic prin-
ciples of playing a game is to allow all participants to start on an equal basis. 
Cheaters pretend to abide by this rule, but in reality they know a way of manip-
ulating the game so that they gain an advantage vis-à-vis other players. A cheat-
er violates the game rules while pretending to respect them. “He is dishonest, 
but hypocritical. He thus, by his attitude, safeguards and proclaims the validity 
of the conventions he violates, because he is dependent upon others obeying 
the rules” (1958/2001: 45).56 In computer games,  obeying the rules is not a 
56 For Caillois professional playing of either games or sports is also a form of contagion against 
which a game should take precautions, otherwise it becomes corrupted. Playing and working 
should be separate undertakings and the professional player is a sort of minor cheater in that 
she pretends to be playing a game, but is secretly practicing a profession. When playing a game 
becomes a form of work, the essence of the game is lost and therefore so is the game for Cail-
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choice, but an imperative. Input from the player is controlled in such a way that 
the rules of a game cannot be broken by standard actions. Hence, within the 
scope of these commands, anything that is possible is allowed in order to try 
and win the game. In a real card game, if you are a highly skilled cheater, you 
may try to slip in an additional card from your pocket.  In a computer card 
game, however, there are no pockets and no additional cards unless they have 
been explicitly programmed by the makers of the game. When they have been 
programmed, cheating simply becomes part of the computer game and, in a 
strict sense, it would no longer be cheating. Computer pinball games for ex-
ample allow the player to bump the virtual pinball machine so as to alter the 
course of the virtual ball. If you bump it too hard or too often, the virtual ma-
chine tilts and you lose your game. Whereas in a real pinball context, bumping 
the machine is forbidden and the tilt mechanism is added to enforce the rule, in 
the computer game, since it has been programmed, it is allowed, a calculated 
risk but not a form of cheating. Cheating in computer games only occurs when 
players succeed in changing the game itself, when they hack into the game code 
and adapt its rules. Typical hacks in online shooters, for example, are the so-
called god mode, whereby the player's avatar is recoded to be impervious to en-
emy fire; hacks providing unlimited resources, weapons or health or allowing to 
manipulate physical laws like gravity; and wall-hacks, whereby the player can 
move through walls within the game environment while his opponents cannot 
(see also Kücklich 2004). 
Game hacks can affect entire persistent worlds with thousands of online 
players at  once. In January 2005, for example,  The Sims Online {Will  Wright 
2002} was subjected to an attack by a community of hackers who reverse-en-
gineered, changed and added  game programming code. Amusingly, the attack 
was not malicious and was in fact intended to make life easier for the Sims. 
“Entire  neighborhoods  of  Sims  are  being  mysteriously  graced  with  eternal 
youth, while some characters are finding all their needs fulfilled by a single shot 
of magic espresso. Others no longer need to empty the toilet after potty train-
ing their toddler.  Some Sims are being abducted by aliens when they glance 
lois.
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through their telescope -- every time, instead of just occasionally, which is nor-
mal” (Poulsen 2005). This does not make it less of a cheat of course as making 
a game easier may be just as pernicious to its functioning as making it more dif-
ficult. Not all attacks on online worlds have been so harmless to its inhabitants 
however. In May 2003, for example,  Shadowbane {Wolfpack Studios 2003}, an 
online persistent fantasy game, was hacked, but whereas most hacks only alter 
the a limited set of entities or properties, this one changed the basic rules of the 
virtual world turning it into a virtual Twilight Zone. “The population of an en-
tire Shadowbane town was forcibly moved to the bottom of the sea, where they 
drowned. City guards turned feral and attacked town residents. Mobs of never-
before-seen superpowerful creatures, seemingly  spontaneously spawned from 
the ether, began to prowl the streets unchecked, killing characters in the most 
painful way possible” (Delio 2003). Fortunately, the game makers were able to 
identify the culprits disrupting the game and forced a roll-back, reverting all vir-
tual entities to their status shortly before the attacks.
Finally, persistent worlds can be hacked in order to generate unnaturally 
large quantities of virtual goods. One Rich – what's in a name – Thurman, for 
example, is known to have earned more than US $100.000 by farming 9 billion 
gold in Ultima Online. By using a macro, a small piece of software automatically 
performing the various clicks required to create a virtual object, he was able to 
generate an almost infinite amount of virtual wealth. At one point, Thurman 
had up to 30 personal computers running 24 hours a day, automatically generat-
ing virtual gold for him (Lee 2005). Similarly, in Everquest, players found a com-
bination of profession, skill level and a macro that turned small cash piles into 
larger ones. By running the macro countless times, they were able to generate 
huge amounts of virtual money, which created uncontrollable inflation in the 
game world and threatened its virtual economy (BBC 2002). In other cases, 
players discovered bugs in the programming code which could be exploited to 
make virtual gains. In February 2005, for example, in the Korean persistent en-
vironment Maplestory {Wizet 2002}, a player created a hack that enabled him to 
kill every enemy on the map and deposit the drops of these kills at his feet. 
Needless to say that in no time unearthly amounts of goods were collected, col-
lapsing the Maple virtual economy (Queen 2005). One final example occurred a 
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few months later in the tremendously popular World of Warcraft when a player 
had discovered that when you give an item to a friend and then try to enter an 
overloaded area, you are refused access, but have the item again and so does 
your friend. Virtual worlds are not actually possible ones, but only representa-
tions  generating  objects  of  imagining.  Tricks  like  macros,  cheats  and hacks 
painfully expose the artificiality of the virtual and its indebtedness to and de-
pendence on their real-world software counterpart. 
3. THE VIRTUAL AS MIMESIS
The concept of 'mimesis' goes back to Old Greek metaphysics and philosophy 
of the arts. A precise translation of the term is difficult as it is used with differ-
ent connotations in various fields and by various authors. On many occasions, 
also in later aesthetic theory, 'mimesis' is placed next or in opposition to the 
concept of 'diegesis'. In this context 'mimesis' is used refer to those arts that 
show reality such as painting and sculpture, whereas 'diegesis' is used to describe 
those that speak about it, particularly literature. Etymologically, 'mimesis' is much 
richer however. The usual  Latin translation is 'imitatio',  which is useful,  but 
which does not cover the meaning of mimesis entirely. Possible translations in 
modern English include: imitation (as in acting like, impersonating), simulation, 
copying, forging, mirroring, doubling, representing and citing (based on IJssel-
ing 1990: 7). 'Mimesis' is said to originate in the world of music, dance and ritu-
al from where it migrated to theatrical discourse, literature, the visual arts, and 
from there to philology, education and culture in general. Music is built up of 
different movements such as rhythm and refrain which are repeated and varied 
thus guaranteeing the continuity of a song. Through this repetition and imita-
tion (or mimesis), music comes into being (9). In theater, actors impersonate 
historical or fictional characters by copying words and gestures and thus repres-
enting their deeds. Both the actors playing and the resulting plot are instances 
of mimesis, products of imitation of something else (10). Today, theorists tend 
to restrict the application of the concept of mimesis to art and culture in the 
narrow sense, but in Ancient Greece and Rome, this was not the case. For the 
Greeks and the Romans, every form of 'technè' and 'ars' (craft, skill, technique) 
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is mimetic in that it is based on other manufacturings and creations. In this 
context,  it  is  important to keep in mind the difference between the ancient 
concept of 'art' as creation and the romantic view of art as creative genius. Fi-
nally, not only making ('poèsis'), but also everyday acting ('praxis') was seen as a 
mimetic activity, a practice based on a principle of imitation and repetition (19). 
Thus, for the ancients,  mimesis was not just an aesthetic form or a cultural 
practice, but one of the very principles underlying human behavior and culture 
itself.
When we look at the various present-day meanings of 'mimesis'  (from 
representation over imitation to forgery), we notice a certain ambiguity, placing 
it balancing on the thin line between authenticity and non-authenticity, truth 
and falsity (7). On the one hand, there is the fear that imitation and representa-
tion of reality estrange people and thought from the reality at hand, a concep-
tion shared by Baudrillard for example (see previous chapter). On the other, 
there is the knowledge of the power and necessity of representation for cultural 
dynamics and scientific development. In Plato's philosophy, the idea of mimesis 
is directly linked with the idea of truth as correspondence and identity. For Pla-
to, that which exists in reality is in itself already an imitation, an instance of 
mimesis, of the 'ideal', the world of absolute and essential ideas. Reality is an in-
complete and imperfect derivation of the absolute forms (which would later be 
seen as ideas in the mind of god) determined by time and place. Visual art in 
turn exists in a mimetic relation to an already mimetic reality of which it is again 
an incomplete representation. Thus, for Plato, a real bed is an imperfect 'shad-
ow' of the absolute idea of a bed and a painted one is a derivation of that deriv-
ation: it cannot even be slept on (15). Mimetic art creates a world of appearance 
and deception. Painters and poets replace reality with words and images and re-
place the essence of its objects with their superficial appearance. Hence Plato 
bans the poets from his ideal state in The Republic (11). Aristotle, on the other 
hand, places mimesis in a much more positive light, describing it not as inferior 
imitation, but as a form of representation carrying the power to make reality ap-
pear differently and thus generate new and unique understanding of that reality. 
For Aristotle, the essence of representation lies in the fact that man, in his very 
nature, tends to imitate and represent others and derive pleasure from recogniz-
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ing this representation.  Mimetic art enables man to point to the essential and 
necessary in the seemingly incidental and arbitrary of the real (16). For Aristotle, 
it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may 
happen, what is possible according to probability and necessity. Hence poetry is 
more philosophical and more true than history as it describes the general rather 
than the specific (10).
MIMESIS AND PLAY
Imitative activity can be observed in animals as diverse as insects, birds and 
mammals, but man appears to be the imitator par excellence. Not only do we 
imitate  our  parents  and  environment,  we  also  develop  complex  structures, 
codes and technologies so as to be able to observe and imitate that which we 
do not have at hand. As Aristotle describes in his Poetics, man seems to be direc-
ted towards mimesis in his very nature. But how should we look upon this abil-
ity? How is it introduced in our lives, how does it function, and what purpose 
does it serve? A recent, original, and highly useful perspective on the matter can 
be found in Kendall Walton's  Mimesis as Make-Believe: on the Foundations of the  
Representational Arts (1990). In this study, Walton describes the functioning of 
the arts as a form of pretense play based on the same fundamentals children's 
play. His analysis is refreshing because he succeeds in relating the practices of 
representation and art to human culture without resorting to the mechanical lin-
guistic/communicative scheme of sender-medium-receiver, which offers little 
room for the description of mental representation and interpretation within a 
cultural context (5). Mimesis as pretense play provides a useful framework for 
the description of how media, art and culture function in our society today, and 
allows to shift the analytical emphasis away from the maker and the technology 
towards the socio-cultural context of reception. 
Children devote enormous quantities of time and effort to make-believe 
activities (see also chapter 5 on the purpose of play), a preoccupation which ap-
pears both natural and nearly universal, not particular to any specific culture or 
social group. The urge to engage in play and the needs these activities address 
for  children  are  fundamental,  and  Walton  appropriately  poses  the  question 
154         UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER GAME CULTURE
whether such fundamental activities could disappear entirely as we grow up. His 
conclusion is that they do not (11). Adults still play games of pretense alone or 
in group when they look at a painting, a photo, read a novel, go to the theater, 
watch a film or, as I shall claim, play a computer game. When they decide to 
enter into a relationship with these objects, they enter a game of pretense in 
that they consciously accept what is being represented to be objects, people and 
places, although they know it consists of only words, enactment, brush strokes, 
light or geometric simulation. Readers spectators and players participate in pre-
tense play in which cultural artifacts function as props much as children use 
plastic revolvers in games of cops and robbers, cowboys and Indians or dolls, 
and mud pies when playing family (213). Of course there are important differ-
ences between children's and adults' games of pretense. As we grow up, our in-
terests change and so does our play. It becomes more subtle, more refined, but 
this should not obscure the underlying similarities between the activities.  As 
Walton explains:  “The games children play with dolls and toy trucks are in 
some ways more transparent and easier to understand than their more sophist-
icated successors. This is one reason why children's games will help illuminate 
the games adults play with representational works of art” (12).
PROPS, PROMPTERS AND OBJECTS OF IMAGINING
For Walton, activities such as daydreaming, interiorizing a representation and 
playing a game are all activities which appeal to the same imaginative faculties 
of  a  person.  Man  is  able  to  imagine  certain  objects,  situations  and  events 
without them actually being present. There is a difference, however, between 
dreaming or imagining per se and mentally evoking an image based on an ob-
ject. Whereas per se imagining is only bound by the imagination of the indi-
vidual, mental evocation is constrained by structures in sound, language, geo-
metry or movement actively shaping the perceptions that are generated. When 
looking at a painting, reading a novel, viewing a film or playing a computer 
game, the viewer, reader or player engages in pretense play, generating percep-
tions, but they are based on the forms and structures presented to her. Walton 
describes the role of these fixed elements as  props or aids, accessories in pre-
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tense play, evoking the image of a stage-play in which actors make use of re-
quisites to suggest actions and events. In other words, representations are ob-
jects possessing the social function to serve as props in games of pretense (69). 
As Walton argues “Indeed, I advocate regarding these activities as games of 
make-believe themselves, and I shall argue that representational works function 
as props in such games, as dolls and teddy bears serve as props in children's 
games” (11). It should be noted, however, that props are not necessarily repres-
entations. Walton gives the example of children playing in a forest and imagin-
ing that a stump of wood is a bear. In this case, the prop is not an artifact, but 
an object found in nature which may or may not bear visual similarities to what 
it represents in the game. These stumps are ad hoc props, pressed into service 
for one instance of pretense play. Dolls and toy trucks (like mimetic representa-
tions) are artifacts designed to be props; they were made specifically for that 
purpose as chairs are designed to be sat in and bicycles to be ridden. Moreover, 
within their very design,  they suggest  the games in which they can serve as 
props. They are determined to generate certain perceptions and not others (51). 
A rag doll is meant to serve in playing family and a toy truck in playing work-
man. Similarly, representations are artifacts meant to serve in some instances of 
pretense play and not others. A comic strip of The Smurfs {Peyo 1958} is meant 
to figure in imagining small blue creatures wearing white hats and The Guernica 
{Pablo Picasso 1937} is meant to figure in imagining the consequences of car-
pet bombing and in extenso the hopelessness and cruelty of war.
A second role played by real-world objects  in pretense play is  that  of 
prompter. When walking in a forest, hearing creaking noises and seeing a large 
stump of wood, one could suddenly be prompted to imagine that there is a bear 
blocking one's path. In this case the creaking and the stump serve as prompters 
in that they trigger the process of imagining a scene, i.e. that of running into a 
bear in the forest. Different kinds of objects can serve as prompters: a cloud 
formation looking like a dragon, a star constellation suggesting the form of an 
archer, or the sight of other people or animals triggering the imagination of be-
ing someone or something else. Similarly, artifacts like toys, books, drawings or 
television images  can function as  prompters  of  playful  imagining.  Placing  a 
drawing of a lion on a cereal box, for example, is meant to prompt the idea of 
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power and energy, qualities anyone can use in the morning. But also more gen-
erally, any form of representation is meant to convey information. These very 
words are meant to prompt certain perceptions in the reader. As such, prompt-
ers have an important social function in that they generate and structure ima-
ginative activities which can help the subject to become acquainted with images 
and ideas which are not available in her direct real-world environment.  “By 
constructing artificial prompters, we share our imaginative thoughts with oth-
ers; and all of us can profit from those who are unusually imaginative, creative, 
perceptive, those who possess special talents for thinking up provocative or il-
luminating or comforting lines of imagination” (22).57 Finally, real-world objects 
can also be an object of imagining. When children build a snow fort or play family, 
they not only imagine a snow fort, a mud pie or a baby, they imagine a sculpted 
heap of snow to be a fort, a bucket of sand to be a pie and a rag doll to be a 
baby (25). There is a direct association between the representing artifact and the 
imaginary object which can at the same time be the prompter of the imagining, 
but not necessarily so. Walton gives the example of a water faucet triggering a 
fantasy about a trip to Italy (25), but in many cases the objects serving as props 
in pretense play also serve as its prompter and parts of it act as objects of ima-
gining (38).
In this study I claim that computer simulations and games are forms of 
mimesis or representation which function as props in pretense play like, among 
others, paintings, novels, comics, photos and films. Simulations and games are 
artifacts built to serve as props in individual and collective games of pretense. 
Even users of a scientific simulation temporarily pretend that the model they 
are dealing with is the real phenomenon and study its behavior. Similarly, com-
57 It has been noted that the 'paratext' to computer games, its cardboard box, introductory screen 
and cut-scenes are often more photo-real than the games themselves which are usually restric-
ted by computing limitations and therefore offer only crude and abstract graphics. The box of 
Super Breakout {Steve Wozniak 1981}, for example, contains a high quality print of a hand-
made drawing of a man in a space suit playing something like space hockey while the game it-
self is a simple derivative of Pong in which you have to return a ball using a small bar at the bot-
tom of the screen. This use of photo-real imagery in the margin of the game has been described 
as a premature yearning by designers and players to have more graphical computing power at 
their disposal. This may be true, but it does not mean that these graphics are without a purpose, 
however, as they, together with the frame story of the game, serve as prompters of the player's 
imagination, as an entrance, as it were, into the semiotic codes of the game.
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puter game players pretend that the images, sound and behavior of the objects 
generated by the computer are coherent and meaningful as if they were real-
world entities. Like toys, drawings, prints, descriptions and so forth, models are 
approximations of real-world forms representing some characteristics of  the 
represented and leaving out others, suggesting the presence of an object or en-
vironment,  but  not  duplicating it.  What  distinguishes  simulation from most 
other forms of representation is that, due to its quantitative layout and dynamic 
nature, it can be used not only to represent static elements, but adds a behavior-
al component. This does not, however, make it less of a representation. Simula-
tion as a form of mimesis allows for the analysis and representation not only of 
sound, visuals and movement, but also real-time dynamic behavior and the gen-
eration of participatory environments. Again it should be noted, however, that 
this behavior is no more real than a brush stroke is a church spire. Behavioral 
simulation is the result of human analysis and imitation and only mimics those 
situations that were foreseen by the programmers, showing its nature as an ap-
proximation in others. Computer simulations and games are forms of mimesis 
functioning both as props in pretense play and as prompters of their imagining 
eliciting player actions only meaningful within the unfolding game of pretense.
ASSOCIATIONS, CONVENTIONS AND RULES
The moment pretense play starts and the process of imagining is triggered, ob-
jects and artifacts used as props acquire a sort of double identity. Outside the 
game, a pebble stone is a pebble stone but within, it becomes a car, a soldier, a 
coin... Outside the game, a matchbox car is a small iron and plastic toy which 
can be pushed and watched rolling on its tiny plastic wheels. Within, it becomes 
an escape car full of robbers being chased by the police on narrow forest roads 
through mother's begonias. “All play presupposes the temporary acceptance, if 
not of an illusion (indeed this last word means nothing less than beginning a 
game: in-lusio), then at least of a closed, conventional, and, in certain respects, 
imaginary universe” (Caillois 1958: 19). Similarly, when confronted with a rep-
resentation like a drawing, a short story or a computer game, elements in these 
props take on a double role. Outside pretense play, a drawing is a piece of pa-
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per filled with lines, a short story a collection of abstract signs and a computer 
game a set of instructions for a discrete state machine. Within the game, the 
forms,  syllables  and  algorithmic  constructions  become  objects,  people  and 
places. The various elements in the prop are linked to outside entities using the 
beholder's imagination to create an association between representation and rep-
resented, referrer and referent, material object and imagining. 
Associations between elements in the representation and objects of ima-
gining are usually suggested by the artifact itself. A drawing, a description or a 
simulation of a horse is likely to suggest an association with... a horse. This does 
not mean, however, that the viewer, reader or player does not have an active 
part in the imagining of the horse. She may imagine certain characteristics of 
the horse that are not in the representation, e.g. the touch of its hair, its smell, 
how it would be like to ride a horse and so forth. She might even be reminded 
of a holiday camp as a child when she fell off a pony and was too afraid to 
come near one for the rest of the week. Finally, representations are not always 
clear as to what they represent. More abstract visual art, poetry or computer 
games may suggest particular objects and situations to different people or none 
at all. Strictly speaking, in the latter case we are no longer dealing with repres-
entation or mimetic art, but I do not believe there is a strict distinction between 
the two. Mark Rothko's  Red on Maroon {1959}, T.S.  Elliot's  The Waste  Land 
{1922}, or Alexey Pajitnov's Tetris {1985} may not represent easily identifiable 
objects  or  situations,  but  they  do  generate  associations  and  perceptions  to 
which the viewer, reader or player can relate.
Pretense play does not maintain strict borders between what is inside and 
what is outside the game. When children are playing family, they continuously 
add objects to their imaginary universe. They may introduce pebble stones as 
currency for going to the market, a bread box as first aid kit or the bamboo 
sticks between mother's begonias as swords for fighting off imaginary intruders. 
Similarly, the dog may be just the dog in one scene, become a horse in another, 
and  rebecome  the  dog  when  getting  back  from  the  market.  Importantly, 
however, although there is no strict delineation as to what is part of the game 
and what is not, the introduction of objects is never arbitrary. First of all, asso-
ciations are more easily accepted when there is a formal likeness between prop 
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and imaginary object like in the case of pebbles and currency: both are small, 
can be put away easily and are countable. And second, associations are more 
easily accepted when they serve a specific purpose within the pretense play. In-
troducing pebbles for going to the market is useful because it allows the enact-
ment of a scene in which money and goods are exchanged for one another. 
What is introduced into the game is the result of a social process of nego-
tiation resulting in a convention. One participant in the game of pretense intro-
duces the pebbles and the others either accept the idea or reject it – often by ig-
noring her. Significantly, not just one specific set of pebbles is associated with 
money, but pebbles themselves 'become' money, all pebbles. The association 
becomes an understanding, an agreement, a convention and in some cases even 
a rule. In a similar way, representation does not always maintain a strict border 
between what is represented and what is not; one person may generate more as-
sociations and imagine more than another when looking at an image, reading a 
story, or playing a computer game. Importantly, however, these associations are 
also subject to the restrictions sketched above. When interpreting a representa-
tion, elements are only accepted into the game when there is a certain formal 
similarity,  when they  are  functional  within  the  game of  representation  as  a 
whole and when they are acceptable as a form of understanding or agreement. 
Hence both children's pretense play and representation function within a hu-
man, social context not determined by, but bound to cultural convention.
Both in children's pretense play and in games of representation, the player 
is allowed a strong sense of freedom in engaging in the game and in accepting 
or rejecting various elements. When a child does not want to play market within 
the game of family, she may continue to make mud pies in the kitchen while the 
others are catching the dog to go to town. Similarly, when looking at a painting 
or reading a book you do not find pleasing, you can take a quick glance at what 
you are interested in and then move on to something you find more appealing. 
Once competition between contestants enters the 'picture', however, free play 
and imagining move to the background.58 In competitive games, associations 
58 It should be noted that other forms of representation such as stories and paintings also stage a 
form of competition, conflict or contrast between emotions, characters or concepts like good 
and evil. The difference between this type of conflict and the competition I am discussing with 
regard to game rules is that in the former, conflict is hard-coded within the artifact whereas 
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are no longer just understandings or agreements: they become strict rules which 
you can either follow or not, but if you do not, you are at once outside the 
game. When a simulation, a board game or a sport is created to allow for com-
petition between contestants, rules are agreed upon when the playing starts to 
allow for equal treatment by the game, and they must be guaranteed for as long 
as the game lasts. When taking part in competitive play, one cannot introduce 
new elements or rules. If one would introduce pebble stones as extra currency 
when playing Monopoly, for example, the game would collapse. It is precisely the 
constraint of having a limited amount of money which allows for competitive 
play. In a competitive game, winning automatically replaces the simple act of 
taking part in playful imagining as its main goal. Rules are not inherent to play, 
but they can be used to structure it, to allow for equal treatment and honest 
competition. Roger Caillois claims that “rules themselves create fictions. The 
one who plays chess, prisoner's base, polo, or baccara, by the very fact of com-
plying with their respective rules, is separated from real life where there is no 
activity that literally corresponds to any of these games” (1958/2001: 8). I do 
not agree. How would we explain traffic rules? Value exchange? Law? Science? 
Are they all fictional because they are governed by rules? Not at all. Rules are 
fixed conventions which can be used to organize both real-world activities and 
imaginary play.  Computer simulation and games are forms of rule-governed 
imaginary play refereed by the rule-governor par excellence: the computer.59
MIMESIS AND TRUTH
Walton describes the process of mimesis as loose associative pretense play, but 
when he reaches the question of truth in representation, he changes his vocabu-
lary and theoretical perspective entirely. For Walton, representations, as they 
competitive games merely have a role of enabling competition between human contestants, hu-
man against computer or human against oneself (e.g. through highscores) and most often a 
mixture of several of these.
59 In a sense, computer simulation and games use the very concept of rules as a form of repres-
entation for mimicking decision-making and behavior. Due to their limited computing power, 
early computer game systems could only process highly abstract games, but today more com-
plex rule systems manage to approximate real-world phenomena realistically. This ontological 
restriction of being tied to rules may also lie at the basis of the fact that it is much easier to rep-
resent competitive play in a computer environment than free associative participation like the 
eagerly awaited interactive narrative.
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occur in art and literature, generate fictional worlds as props in games of make-be-
lieve,  a  theoretical  discourse  obviously  derived from logical  analytical  philo-
sophy,  more  specifically  from  possible-worlds  semantics.  Although  Walton 
denies that his notion of fictionality is a type of truth, he does acknowledge 
their relatedness. “Fictionality has turned out to be analogous to truth in some 
ways;  the  relation  between  fictionality  and  imagining  parallels  that  between 
truth and belief. Imagining aims at the fictional as belief aims at the true. What 
is true is to be believed; what is fictional is to be imagined” (41). In a similar 
way, he acknowledges the indebtedness of his notion of fictional worlds to the 
possible-worlds semantic framework, but he rejects their similarity immediately 
afterwards. “Our pretheoretical notion of fictional worlds is a dangerous one, 
one that can easily mislead the unwary theorist. I noted that it is linked to the 
temptation to think of fictionality as a species of truth.  Other dangers arise 
from the  inevitable  tendency to  associate  fictional  worlds  with  the possible 
worlds of recent semantic theory (1990: 57).  Despite this warning, however, 
Walton does not succeed in overcoming the analogies which he first employs 
and subsequently rejects. While his main theory is based on the fact that a rep-
resentation functions as a prop, one element among many in a game of make-
believe, he claims that propositions about a represented something can be ob-
jective fictional truths. “[A] fictional truth consists in there being a prescription 
or mandate in some context to imagine something. Fictional propositions are 
propositions  that  are  to  be  imagined  –  whether  or  not  they  are  in  fact 
imagined” (39). Although his basic framework is that of children's play, when 
he discusses the truth-value of representations, they are suddenly claimed to 
mandate  truths (albeit  fictional ones)  and these truths form clusters  and even 
worlds just as in possible-worlds semantics. “To speak of a fictional world is, in 
part, to speak of the class or cluster of fictional truths belonging to it. One reas-
on for having a notion of fictional worlds is to be able to refer conveniently to 
such clusters” (62)
There are at least three arguments that can be brought forward against 
Walton's line of thought on mimesis and truth. First and foremost, ironically as 
he himself most ingeniously points out, the process of mimesis is always tied to 
a particular context, i.e. the 'pretense play session', and is relative to its socio-
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cultural context. Like props in pretense play, artifacts in representation do not 
mandate fictional truths, they take part in a complex interplay between prop(s), 
player(s) and context. Therefore, when formulating a proposition about a rep-
resentation, this proposition does not solely or even directly deal with the arti-
fact (painting, story, game), but with the relation between artifact and 'player'. It 
is not some sort of truth about a fictional world that is somewhere within the 
artifact, but a statement about what the artifact means to a person, a group of 
persons or even an entire culture. Of course, I do not claim that there can be 
no objective elements in representation. As I said, formal likeness plays an im-
portant role in pretense play, but reducing representation to verisimilitude and 
ignoring the concrete situation and socio-cultural context would be an enorm-
ous mistake. 
Second, the truth-relation between a representational artifact and what it 
represents in reality is not binary, not even a matter of linear degree, but one of 
multi-dimensional  approximation.  Certain aspects  may be represented,  while 
others are merely hinted at or not represented at all. Hence, propositions about 
a representation are also always relative and approximative vis-à-vis the repres-
entation as artifact, something Walton denies when stating that props mandate 
fictional truths, but which he again accepts in contexts like the following. “A 
proposition is fictional, let's say, if it is to be imagined (in the relevant context) 
should the question arise, it being understood that often the question shouldn't 
arise. In normal cases the qualification can be understood thus: If p is fictional, 
then should one be forced to choose between imagining p and imagining not-p, 
one is to do the former” (40). And third, Walton believes that all pretense play 
is based on rules, whilst in most cases rules are only one aspect of play or rep-
resentation, taking the form of loose conventions or even silent understanding. 
At one point (40), he refers to a children's game whereby every stump in the 
forest is a bear from which they must flee. For Walton, this conditional rule is 
an example of how fictional truths are generated in all play and representational 
contexts. This is not true however. The majority of pretense play is based on 
free association and cultural convention. Conditional rules play a role only in 
competitive play and remain a marginal phenomenon in general associative play 
or when dealing with a representation. Association and convention are complex 
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sociocultural  and psychological  mechanisms which cannot be described as a 
purely logical process taking the prop's formal characteristics as its input. Inter-
pretation is  shaped by context, not determined by law.
FICTION AND NON-FICTION
In the second chapter of  Mimesis as Make-Believe, Walton discusses the differ-
ence between fictional and non-fictional representation. Because he has identi-
fied representations as artifacts mandating fictional truths he runs into a num-
ber of difficulties however. In the beginning his study, he accepts that all rep-
resentations have in common a role in make-believe (4) yet further down he 
claims that these same representations mandate fictional truths, true proposi-
tions about a fictional world that exists outside the real one. Of course, when 
he then reaches the question of non-fictional representation,  he automatically 
places himself  outside his own framework for representation where there is 
only room for fictional and not for real truths. Strangely enough, instead of re-
thinking his notion of fictional truth, Walton opts for the reanalysis of the very 
concept of representation which he redefines as being restricted to fiction. Fic-
tion represents reality but non-fiction presents “another relation that may obtain 
between  representations  and  things  in  the  world,  (...)  matching”  (108).  For 
Walton, “'matching' is complete correspondence between a representation and 
something in the world. (...) [A] man-picture matches a man if the man is in 
every detail exactly like 'the man in the picture'. A story matches a person if that 
person is and does everything that a character in the story is and does” (Ibid.). 
As amply discussed in the previous chapter, this constitutes a somewhat 
naive and problematic conception of representation. How can something like a 
picture or a description match something or someone in every detail without 
being identical to them, i.e. without being the person or thing itself. If we were 
to make a quick drawing of a man using a circle and five lines for body, arms 
and legs, would that be an example of matching as most real people clearly also 
have a head, a body, two arms and two legs? Is a photograph an example of 
matching? Then how do we explain that it does not match the size of its subject 
for example? Is a news report fictional when it is edited and does not exactly 
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match the depicted events? Is a scientific theory fictional when it is approximat-
ive or does not apply to all instances of a phenomenon? Finally, if there is such 
a radical difference between fiction and non-fiction, then how do we explain 
that some forms are mixtures of the two, like historical novels in which histor-
ical events are mixed with fictional ones? And how do we explain that repres-
entations can be non-fictional to some people, but fictional to others, like for 
example ancient  mythology  which was  conceived to  be  non-fictional  at  the 
time, but is regarded as fiction today?
Further in his discussion, Walton recognizes the difficulties of his concep-
tion of non-fiction as matching and fiction as representation, and he admits 
that the difference between the two is far from clear-cut. “The actual literary 
works that populate our libraries do not come neatly differentiated into two dis-
crete piles, fiction and non-fiction, nor do works of other media. It is not at all 
obvious, in practice, where to draw the line” (89). Walton's second attempt at 
defining non-fiction is no longer formal, but based on the function it fulfills in 
a  concrete  socio-cultural  context.  “What  counts  as  fiction  will  depend  on 
whether we understand a work's function to depend on how its maker intended 
or expected it to be used; or on how, typically or traditionally, it actually is used; 
or on what uses people regard as proper or appropriate (whether or not they do 
so use it); or on how, according to accepted principles, it is in fact to be used 
(whether  or  not  people  realize  this);  or  on one or  another  combination of 
these” (91). Again, however, because he has claimed representation to be ex-
clusively tied to fictional truths, Walton finds himself forced to look outside his 
own theoretical framework to explain the phenomenon of non-fiction, which 
he this time, without retracting the previous analysis, situates with the author's 
intention or the work's culturally accepted status vis-à-vis reality. 
Thus, for a second time, Walton's choice of a discrete logical discourse 
derived from possible world semantics and his fundamental belief in the unas-
sailable truth and objectivity of science and knowledge prevents him from stat-
ing  the  obvious  conclusion  that  should  be  drawn from his  own theory  of 
mimesis as pretense play: i.e. that there is no radical difference between fictional 
and non-fictional representation. Both function in similar pretense play: 'Let's 
pretend that the words, images, camera shots, simulated objects and so on are 
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not just themselves, but also something else.' Fiction and non-fiction use simil-
ar codes, forms and materials60 and they can be mixed in one and the same arti-
fact. Non-fictionality is not an inherent quality of a representation, but it is a 
form of meta-knowledge about the representation which can be signaled by its 
formal features, but is more often communicated through para- or meta-com-
munication such as book covers,  spoken introductions or other meta-know-
ledge about the magazine or program in which it appears.61 Historical writings, 
news reports, scientific theories and so forth function in pretense play as do 
their fictional counterparts, it is only the meta-knowledge of their being meant 
to mimic real world events, their claim to verisimilitude, that causes the reader 
or viewer to make a direct link between the depicted and real-world happen-
ings. 
Both in the case of fictional and non-fictional representation, an artifact is 
created to serve as a prop in pretense play and trigger certain perceptions. The 
difference  between  fictional  and  non-fictional  representation  is  not  to  be 
sought in the artifact itself, but in the status of the imagining it triggers. In one 
way or another, non-fictional representation introduces its aim at verisimilitude 
into the game of pretense and this is either accepted by the reader or viewer, or 
it is not. If it is, the non-fictionality of the representation becomes a convention 
within the pretense play, one determining that the perceptions triggered corres-
pond to certain aspects of real-world events. Compare it to the functioning of a 
60 A famous example of confusion as to the fictional status of a representation is Orson Welles' 
radio play The War of the Worlds {1938}, an adaptation of H.G. Wells classic science fiction nov-
el by the same name. It dealt with the invasion of the USA by Martians and was organized as an 
ordinary music show periodically interrupted by news bulletins in documentary style. Although 
the program had started with an introduction explaining that the broadcast was only a radio 
play, people tuning in later were panic-stricken and are reported to have called the police and 
even gone to see the purported landing area carrying firearms. Afterwards, neither Welles nor 
CBS were punished, but CBS had to promise that they would never again use the phrase 'we in-
terrupt this program' for dramatic purposes. It is sometimes said that the attack on Pearl Har-
bor three  years later  was at  first  received in skepticism by the American public  as a  con-
sequence of The War of the Worlds.
61 This is the main reason for my criticism on the use of computer games for propaganda pur-
poses in the previous chapter. When a game like America's Army presents itself as a faithful rep-
resentation of army life, it deliberately 'forgets' to mention that this fidelity is very much related 
to the task at hand which is to generate more conscriptions. If this discussion is to serve but 
one purpose, it is to demonstrate computer simulations and games are just another form of 
mimesis and that, like all forms of representation, they serve a purpose and should therefore be 
interpreted critically in light of its goals.
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clock. A clock is a representation of time: a device mimicking the running of 
seconds, minutes and hours. When we see a clock in a station, for example, we 
presume it runs correctly, we accept the convention that it corresponds to the 
real time and act accordingly. From this analogy, a number of conclusions can 
be drawn regarding use of representations to communicate about the world. 
First of all, formal features play only a minor role in the acceptance of the 
clock as a 'true' representation. An observant commuter may note one day that 
the clock is broken, because it is not moving for example, and on that basis re-
ject its indication of time, yet generally it will be accepted simply on the basis 
that clocks in stations are supposed to run correctly. Second, our acceptance of 
the clock representing the correct time is directly related to the task at hand. 
The time indicated in the station may not be exact to the second, but if it allows 
you to catch your train, its correspondence to reality is sufficient. Similarly, a 
newspaper article, a news report, a scientific theory etc. are verisimilar when the 
perceptions they trigger correspond sufficiently to reality relative to the task at 
hand. Just as a station clock will be rejected for scientific experiments, a news 
report may sufficiently correspond to reality as a news report, but not as a sci-
entific reference. And third, a representation is never the phenomenon it rep-
resents as a whole, but an imitation and approximation of a limited set of its 
characteristics. A clock, for example, is a device imitating the rotation of the 
earth around its axis, imitating and approximating a single aspect of a natural 
phenomenon, one that has become so important to us that it is accepted to be a 
category in itself, i.e. time. In a similar way, a report or an article represents a 
limited number of aspects of a phenomenon relative to its goal. A broadcast of 
a football match, for example, does not show the playing field as a whole in-
cluding every movement (how could it?),  but  rather follows the action sur-
rounding the ball. A representation is not a duplication of a natural phenomen-
on, but an artifact triggering perceptions corresponding to it relative to the goal 
of the representation.
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IMAGINING AS COPING WITH REALITY
Children participating in a game of make-believe are generally less interested in 
the props used in the game than in the fantasies they evoke. Props function 
only as aids, attributes. It is the imagining that is triggered by the game and the 
emotions that come with it which are the real incentive to play. When children 
are walking in a forest and one of them starts a game of make-believe in which 
a stump of wood is a dangerous grizzly bear, she is not interested in the stump 
of wood itself, but in the situation it evokes in her imagination. She wants to 
know what would happen if a bear appeared on her path, how she or her friend 
would react, how brave they would be. The stump of wood merely functions as 
the prompter of the imagining; it triggers it, but it is not its underlying motiva-
tion. Another prompter like a rustling in the thicket could have triggered the 
same fantasy. One could even argue that it is not the stump which is the actual 
prompter, but the entire situation of being alone in a forest: wandering through 
the woods,  the sun going under,  recently heard a story about bears,  and so 
forth. It is a particular context that generates an imagining and in this context 
the imaginer, with her preoccupations, fears, and joys, is an important, in many 
cases the most important element. Man has a tendency to imagine, to generate 
associative thoughts prompted by environmental factors. For Walton, imagin-
ing and pretense play are an opportunity to toy with, explore and try out new 
and  sometimes  far-fetched  ideas  (22).  By  projecting  objects,  situations  and 
problems into an imaginary context, a safe and malleable environment is gener-
ated for trying out new and risky solutions, for rehearsing specific future tasks 
or for coming to grips with certain emotions like fear and uncertainty. In this 
way, imagining and play provide “practice in roles one might someday assume 
in real life, that it helps one to understand and sympathize with others, that it 
enables one to come to grips with one's own feelings and that it broadens one's 
perspectives” (12). They are a means of coping with our environment, our life, 
reality.
When we read a novel, look at a painting, watch a film or play a computer 
game, it is the pleasure, understanding, recognition or perhaps simply the ad-
renaline rush accompanying the imagining in which we are interested. Art, liter-
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ature and media are artifacts conceived and manufactured for generating per-
ceptions relating to our emotions and we choose them on that basis. Just like 
the child in the above example may be imagining a bear because she is coping 
with her own fear of encountering one, we choose our representations based 
on what they mean to us, how they generate perceptions which somehow help 
us deal with our environment and our emotions toward it. Fictional representa-
tions allow for the generation of a safe environment in which we can deal with 
various  emotions  toward  present,  possible  future  or  entirely  imaginary  situ-
ations. Pretense play based on fictional representation could be introduced as 
“let's imagine the events represented in these descriptions, images or models, 
explore them, and see how they relate to how we experience our lives.” As 
such, fiction presents an alternative configuration of reality which can be used 
both for comparison and consolation. Similarly, if we look at forms of mimesis 
that do aim at verisimilitude such as newspaper articles,  documentaries, bio-
graphies,  scientific  studies etc.  they are used as props in games of  pretense 
which could be introduced as “let's imagine that these descriptions, images or 
virtual objects are how the things they remind us of truly work and let's see 
how they can help us deal with them.” Different forms of mimesis, both as me-
ticulous imitation and willful distortion can be seen to form part of a human at-
tempt to learn about and cope with his environment by evoking clarifying and 
consoling imagining.
SUBJECTIVE IMAGINING AS COPING WITH THE SELF
Representations are artifacts built to be used as props in pretense play in which 
they function as tools for helping to generate imagining. Walton distinguishes 
between two types of imagining: subjective and objective. Subjective imagining 
(de se, from the inside) occurs when imagining a scene or a series of events in 
which an imaginary self is projected into the imagining. For example, in the 
game of make-believe sketched above, in which children are walking in a forest 
and suddenly imagine a bear where there is  a  stump of  wood,  they project 
themselves into the very center of the scene they are imagining. It is not the 
bear  that  matters,  but  their  encountering  it  and  the  possible  developments 
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emerging from that encounter. By projecting themselves into a safe imaginary 
setting where they are faced with a dangerous animal, they are able to anticipate 
the situation's possible outcomes and evaluate different strategies like fighting, 
running away or climbing a tree. Thus they are able to prepare for possible fu-
ture dangers and cope with their feelings of anxiety toward them. 
When imagining objectively (de re, from the outside), on the other hand, 
the subject refrains from projecting herself into the imagined scene. She could, 
for example, imagine a cloud to be a locomotive without imagining herself be-
ing present to that locomotive. When imagining a train objectively, she is not 
necessarily imagining herself seeing one. She is not part of the imagining. It is 
the mere pleasure of exploring the imagined appearance of a locomotive that 
guides her thoughts, not the interest in making contact with it.62 In a similar 
way, imagining generated in pretense play with representations can be subject-
ive or objective. If we look at a person reading a novel or watching a film, she 
may identify with a character and feel deeply immersed in the story world. She 
does not, however, project her own self into the fiction. She observes charac-
ters with whom she may become acquainted, sympathize and identify, but she 
does  not  become one  of  them.  Novels  or  films  generate  objective imagining 
about events taking place separate from the reader or viewer. Other, more sub-
ject-oriented and usually more participatory forms of poetry, interactive theater, 
board or computer games, project the player's self into the imaginary environ-
ment generating subjective imagining. In the next chapter, I go deeper into this 
issue and develop the notion of introjection (casting, projecting into) and com-
puter games as an introjective cultural form.
When looking more closely at the distinction between objective and sub-
jective imagining, we notice that objective imagining (de re, imagining from the 
outside) is usually a more distanced, more cerebral activity. In this sense it is 
62 After introducing the distinction between subjective and objective imagining, Walton relativizes 
and eventually neutralizes his own proposal by stating that “all imagining involves a kind of 
self-imagining” (28). This is true when considering every trace of perspective as a form of sub-
jective presence. For my analysis, however, the idea of restricting subjective imagining to pres-
ence of an imagined self makes more sense. Therefore, I do not follow Walton's claim that 
“[i]magining an elephant in Central Park is likely to involve imagining oneself seeing an ele-
phant in Central Park, especially if one visualizes the elephant” (28). One can perfectly imagine 
an elephant in Central Park without imagining being there oneself.
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more closely associated with what we generally understand by 'thinking', 'con-
ceiving' or 'reckoning'. When imagining a bear objectively and keeping oneself 
outside the imagining, a distance between the imagined and the self is estab-
lished and maintained. Hence objective imagining, as its denomination suggests, 
is more suitable to exploring and learning to cope with the world by under-
standing it. Subjective imagining (de se, imagining from the inside), on the oth-
er hand, is more directly concerned with the relation between self and environ-
ment and is more self-engaging and emotional. Hence it is associated with what 
we generally refer to as 'play'. Imagining a bear subjectively involves active self-
engagement and introduces the self and her behavior as a variable into the pre-
tense play. Subjectively imagining an encounter with a bear on a forest path 
more easily turns into a playful evaluation of what could happen to oneself and 
what the consequences could be of different actions in that situation. Whereas 
objective imagining can be seen as a way of coping with one's environment 
through understanding, subjective imagining is more generally concerned with 
emotional coping, with learning to cope with oneself. 
Finally, it should be noted that, by introducing the self into the imagining, 
almost  automatically  a  notion  of  imitation  and  intersubjective  comparison 
enters play. When children are playing family or cowboys and Indians, for ex-
ample, they cast themselves into a role within the imagining and try to play it 
according  to  certain self-imposed standards  allowing them to  measure  their 
imaginary performance and compare it to that of others. Introducing rules and 
turning the imaginative play into a regulated competitive game is then only an-
other step in facilitating the comparison between different players and an en-
hancement of the process of probing the self and finding one's place in the 
world. In the last chapter of this study, I delve deeper into the idea of imagining 
as coping and subjective imagining as coping with the self.
MIMETIC ECONOMY
To conclude my inquiry into the ontological nature of the virtual, I would like 
to return to the issue of virtual economies and their status vis-à-vis the actual 
world. Without aiming to make a judgment regarding the practice of selling vir-
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tual goods for real money, I would like to stand still at the nature of the goods 
being  bought  and  sold.  Based  on  the  previous  discussion  of  the  virtual  as 
mimesis, my claim is that a virtual economy is not an actual economy like a 
brush-stroke is not an actual church spire, but an imitation of one. A virtual 
economy is a system devised for giving players the impression that they are 
dealing with a real economic situation where there is scarcity, price fluctuation 
and so forth. There is no scarcity in a virtual world, however, unless the pro-
gramming rules artificially create and maintain it. When a virtual entity has been 
programmed, it can be reproduced almost infinitely, only bound by the physical 
limitations of the computer system on which the simulation is run.63 In other 
words, if persistent worlds develop an economy, this is because they are meant 
to, because the programming rules of the game world create constraints for 
production, control supplies and generate artificial scarcity. Technically, a com-
puter simulation could provide each player with an armory full of the newest 
and most powerful weapons, but then the tension between being and not be-
ing, having and not having, maintained through artificial scarcity, would be lif-
ted and the growth topos of the game would collapse. When the player be-
comes a smith and starts forging virtual axes, she is not really creating anything. 
All she is doing is performing a number of preprogrammed tasks after which 
the simulation launches the event of creating an instance of the object ax. It 
may seem to the player that she is creating a virtual item, but in reality the sys-
tem could have generated thousands of them on the spot if it were only pro-
grammed to do so. Functionally, a virtual economic system is almost the op-
posite  of  a  real  one.  Whereas  a  real  economy is  a  system for  dealing  with 
scarcity and for distributing goods in an optimal manner, a virtual economy is a 
system for creating scarcity where there would be abundance and maintaining 
it.
Designers and maintainers of persistent game worlds sometimes refer to 
virtual economies as faucet-drain systems, using the metaphor of a sink to de-
63 If we look for an analogy, we could try comparing a virtual object to one card in a deck. From 
a structural point of view, however, this comparison is invalid. A better analogy would be to 
compare a computer game to a game of chess, whereby a virtual item is not a chess piece, but 
one specific position in the game. In this sense, buying a virtual item for real money would be 
like paying your opponent in chess to be allowed to move one of your pieces.
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scribe their behavior. The game world with everything in it is the sink, the total 
amount of money that circulates within the simulated environment. Above it, 
there  is  a  tap  running  money  into  the  system  when  robot  merchants  buy 
freshly-forged axes from players, when monsters are killed and looted or when 
hidden treasury is discovered and sold. At the bottom of the sink, there are a 
number of drains pulling money out: for example when players pay a merchant 
for goods or weapons or when they are attacked, killed and pillaged by a mon-
ster. When money comes out of the faucet, it is 'minted', generated by the game 
system on the spot, and when it goes out through one of the drains, it is deleted 
from the system. There is no reuse, neither of money nor of goods; there is no 
central bank, only faucets and drains opening and closing so as to keep the total 
amount of money and items in the sink in balance with the number of players. 
A virtual economy is an imitation of economic reality from the perspective of 
the player; it is a system devised to generate and maintain the illusion of scarcity 
without endangering the game's topos of character-development and progres-
sion. A virtual economy is no more an economy than a virtual car is a car. In 
certain limited conditions it behaves like a real economy would. It is not the 
same, however, and neither will it ever be. A virtual world is not a possible 
world and a virtual economy is not a possible economy. It is a behavioral simu-
lation devised to imitate an economic system, an instance of mimesis.64
64 Information technology has a history mystification. Around the turn of the 19th century Parisi-
ans are reported to have hidden under their chairs when an approaching train locomotive was 
projected and a Brazilian spectator is said to have shot at displayed thugs (Lunenfeld 2004: 
381). In the 1950s, shots heard on television are claimed to have scared away burglars. Virtual 
economies may well be an example of the same myth-making mechanism.
IV
SIMULATING A SELF
If images make their subjects present to us, digital representations make 
us present to them. 
Timothy Binkley, The Vitality of Digital Creation, 1997
In 1932, Aldous Huxley published Brave New World, a dystopian science fiction 
novel about a future society in which rational collectivism reigns to the detri-
ment of human emotion. War, scarcity, pain and old age have been eliminated, 
but the resulting equilibrium has come at a price. Family, religion, art and cul-
ture have been erased and replaced by detachment, sexual promiscuity and anti-
depressant drugs.  Children are no longer born, but genetically manufactured 
and psychologically conditioned to fit specific categories of man and women 
predetermined to carry out specific tasks in society in the most efficient way 
possible and be happy whilst doing so. Everything in the World State is either 
directly related to material production or meant to sustain the equilibrium and 
safeguard future production. One of the tools employed in this latter process is 
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information technology. Sound recording and playback, for example, play an 
important role in the conditioning of children in their sleep. Over and over they 
are subjected to spoken rules and adages until they accept them to be their own. 
Nonetheless, in Brave New World, information technology does not yet represent 
the overwhelming force that it becomes in later dystopian nightmares. It is still 
a means toward a goal, i.e. to serve collective interest, rather than an independ-
ent agent. At one point, Lenina and John (the savage) go to the feelies, a sort of 
cinema with added scent and nervous stimulation. The film is pornographic. 
John, who has not been conditioned and is unfamiliar with feelies and porno-
graphy, is shocked. “I don't think you ought to see things like that.” Lenina, 
who has been conditioned, does not understand and answers that she found it 
lovely. John's conscience keeps playing up, however, and he finally denounces 
the film on moral grounds. “'It was base,' he said indignantly, 'it was ignoble'”. 
The feely is unacceptable to him. Again, however, it should be noted that it is 
not the technology itself that is the subject of contempt, but the way it is used. 
In Huxley's universe, man has become part of the technological apparatus, but 
the decision to do so was still his own. The technological imperative is eminent, 
but it is the result of the human choice to replace human intuition by rational 
collectivism.
In 1949, George Orwell published Nineteen Eighty-Four, again a nightmar-
ish dystopia set in future London where the state has seized absolute control 
over the lives of its citizens. The story deals with one Winston Smith, a middle-
aged member of the outer Party who silently resists the state's control by keep-
ing a diary and having a sexual relationship with Julia, one of his colleagues.65 
Initially everything appears to go well and Winston and Julia make contact with 
the  underground  resistance  movement.  The  movement  turns  out  to  be  a 
façade, however, and they are caught by the thought police and 'cured' from 
their deviant ideas by electroshock therapy and torture. Whereas in Brave New 
World, information technology was used to support other mechanisms of op-
pression such as psychological conditioning and sexual promiscuity, in Nine-
65 Contrary to Brave New World, in  Nineteen Eighty-Four, not sexuality is used to suppress human 
nature, but its prohibition. Any ties between party members that are outside the state's control 
are forbidden and when caught one will be sent to the Ministry of Love, which is really a min-
istry of torture, for reeducation.
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teen Eighty-Four, it has become a mechanism of oppression in itself. Televi-
sion-like devices called telescreens are omnipresent both on the street and in 
private residences and are used to disseminate propaganda and spy upon cit-
izens through built-in cameras. Winston works in the records department of the 
Ministry of Truth where he is responsible for falsifying history to make it reflect 
present interests. Even language itself is being molded into artificial Newspeak 
which is to eradicate all thought that deviates from Party doctrine by simply 
making it impossible to think beyond its principles. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, real-
ity is determined by the information controlled by the Party rather than the oth-
er way around. Information and information technology are a means to control 
human thought, symbolically represented by the obliteration of logical reason-
ing in doublethink. Although you know something cannot be logically true, you 
believe it is; that is, you do not just accept that you are supposed to think that it 
is, you believe it! On the closing page, Winston writes the equation 2+2=5 and 
as he is lead to the execution squad, his last thoughts are of loving Big Brother, 
not Julia.
In 1968, Philip K. Dick published Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, a 
third dystopian novel which was later adapted into the cult classic film  Blade  
Runner {Ridley Scott 1982}. The world has been devastated by atomic warfare 
and nuclear fallout is slowly suffocating all terrestrial life. Earth's few remaining 
inhabitants are encouraged by government programs to emigrate to colonies on 
other planets in the solar system. Life in these colonies is hard, but human-like 
androids are manufactured to do the heavy and dangerous labor. Do Androids? 
tells the story of six of these artificial humans who have escaped to earth and 
are being chased by Rick Deckard, a bounty hunter who has been contracted to 
kill them. Although the novel is primarily concerned with the ethical question 
of artificial humanity and how man as a creator would decide about their life 
and death, it also contains a distinctive subplot dealing with the status of reality 
and  information  technology  in  modern  society.  Whereas  the  feely  and  the 
telescreen were direct derivatives of existing technology, i.e. cinema and televi-
sion respectively, the empathy box is not. It is described as a sort of console 
with a handle and a screen, but the experience it generates is much more than 
that of present-day digital representation. It is a transcendental experience. It al-
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lows its user to “participate in fusion” (57) with the Christ-like figure of Wilbur 
Mercer and share his sufferings. At one point, Deckard is fused with Mercer 
when being hit by a rock within the simulated world. When he breaks off his 
session, it turns out that the wound is not just virtual, but that he is actually 
bleeding. Also, toward the end of the book, Mercer appears in the actual world 
when he helps Deckard to eliminate the three remaining androids effectively 
lifting the border between virtual and actual, imagination and reality. In Do An-
droids?, technology is not just something that can be used to change or control 
reality like in Brave New World and Nineteen Eighty-Four respectively, it becomes a 
device that is able to generate a reality of its own and make it accessible to man.
The science fiction novel that completed the symbolic switch from tech-
nology existing in a man's world to man existing in a world of technology is 
again  Neuromancer,  William Gibson's  1984 cyberpunk dystopia. In this novel, 
Gibson describes how people have cranial jacks installed which allow them to 
plug into SimStim units and into the Matrix, a cyberspatial meta-world of three-
dimensional  digital  renderings,  corporate  information  systems  protected  by 
thick layers of security ice, and artificial intelligences such as the Flatline and 
Wintermute.  Neuromancer is not the first narrative to play with the idea of a 
computer space enveloping the user however. That credit goes to the science 
fiction film  Tron {Steven  Lisberger}  which  came out  two  years  earlier  and 
which was  most  likely  one of  Gibson's  principal  sources  of  inspiration  for 
Neuromancer's cyberspace.66 Tron tells the story of Flynn, a hacker who used to 
be  a  computer  game  programmer,  but  whose  designs  have  been  stolen  by 
66 The resemblance between Neuromancer and Tron is rather striking in fact. Both tell the story of a 
'fallen' computer hacker who is raiding a well-protected corporate computer system. In both 
cases, the raid is carried out by two characters working together: in Tron it is hacker Flynn and 
fighter Tron, in Neuromancer it is hacker Case and 'razor girl' Molly. Moreover, in both cases, the 
computer hacker has to reach the heart of the system so that his companion can carry out their 
ultimate task which, in Tron, consists in preventing the unification of the central artificial intelli-
gence and other demon programs, and in Neuromancer in helping to unify the two artificial intel-
ligences Wintermute and Neuromancer. Furthermore, apart from these thematic and plot level 
similarities, there is also Gibson's description of cyberspace which is highly reminiscent of Lis-
berger's game space: “Cyberspace.(...) A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer 
in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations 
of data. Like city lights, receding” (55). Tron's last scene is in fact an image of city lights gradually transforming into an image 
of the matrix as the camera zooms out. Finally, there are a number of descriptive elements from Tron that 
return in Nuromancer such as 'the matrix' for cyberspace and 'space cowboy' for Flynn.
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Dillinger who made fame and became rich marketing them. Flynn, however, is 
determined to find evidence of his creating the highly successful arcade games 
and breaks into the company network which is controlled by the Master Con-
trol Program (MCP), an artificial intelligence which has become self-aware and 
is planning to take over computer systems all over the world and thus subject 
humanity to its will. As Flynn is hacking into the system from a terminal in the 
corporate laboratory, the MCP dematerializes him using a computer-controlled 
laser reading Flynn's molecular code into the internals of the computer system. 
There,  he becomes a  character in his  own games and competes against  the 
computer system.67 Because Flynn is a hacker, he has control over cyberspace 
however – a theme which is also highly present in the film The Matrix {Andy & 
Larry Wachowski 1999} – and eventually  succeeds to penetrate into the heart 
of the Master Control Program, where he manages to destroy the central unit 
and restore human control over cyberspace. 
In this chapter, I take a closer look at one of computer simulation's more 
distinctive characteristics  vis-à-vis  other,  narratologically  fixed cultural  forms 
such as literature and film, i.e. the fact that the player's reactions are registered 
by the system and projected into the simulated environment. I refer to this phe-
nomenon as introjection, a term which I derive from Latin 'being thrown, projec-
ted into'. In the first section, I discuss the notion of introjection in relation to 
existing concepts such as 'presence' and 'immersion' which I deem unsuited for 
my present purpose. Both 'presence' and 'immersion' are primarily psycho-emo-
tional concepts referring to the observer's subjective feeling of being present in 
a virtual environment and feeling surrounded by it respectively. In the second 
section, I go deeper into the actual role that is reserved for the player by the 
simulation and I distinguish between two configurations. Avatarial introjection oc-
curs when a player steps into the simulated world taking the role of an avatar: a 
simulated entity with which she not only identifies herself, but which she also 
controls. As its name suggests this first type of introjection can be associated 
with Hindu mythology in which avatars are God's representatives in the materi-
67 The games featuring in Tron are based on a number of early Atari classics. The disc throwing 
game with bouncing walls is reminiscent of Pong {Nolan Bushnell 1972}. The motorcycle ra-
cing game in which the contestants have to try to corner their opponent is a derivative of Sur-
round {Alan Miller, Atari 1977} and the tank war game resembles Battlezone {Ed Rotberg 1980}.
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al world. The second type of introjection is  transcendental introjection,  often re-
ferred to as God's perspective, which complies more with the Christian idea of 
an invisible, omnipresent, interventionist God. In the third and final section, I 
go deeper into the question of point of view in graphical computer games start-
ing from Britta Neitzel's suggestion to transpose Gérard Genette's conceptual 
apparatus for describing narrative focalization to computer games. As a com-
ment upon and specification of Neitzel's theory, I propose an analytical frame-
work based on three levels of modeling: that of the virtual world, that of the 
role of the player and that of the virtual camera.
1. Introjection
In June 1980, Marvin Minsky published an article titled “Telepresence” in Omni in 
which he coined the concept by the same name. His idea was that as commu-
nication technology would become more powerful  and more precise,  an in-
creasing number of specialized tasks such as surgical operations could be car-
ried out by robotic systems remotely controlled using tele-operating technology. 
This would allow specialists to gather in one physical location and operate any-
where the robotics have been installed, which, in turn, would lower transporta-
tion costs, increase efficiency and promote specialization. Moreover, dangerous 
tasks such as mining and nuclear power generation could be carried out from a 
distance so that miners and controllers would no longer have to unnecessarily 
expose themselves to radiation, pollution or risk mining accidents. By making 
use  of  robotics  manipulated  using  telematics,  operators  could  stay  above 
ground or keep their distance from a nuclear reactor without relinquishing con-
trol over its systems. This would both save lives and lower insurance fees. A 
third  and  final  possible  application  Minsky  suggested  was  teleworking,  i.e. 
working from home instead of  commuting  to  an office building on a daily 
basis. This is not just a more practical solution for the employee who can be 
home when his children return from school, it can also lower the costs for the 
employer as less office space is needed and it can help reduce traffic jams which 
is beneficial to everyone. 'Telepresence' refers to the degree to which operators 
feel present at a distant location evoked using telematic technology and meas-
ured by comparing the efficiency with which they are able to carry out their task 
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to the efficiency with which they would be able to perform if they had actually 
been present.
Twelve years later, in 1992, Thomas Sheridan introduced the concept of 
virtual presence as a counterpart to Minsky's 'telepresence' meant to describe the 
degree to which a user feels present in a simulated environment. Sheridan's aim 
was to describe a theory and a measuring device for the analysis and comparis-
on of virtual reality systems. Conceptually, 'virtual presence' is much more elu-
sive than 'telepresence', however, because of the highly variable nature of simu-
lated environments. Whereas tele-operating systems are always constructed with 
more or less the same goal in mind – i.e. to enable to perform a task as if you 
were there – simulations can be constructed to facilitate the carrying out of cer-
tain tasks (e.g. a word processor), but also to transfer knowledge (e.g. a medical 
simulation of  the bloodstream),  to conduct  experiments (e.g.  chemical reac-
tions), to train certain skills (e.g. a flight simulator) or to provide entertainment 
as is the case for computer games. Because of this diversity, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to create a single system of measurement. In the case of telematics, 
the question is rather straightforward: how good are you able to carry out your 
task as compared to if you were there? In the case of virtual environments, 
however, the question is much less uniform and tends to vary from one envir-
onment to another. Sheridan recognizes this and admits that virtual presence “is 
a mental manifestation, not so amenable to objective physiological definition and measurement. There-
fore  (...)  subjective  report  is  the  essential  basic  measurement.”  However,  different  users  tend to feel 
present in different types of virtual environments and the factors determining the experience can be as di-
verse as the number of sensory stimuli (image, sound, touch), the quality or depth of the information they 
present (colors, resolution, sound bitrate etc.), but also the meaningfulness of the media content and per-
sonal factors such as gender and mood.68
In 1997, digital literature and media theorist Janet Murray published Ham-
let on the Holodeck, a hypothetical study of the narrative potential of digital tech-
nology and virtual reality. One of the principal concepts she introduces for the 
description of digital narrative is 'immersion' referring to the sense of transport-
ation and envelopment experienced by users of virtual systems. “Immersion is a 
metaphorical term derived from the physical experience of being submerged in 
water. We seek the same feeling from a psychologically immersive experience 
68 For an excellent overview, see Lee K. M. 2004 a &b.
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that we do from a plunge in the ocean or swimming pool: the sensation of be-
ing surrounded by a completely other reality, as different as water is from air, 
that  takes  over  all  of  our  attention,  our  whole  perceptual  apparatus”  (98). 
Whereas the concept of 'presence' primarily refers to how technology can be 
used to give the user a feeling of being present in the simulation, of being close 
to its virtual entities, 'immersion' is more concerned with disappearance than 
with proximity. Someone who is immersed in a book or a game is no longer 
emotionally present in the actual, but is willingly transported into the fictional 
world depicted by the representation.  As a possible future scenario,  Murray 
imagines the staging of a performance of  Shakespeare's  Hamlet {1602} in a 
Holodeck-like virtual reality environment.69 Thereby, her implicit assumption is 
that more powerful virtual reality technology and more refined artificial intelli-
gence forms the impetus behind a reanalysis of the principles of narrative and 
will lead to new, more engaging and more immersive forms of virtual perform-
ance. 
Both the notion of '(virtual) presence' and that of 'immersion' refer to the 
emotional experience of a non-actual reality by a person stepping into a game 
of  make-believe  evoked  by  the  simulation.  What  these  concepts  do  not, 
however, is describe the role of the reader, spectator, user or player within the 
presence-inducing or immersive work. 'Presence' is associated with a feeling of 
being close to the elements of the representation, of being present in a different 
reality. 'Immersion' designates a state of absentmindedness, of cognitive trans-
portation into a world evoked by a book, a film or some other form of repres-
entation. Hence one can feel 'present' or 'immersed' when looking at a holiday 
picture of Petra, Jordan, when reading a detective novel set in the ancient Arab-
ic capital,  when watching  Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade {Steven Spielberg 
1989} or  when visiting a virtual reality simulation of the city in a Cave Auto-
matic Virtual Environment. In all of these examples, it is likely that the person 
69 The Holodeck was introduced in Star Trek: The Next Generation {Gene Roddenberry} in 1987 and 
consists of an enclosed room in which objects and people can be simulated by a combination 
of projection, holography and magnetic force fields. Sound is provided by speakers and smell 
by fluid atomizers. The Holodeck can be seen as an imaginary yet more advanced precursor to 
the Cave Automatic Virtual Environment {CAVE}, a present-day existing virtual reality technology 
using projections on the walls of a room-sized cube of which the first example was developed 
at the University of Illinois and demonstrated in 1992.
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subjecting  herself  to  the  game  of  make-believe  does,  to  some  extent,  feel 
present among the ancient buildings and immersed in their alternate reality. My 
focus in this chapter is not on the user experience, however, but on the actual 
role assigned to her by the representation. Typically, a game player is not just an 
innocent bystander watching the ongoing action, but is projected into the game 
world where she is to make decisions and carry out tasks which can have im-
portant consequences for the course of the (virtual) events and their outcome. 
As previously discussed, I refer to this projection and active role-assignment as 
'introjection' from Latin 'being thrown into'. In this section, I go deeper into 
the conceptual nature of 'introjection' and will further motivate my coinage.70
ROLE-PLAYING AND REPRESENTATION
As discussed in the previous chapter, for Kendall Walton (1990), representa-
tions such as paintings or works of literature are objects meant  to serve as 
props in games of make-believe. They are artifacts created for evoking imagin-
ing in those spectators and readers that accept to engage in their pretense play. 
As such, representations generally inhere a role for a 'player' or 'imaginer' who 
completes the depiction using her imaginative faculties. Most literary forms, for 
example, are accepted to present not only a narrating instance, but also a nar-
ratee or receiver role. In some instances, this role may be minimal, present in no 
more than the shape of the book showing it to be meaningful for someone 
reading it. In other cases, it can be an explicit entity which narrator and charac-
ters can address as in  A Clockwork Orange {Stanley Kubrick 1971} “You, my 
brothers and only friends.” Similarly, since the development of linear perspect-
ive in the fifteenth century, painting and later also photography and film have 
been fashioned after how man sees the world from a single point of view. By 
projecting all distance upon lines converging toward the center of the horizon, 
the represented space is depicted as if seen by a person, deriving information 
70 The notion of 'introjection' is my own, but it is based on the work of several other researchers 
and theorists. Special note goes to Marie-Laure Ryan whose influence – through her earlier 
work on 'recentering' (1991), her later effort to elevate 'immersion' to a narratological status 
(2001a) and her idea of 'internal interactivity' (2001b) – is difficult to overestimate. Another im-
portant source of inspiration has been Britta Neitzel's work on 'point of action' in computer 
games (2005), see also below.
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regarding depth from the two slightly different images recorded by her eyes. 
The exact location and hence also the role of the spectator are coded within the 
very coordinate system of the representation. When looking at a perspective 
painting, for example, not just glancing over its colors and lines but taking in 
what is on it, a person automatically fills in the role of a spectator as is foreseen 
in its structure, and only then that person is able to really see what is represen-
ted. In film, finally, there is the additional mechanism of the moving camera, 
not just recording what is in front of it, but taking on the role of an onlooker, 
moving with the action and zooming, panning, tilting, and tracking as required. 
Accordingly, the mechanism of introjection did not appear in a void and can be 
said to be announced by earlier technologies such as the moving camera. This 
does not mean that it is indistinguishable and that simulation is merely a form 
of interactive cinema however. As discussed in the second chapter, simulation 
is a form of dynamic representation of behavior and, as could be expected, its 
reserved role for the player is one of active in-world participation.
In the heyday of hypertext literature in the early 1990s, an often heard 
claim was that hyperfiction would 'empower' the reader, place her on the same 
plane as the author. Some theorists even suggested that hypertext would turn all 
readers  into  authors.  New  forms  of  textuality  had  been  predicted  by 
(post)structuralist theorists such as Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida and hy-
pertext would redeem such promises. Interactive computing technology would 
bring forth a new type of decentered, organic, multi-dimensional textuality in 
which reader and author would be indistinguishable:  clearing paths,  creating 
links  and adding  notes.  All  these  Utopian  promises  have  yet  to  come true 
however. Readers, spectators and players alike do not really want to be the au-
thors of the stories to which they submit themselves. They want to be their 
hero. In 1984, several years before the first successful hypertext systems began 
to appear, Sherry Turkle observed that when practicing sports, “the player is 
held by the power of total concentration on action, the sense of melding body 
and mind. The television spectator’s body is out of the picture. Here the sense 
of immersion is through imagination and identification. The entertainment in-
dustry has long believed that the highest payoffs would come from offering the 
public media that combine action and imaginative identification” (75). Indeed, 
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it is not the idea of being an author that urges the player to dive into the game 
world, but the desire to be part of the action and to bring it under her control. 
Hyperfiction and so-called interactive cinema assume that the reader or spectat-
or would become a creator, shuffling bits and pieces so as to guide the storyline 
as desired. What they did not foresee, however, was how to make that guidance 
meaningful. One of the more successful strategies, as it turned out, was to give 
the spectator a role within the story and make her a player. Interaction without 
introjection  into  the  virtual  environment  tends  to  be  directionless  and ulti-
mately tedious. This may be one of the explanations of the limited success of 
hyperfiction and interactive cinema.
TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY
When we look at the identification mechanisms between imaginer and imagin-
ing, reader and fictional world, spectator and image, we cannot but conclude 
that  they are  as  old  as  representation itself.  Arguably,  the very structure  of 
storytelling is a way of conveying a perspective, offering a view on reality for 
the listener to identify with and take part in the experience. Literary and other, 
visual narrative forms such as film and television series offer the viewer access 
to the experiences of a number of fictional characters, providing an opportunity 
to identify and place oneself in their position. Computer games are no different 
in this  respect.  They offer  a  background story,  introduce a  protagonist  and 
present a problem needing to be solved during the game. Hence, like older, 
more traditional forms of narrative media, computer games are inscribed with a 
role for the receiver, the imaginer of the game of make-believe to complete the 
representation. Like other forms, they offer one or, as is sometimes the case, 
several characters to identify with. What makes the mechanism of introjection 
different, however, is the fact that both the role-playing and the identification 
are part of one and the same movement. A player of a game does not just fill 
the role of audience, and apart from that identify and place herself in the posi-
tion of a character: she does both at the same time. When playing a game, you 
take an active role and identify with that same role while you try to overcome 
the problems your character is confronted with. For the duration of the game, 
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you form a  transcendental  unity  with  the  game-persona,  thinking  what  she 
would think, doing what she would do. Contrary to film, for example, in a com-
puter game, you, yourself, as a player are also a prop in the game of make-be-
lieve, you become one of the entities of the computer simulation. In the case of 
deictic reference, for example, the player of a game refers relative to herself 
when speaking about the game character. Unlike in film, personal pronouns and 
spatial reference are tied to the game role as if the player were positioned inside 
the game world. As Stephen Poole observes, “A game player whose ship has 
just exploded does not say ruefully, 'The ship just exploded'; he says, 'I died'” 
(2000: 183).
The process of stepping into the role of a player and identifying with that 
role by accepting the game rules and the character's goals is not exclusively tied 
to computer gaming however. Arguably, any kind of game or sports, even that 
played by young mammals or birds, involves a degree of role-playing, of accept-
ing and unifying with a position in the game system. What exactly that position 
is and what sort of material manifestation the identification involves varies. In 
most sports and in many games, the representative body in the game is simply 
the player's physical body, albeit tied to the game rules. If you are a defender in 
a game of football, for example, it is your own body you can use to stop the 
strikers from scoring, but you cannot use your hands nor tackle from behind. 
In tabletop games such as Monopoly {Charles Darrow 1935} on the other hand, 
every player has a material entity within the game representation. Whereas in 
the previous category, the player can use all of his bodily abilities as long as she 
stays within the rules of the game, in representational games, there is no more 
than a sign, a representative entity moving within a representation of a space. 
Hence, while in the first category, game rules are generally restrictive, guiding 
and limiting bodily actions, here, they are constitutive of the entity's actions. In 
other words, in the first category, game rules determine that you cannot tackle 
from behind whereas in the second, they say that you can tackle when you are 
in front of or next to your opponent. Games in which the player is represented 
by a sign are not a recent phenomenon. In fact, the idea of moving a projection 
of oneself about a projection of the world is an ancient one, dating back as far 
as some of the oldest board games in recorded history such as The Royal Game of  
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Ur, played in Ur, Mesopotamia (now Iraq, close to Basra) around 2500 BC. Fi-
nally, the shape of the representational  entity within the game may vary. In 
many cases, it is one piece, as for example in Monopoly or in avatarial computer 
games like Pacman {Toru Iwatani 1980}. In other games, the entity consists of 
multiple pieces as in Chess and in most strategy and simulation computer games. 
In some games such as Tetris {Alexey Pajitnov 1985}, there is not even a visible 
entity within the game world. In the next section, I go deeper into the symbolic 
role of the player as a god and describe her engagement from that perspective.
Introjection  is  more  than  identification  with  a  game  protagonist.  The 
player steps into the world of the game and assumes an active, participatory role 
in its emergent game play.71 Thereby it should be noted that introjection is not 
something the player does alone. As a computer game player, you accept the 
role that is offered to you by the system. Within this role, you can do whatever 
is permissible by the rules, but you cannot change the rules themselves, you 
cannot control the nature of your own introjected self. When you play Pacman, 
for example, you have to accept that you are a dot-eating slice of pizza for the 
duration of the game and that eating as much as you can while avoiding the 
spooks is your highest goal in life. In other words, it is the game system which 
offers you a role in its internal functioning and as a player you cannot do much 
more than either reject the offer and refrain from playing or accept and live by 
it.72 The main difference between so-called old and new media is not so much 
that the user has become active or empowered, but that the medium has. When 
beginning a computer game, the player finds herself cast into a role that is not 
her own without the ability to change its fundamentals. As such, playing a com-
71 Note that 'the world of the game' is not necessarily restricted to what happens in the computer-
's memory or on screen. Game paraphernalia such as the Nintendo Zapper {1985}, a plastic 
gun used to shoot onscreen ducks or villains, and the Sony EyeToy {2003} extend the imagin-
ary universe to what happens in the living room.
72 What role the game system has foreseen for the player is basic to the game experience itself. In 
the Grand Theft Auto series, for example, the player is cast as a criminal in an extremely violent 
and hostile milieu, hence she has to behave like one. Another example is  Head over Heels, an 
Amstrad classic created by John Ritman in 1987. It is a fairly conventional puzzle game, but by 
presenting the player with two avatars having to work together, it projects a particular view on 
the game world creating an atmosphere of solidarity, friendship and even love (see Van Looy 
2002 for an extensive analysis of  Head over Heels). Just like the camera work in a film is con-
stitutive of the viewing experience, the role of the player is a determining factor in how the 
game is interpreted. 
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puter game can be seen as a reflection of role-taking in real life. As you grow 
up,  you find yourself  cast  in the middle  of  ideas,  theories and expectations 
about yourself which are not your own. You are given more and more respons-
ibility, but it is not on your own terms. You are empowered in that you do not 
have to listen anymore, but you are at the same time impeded by the system's 
rules.  Interestingly,  the idea of  introjection is  often reflected thematically  in 
computer games.  The whole idea of being cast in a maze, which is present in 
games as diverse as Dungeons and Dragons, Pacman, and Tomb Raider can be seen 
as a contemplation of the feeling of being stuck in the world itself, expressing a 
desire to descend into the heart of the system to change its rules and create a 
better world with a more acceptable role for oneself.
2. PLAYING GOD
Computer simulations and games are human creations, sets of instructions for a 
finite state machine meant to generate complex forms of emergent behavior 
and game-play. Virtual objects and characters are entities generated by such sys-
tems. They are collections of shifting zeros and ones, temporarily imprinted in 
the computer system's random access memory, moving according to rules de-
vised by human programmers. Within the computer's internals, man is a creat-
or, a god who can decide over virtual life and death by typing no more than a 
few key-sequences. At the same time, however, emergent systems tend to defy 
their creators by seemingly having a will of their own. As they grow more com-
plex, involving an increasing number of rules, interacting and neutralizing one 
another, their behavior becomes less predictable, even for their programmers. 
Emergent systems tend to resist their creator's will by constantly singling out 
those cases the latter has not foreseen, forcing her to carry out endless debug-
ging, checking the values of variables at different states and reworking the pro-
gramming code until the system is back under control. The film  Tron can be 
seen as  a  symbolic  representation of  the  struggle  between programmer and 
code, creator and creation. Flynn is a computer hacker and game programmer 
who has lost control over his programming code. It is only by entering the in-
ternals of the computer, destroying the malevolent code and replacing the ker-
SIMULATING A SELF          187
nel by a human controlled system that the Master Control Program can be pre-
vented from subjecting and possibly destroying the whole of humanity.73 Com-
puters are there to serve man, not the other way around. By pointing to that 
fact,  Tron further refined  the topos of war between man and machine intro-
duced into popular culture by a.o.  2001: A Space Odyssee and the epic battle 
between Dave, the last surviving crew member on a mission to Jupiter and his 
artificially intelligent board computer HAL. This theme of man as a creator bat-
tling against artificial intelligence was reflected in Neuromancer, but also in films 
such as  WarGames {John Badham 1983} and to a lesser extent in  Terminator 
{James Cameron 1984}, was further popularized by The Matrix, and eventually 
even came to replace the topos of alien invasion in the recent remake of Battle-
star Galactica {Ronald Moore 2003}. In this section, I investigate the symbolic 
relation between player and game as one between a god and his creation and I 
describe the different forms of introjection as reflections of different concep-
tions of the role of the divine Creator in his creation.
Two types of introjection can be distinguished: avatarial and transcend-
ental. In the case of avatarial introjection, which is the more common form, the 
player controls one well-defined entity in the game, e.g. a character, a vehicle, a 
party of fantasy creatures or some other element in the virtual world. In Space  
War {Steve Russell 1962}, for example, generally recognized as the first com-
puter game, there are two players, each controlling a spaceship circling around a 
planet at the center of the screen. The aim of the game is to shoot your oppon-
ent while avoiding the planet's gravity pull which would irrevocably tear you to 
bits once in its grasp. In Space War, although the player assumes a bird's-eye per-
spective, she has control over her ship as if she were its pilot. She can change 
direction, thrust the engines, and shoot its missiles. Within the game world, the 
player is the spaceship and whatever goal she wishes to attain, she has to pursue 
it by directing her actions through her unit. 
73 Echoes of these ideas can also be heard in the discourse surrounding the development of free 
and open source software such as Linux. By opening up software development and replacing 
the heart of the operating system by a modularized, transparent and publicly owned kernel, the 
open source community aims to return mankind's control over his creation so that it cannot be 
used to leverage economic power or support monopolistic practices.
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In the case of transcendental introjection, on the other hand, there is no defin-
ite, visible entity representing the player in the game world. Rather, she assumes 
the role of an outside observer managing and controlling the events in the game 
world which is directly placed under her supervision. In  SimCity {Will Wright 
1989}, for example, the player takes on the role of a mayor and city planner, 
but as such she is not represented as a person living among computer charac-
ters. Rather, she takes the perspective of a manager bent over a continuously re-
freshing satellite image of her city, collecting taxes and ordering buildings to be 
built at specified locations. When represented transcendentally, the player is not 
restricted to one specific entity such as a puppet, through which she is forced to 
direct her movements. She can move and act across the entire game map as if 
she were a ghost instilling thoughts in the inhabitants of the virtual world, guid-
ing and controlling their behavior. In this section, I go deeper into the nature of 
avatarial and transcendental introjection and associate them with two theologic-
al conceptions of the relation between a Creator and his creation, namely that 
of  avatarial  representation  in  Hindu  religion  and  the  interventionist  God 
present in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
IF GOD WAS ONE OF US
The word 'avatar' has its origins in Hindu religion. For a Hindu, every living be-
ing is essentially a spiritual entity. When he or she is born into the material 
world as an animal or a human being, this is only a temporary measure, a sort 
of punishment. Within the material world, the soul is caught in an endless cycle 
of rebirth, an ordeal of suffering and mortality, but at the same time a chance to 
abide by the dharma, the moral law prescribing the religious and ethical duties 
of every individual. Following the rules of dharma allows the soul to ascend the 
moral ladder, be born in ever more virtuous appearances, and eventually be al-
lowed back into the spiritual world never to be born again. Hindu gods equally 
live in the spiritual realm, but every now and again they descend into the mater-
ial to deliver a message to the mortal or to carry out a specific task. The word 
'avatar'  comes  from  Sanskrit  'Avatāra'  meaning  something  like  'descent'.  It 
“refers to an incarnation of the God Vishnu, who always remains in his godly 
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realm, but who can, at the same time, appear on earth as a finite being fighting 
evil and averting tragedy” (Wessely 1997: 177, author's translation from Ger-
man).  Hindu legend states that  Vishnu has already assumed nine avatars  of 
which Krishna and Rama are the best known, with a tenth, Kalki, due to appear 
to usher in a golden age. Arguably, the idea of avatarial descent also shows a re-
semblance to the Judaeo-Christian notions of messiah and angel. The main dif-
ference, however, is that an avatar is an appearance of the god itself. Like the 
Ancient Greeks, Hindus believe in a multitude of gods, each having their own 
form and identity and when one of them appears as an avatar, it is the god itself 
that appears, not just a representative. In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, on the 
other hand, there is only one God and He remains within the spiritual world. A 
Messiah is merely a mortal who has been chosen to receive God's message, and 
angels are celestial beings believed to function as messengers or agents of God. 
Neither of them are an appearance of God Himself.
The concept of 'avatar' was introduced into American popular culture by 
Poul Anderson in his science fiction novel The Avatar {1978}. It describes how 
man discovers the existence of T-machines, interstellar transportation portals 
left by an ancient alien civilization, and decides to use them for galactic explora-
tion and expansion. In 1985, Richard Garriot started his second Ultima trilogy 
with  Ultima IV: Quest of the Avatar. For this, he drew inspiration from Ander-
son's work. Like in  The Avatar,  Ultima IV's background story is based on the 
idea of an ancient civilization having left magical portals scattered across space 
and time which are used by the player to move between worlds. Ultima IV was 
also the first computer game to use the term 'avatar', not yet to refer to the ap-
pearance of the player-character, but to designate a state of moral virtue which 
was to be attained by following a number of ethical principles in the game. As 
such,  Garriot's  conceptualization of  'avatar'  lies  closer to the Hindu idea of 
'dharma' and ascension than to that of 'avatar' itself. The association between 
the word 'avatar'  and a game protagonist had been instigated, however, and 
backed by its original meaning of godly embodiment and descent, it was ready 
to start  taking its place in the public mind.  The first  game to use the term 
'avatar' in its present-day meaning of 'embodiment of the player in the virtual 
world' was probably Habitat {Randy Farmer & Chip Morningstar 1987}, a pre-
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personal computer online environment in which people could meet using vari-
ous appearances.  From there the notion was picked up to be used in other 
multi-user environments and games and would be further popularized by its use 
in Neal Stephenson's description of the metaverse in the popular cyberpunk 
novel Snow Crash {1992}. Today, the notion of 'avatar' is used to designate any 
form of representation of a player or user in a virtual environment such as a 
computer game, a multi-user dungeon, a discussion forum and even in instant 
messaging. In many cases, it carries a connotation of customizability, that is, the 
possibility for the player to choose elements of her avatar's appearance such as 
facial features and clothes.
Avatarial introjection occurs when the player of a computer game is rep-
resented by a clearly delineated entity within the virtual world: a spaceship, a 
car, a human figure and so forth. When controlling an avatar, the player does 
not take an outside, singular, godly perspective, but directs her actions through 
one virtual identity. Like the Hindu god Vishnu who takes on the form of a fi-
nite and mortal being within the material world, a computer game player is sub-
jected to virtual-world restrictions within the game. She has to accept her part 
and play along. During the game, the player descends into the virtual as a game 
character, an incarnation subject to the laws of the virtual environment like any 
other entity in the simulation. Just like Vishnu depends on his earthly incarna-
tion, the computer game player depends upon her substitute and can only act 
through it. When the avatar has lost its life, the player-god loses her gateway to 
and her means of action in the virtual world and the game session is over (cf. 
Neitzel 2001: 66). On the other hand, the death of an avatar has little or no 
consequence for the deity who remains safe within the spiritual world. A new 
game session can be started and a new avatar is born, to die, and be born again, 
in a possibly endless cycle of rebirth. Only when the player, through her avatar, 
manages to finish the game and correct the wrong in the virtual world, she is re-
lieved of her task. Only then, will she no longer be haunted by the urge to play 
again and again in order to try and submit the virtual world to her godly will.
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CYBERSPACE RACE
The earliest avatars in the history of computer games were Needle and Wedge, 
two spaceships featuring in Space War. As mentioned before, Steve Russell star-
ted programming the game in 1962 at the height of the space race between the 
USA and the Soviet Union. Like so many other technical institutions and uni-
versities, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where Russell was working 
as a researcher in the artificial intelligence lab, was heavily involved in the space 
program. At the same time that Russell was developing his demonstration soft-
ware for the newly bought DEC PDP 1 mainframe computer, other computer 
scientists were buried in the development of physical algorithms for different 
kinds of spatial applications. Hence Russell and his team's decision to create a 
computer game set in space was no coincidence. On the one hand, it was a 
practical consideration as several of the algorithms for the simulation of thrust-
ing engines, rotation, and gravity emanation in space were floating around on 
the laboratory floor. On the other hand, it was also a creative decision motiv-
ated by the programmers' interests. Needle and Wedge are two spaceships circ-
ling around a central planet emanating gravity and threatening to swallow and 
destroy them. The aim of the game is to shoot down the enemy spaceship while 
avoiding running out of fuel or laser torpedoes. Interestingly, on a deeper, more 
subconscious level, Space War can also be seen as a reflection of the fear many 
people at the time had, that the space race would eventually lead to a cata-
strophic open conflict with the Soviets, a space war. Needle, the leaner ship 
could then be seen as the faster moving USA and Wedge, the larger one, would 
be the Soviet Union. The planet in the middle of the screen would be Earth and 
the game as a whole a symbolic representation of the battle between two con-
tending world views, a struggle for domination over the world by controlling 
space and striving toward technological superiority.74
74 Arguably, the very idea of there being a space within the computer – a matrix, a cyberspace, a 
virtual reality – may be indirectly derived from that first decision by Steve Russell and his team 
to make a computer game about battling spaceships. From computer games such as Space War 
the idea that a computer can create some sort of parallel, virtual universe slowly trickled into 
popular  culture  and  via  Dr.  Who  and  Tron it  eventually  reached  mainstream culture  and 
triggered the now ubiquitous spatial metaphors surrounding computer and Internet technology.
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The first generation of commercial computer games in the 1970s laid the 
foundations of several  of the computer game genres which are still  popular 
today. In many ways, the Atari age, as it is often referred to, was the most in-
novative period in the history of computer games. Not so when it comes to the 
design and marketing of game avatars however.  Pong {Nolan Bushnell 1972}, 
Atari's first arcade success, was a rough imitation of a ping-pong game. As a 
player, you are introjected not avatarially but transcendentally (see also below); 
your identity within the game is not defined by the paddle but rather by the en-
tire playing field and the position of the ball. Your task is to instruct the paddle 
so as to bounce back the ball rather than become it and think for it. In a way, 
you could say that Pong employs some sort of first person perspective, keeping 
the player largely out of the picture, trying to present a ping-pong simulation as 
closely to the player as possible, downplaying the modeling of the player's intro-
jected alter ego as much as possible. This neutrality as to the identity of the 
player's role in the game remains a constant in the Atari age. Many of their 
greatest successes would employ a first-person cockpit point of view, like for 
example Night Driver {Ted Michon 1976}, Battlezone {Ed Rotberg 1980} or Mis-
sile Command {Dave Theurer 1980}. Moreover, even in sports or racing games 
which did represent the player by an avatar like Football {Steve Bristow 1978} or 
Sprint 2 {Dennis Koble 1976}, the entities used as avatars are flat. There is no 
characterization whatsoever. In the 1970s, computer games were still thought 
of as sheer games or sports, they were not yet recognized as the narrative medi-
um which they would become in subsequent decades. 
WHEN STRIPES BECAME STARS
The  first  anthropomorphic  computer  game  avatar  appeared  on  the  scene 
around 1980 with  the pizza-shaped,75 dot-eating  maze-runner  Pacman {Toru 
Iwatani 1980}, a name derived from the Japanese expression 'paku paku', mean-
ing something like 'gobble gobble'.  Pacman was an almost instant hit both in 
75 It is rumored that the idea to make Pacman was triggered whilst Iwatani was eating a slice of 
pizza and dreamily looking at his plate where the remains of the pizza formed a nicely round 
shape with one triangular part cut out and an olive just above its center. Pac was born and 
would for ever be associated with insatiable hunger.
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gaming arcades and on the video system market. It managed to combine the 
dungeon-crawling motif,  already present  in table-top role-playing games and 
text-based computer games such as  Colossal Cave Adventure {William Crowther 
& Donald Woods 1975}, with simple, yet highly addictive game play. Most of 
all, however Pacman succeeded in introducing a believable character into com-
puter gaming, a protagonist at the same time human-like enough to foster iden-
tification and abstract enough not to look ridiculous due to technological limita-
tions. “Pac-Man had a personality. Sure, it was the personality of a paramecium 
with only two behaviors – engorge or flee. But he had a certain prokaryotic 
flair. Women thought he was cute. But most importantly, he gave the player 
something to identify with. Pacman gave videogames a face” (Herz 1997: 131). 
One year later, Mr. Pacman was joined by Ms. Pacman, who was announced as 
the “queen of video games,” wearing a large hairpin and keeping to a slightly 
more varied diet with fruit and pretzels added. As could be expected, marriage 
and children ensued and two years later, Jr. Pacman {1983} was old enough to 
feature in his own computer game with higher speed, larger mazes and more 
ghosts. Despite the fact that the possible variations on the Pacman theme were 
limited, it had set an important precedent. As Herz observes: “Asteroids [{Lyle 
Rains & Ed Logg 1979}] and Pong [{Nolan Bushnell 1972}] could make money. 
But Pac-Man could become a star, with the requisite merchandising bonanza” 
(Ibid.). 
One year after Pacman, the first human avatar appeared on the game scene 
in Donkey Kong {Shigeru Miyamoto 1981}. After his girlfriend, Pauline, has been 
abducted by a giant ape named Kong, Mario, an otherwise ordinary plumber 
wearing working boots, overalls, a cap and a large mustache, decides to go and 
deliver her.76 Like in  King Kong {Delos Lovelace 1932}, the ape grabs Pauline 
and starts climbing a large building when the game starts, only in this case there 
are no tanks or fighter planes attacking the monster, only poor Mario who has 
to climb one level after the other via extremely awkwardly placed emergency 
ladders while avoiding the barrels thrown down by Kong in order to trip him. 
76 Apparently, Mario was named after Mario Segali, the landlord of the Nintendo US headquar-
ters, who accidentally walked into a meeting where the English names were being chosen for 
the characters in Donkey Kong.
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Donkey Kong became a tremendous success and with earlier successful Japanese 
games like Space Invaders and Pacman, it signaled the coming shift of balance in 
the gaming industry. Two years after Donkey Kong, Mario Bros {1983} appeared, 
introducing Mario's brother Luigi and also for the first time making Mario and 
Luigi perform plumbing duties,  i.e.  clean the sewers from vermin in a one-
screen platform game. However, it would only be with Super Mario Bros {1985}, 
the first scrolling platform game, that Nintendo would truly pull their weight 
and use Mario as an ace to push their Entertainment System, pull Atari off the 
computer game throne, and become predominant on the gaming market. From 
then on, Mario would be an integral part of Nintendo's strategy, who has him 
appear not just in platform and adventure games, but also in sports and racing 
games. Despite or maybe because his chubby and unsexy appearance, Mario 
and platform games, the game genre he popularized, would dominate computer 
game culture for at least a decade until Sony and three-dimensional simulation 
began to play a more important role.
Nonetheless, even for avatars like Mario or Kong, J.C Herz (1997) ob-
serves that, as compared to popular icons from other media, they still lack an 
outspoken personality. Despite their name and fame they still display a remark-
able flatness of character. For this, Herz puts forward three explanations: one 
technical, one cultural and one narratological. The first, technological explana-
tion is the best known, but in my opinion also the weakest. Early computer 
game systems had nowhere near the computing power of today's  units  and 
therefore designers were tied hands and feet to their limitations. Game charac-
ters were represented by so-called sprites, flat animated bitmaps consisting of 
only a few pixels and only two or three different images for simulating motion: 
walking and jumping for example. Mario's appearance, for example, with his 
hat, large mustache, vertical ears or whiskers (your choice), and slightly protrud-
ing belly can largely be ascribed to technological constraints. It was much easier 
to draw a hat and a mustache in a few pixels than a convincing haircut and 
mouth. Herz's second, cultural explanation refers to the fact that early game 
characters such as Pacman and Mario have their roots in Japanese popular cul-
ture, more specifically in Manga and Anime. Hence, Japanese game characters 
tend to feature what Herz describes as a “preternatural cuteness and almost 
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freakish baby-like quality which takes the form of oversized heads, tiny noses, 
and saucer-like, impossibly liquid eyes” (162). Third and finally, there is a pos-
sible narratological reason for the flatness of game avatars, i.e. the fact that they 
must present an acceptable role for the player to fill in. Referring to Scott Mc-
Cloud's work in Understanding Comics (1993), Herz observes that abstract charac-
terization tends to foster identification. “It is only because an animated charac-
ter is abstract and cartoony that we can project our own expressions onto him. 
We can't really map ourselves onto truly realistic characters – we see them as 
objects, separated from us by their details” (162). 
LEISURE SUIT LARA
Arguably the most significant and most studied computer game avatar of the 
1990s is Lara Croft, the main protagonist of the Tomb Raider series {Toby Gard 
1996-}. Lara is an adventurer-archaeologist annex gorgeous young athletic serial 
killer who is hired to retrieve the Atlantean Scion, an ancient magical amulet. 
For this, she has to travel to various places across the world, most notably the 
tomb of Qualopec in Peru which she is to enter and explore. The background 
story  to  Tomb  Raider is  rather  conventional  using  elements  from  popular 
pseudo-historical fantasy combined with the dungeon-crawling Leitmotiv. The 
basis for its success, however, is not its story, neither was it its theme, but Lara 
herself.  Whilst  deriving characteristics from previous adventurous archaeolo-
gists such as Indiana Jones, she is first and foremost a so-called fighter chick 
(cf. Holmes 2003), who, just like Gibson's Molly77 has at her disposal extreme 
physical abilities, a profound knowledge of how to handle weapons and a dev-
astating hermaphroditic yet at the same time girlish sexiness. Just like Case ac-
cessing Molly's thoughts through his SimStim, the player has access to Lara's 
experience and thoughts guiding her to the heart of the tomb while imagining 
being her closest friend and lover. Several observers have noted, however, that 
Lara has  retained a significant portion of her predecessors'  abstractedness.78 
77 Molly who, in turn, is styled after earlier Manga girl warriors.
78 Despite Lara Croft's alleged 'openness' as a vessel character, Stephen Poole notes that feedback 
from the Japanese audience suggested that she should be more 'mangafied', conform more to 
manga convention (2000: 141).
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“Lara Croft is an abstraction, an animated conglomeration of sexual and attitu-
dinal signs (breasts, hotpants, shades, thigh holsters) whose very blankness en-
courages the (male or female) player's psychological projection and is exactly 
why she has enjoyed such remarkable success as a cultural icon” (Poole 2000: 
153).  “[She] is a partially formed character;  she is in essence a cartoon who 
serves as an avatar onto which the player is meant to project her — or more of-
ten, his — own interpretation. It is important that the character is incomplete, 
because if the character is too developed there is nothing compelling for the 
player to contribute” (Pearce 2004). Bob Rehak, finally, describes the same phe-
nomenon from a semiotic perspective as Lara's “ polysemous perversity, her 
ability  to  endlessly  resignify.  In  this  sense,  she  merely  extends  the  essential 
emptiness of the avatar, a semiotic vessel intended to be worn glovelike by play-
ers” (2003a: 481).79
To conclude, it should be noted that many games resort to the technique 
of avatar customization in order to overcome possible elements which could 
hamper identification between player and puppet. Again, of course, computer 
games were not the first form to present the player at the beginning of the 
game with the question whom she would want to be. In a sense, the very es-
sence of board and card role-playing games is to experiment with identity and 
play with its different variables. Apart from computer role-playing games like 
Dungeon Master {Bruce Webster &Wayne Holder 1987} which obviously picked 
up the idea from their paper predecessors, sports and race games were the first 
to offer the player with a choice as to which type of vessel would suit her best. 
Advantages and disadvantages would be distributed according to the paper-
scissors-rock technique: one avatar would be average in most tasks while others 
would excel in specific parameters and be weaker in others. A second class of 
79 One of the most remarkable and amusing analyses of Lara that I came across is that by Re-
becca Tews who looks at her from a psychoanalytical perspective and describes her as a 'highly 
idealized anima form'. “She is novel to the male player because of her highly sexualized body, 
and the angles from which it is viewed during gameplay obscure the more intensely threatening 
possibility that she might turn her weapons on any man that tries to sexually dominate her. 
Through Lara, voyeurism is elevated to a new level, allowing the male player to hide once again 
behind a protective woman as he formerly hid behind his mother. For female players, on the 
other  hand,  Lara  represents  a  powerful  warrior  icon that  empowers them to express  their 
strength and sensuality” (2001: 179).
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games  which  enthusiastically  picked  up  customization,  was  the  so-called 
beat-'em-up scene in which ridiculously muscled bodybuilders could be pitched 
against tiny, but tremendously fast and precise Japanese kung-fu schoolgirls. At 
least since Street Fighter {Yoshiki Okamoto 1987}, the player would be presen-
ted with a series of avatars at the beginning of the game from which she could 
choose her temporary virtual identity. Later, shooters like Unreal {Tim Sweeney 
& Cliff Bleszinski 1998} would also adopt the technique and bring it to the 
popular 3D shooter scene. Finally, an extreme form of avatar customization can 
be found in so-called 'moddable' games which allow the player to change visual 
or other characteristics of game objects or even create new ones. Games like 
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City {Rockstar 2002} allow the player to scan her own 
face and have it fitted onto her avatar. Since then, an active community of fans 
and amateur designers have set up numerous sites where identities and modific-
ations for dozens of games can be freely downloaded.80
INTERVENTIONIST GOD
The second type of introjection is what I have referred to as transcendental intro-
jection.  Whereas in the case of avatarial introjection, the player is represented 
within the simulation by a clearly identifiable entity which is a member of the 
game world, when introjected transcendentally, she is not associated with one 
distinct object or character. Rather she takes the position of a ghost moving 
freely across the game map, giving instructions to characters and entities. Most 
strategy and so-called simulation games such as Simcity use transcendental intro-
jection, positioning the player not within a virtual body, but in a managerial 
role. This perspective can be associated with the Judaeo-Christian conception 
of an interventionist god, being neither a character as in Hindu belief nor the 
world as a whole as in pantheist beliefs, but rather an external identity, a shep-
herd watching and guiding his creation according to his personal will. “The title 
and the description of god-games generally underplay the dependence of the 
player on the game and refer to a Christian God as the Creator of the world 
80 One well-known example of an illegal modification is that of  Nude Raider {unknown 1996}, 
which, as the name suggests, strips Lara of her every garment and sends her off to save the 
world wearing no more than boots, gloves and a pistol holster.
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and its history” (Neitzel 2001: 66, author's translation from German). In most 
of these games, the role of the player is explained as that of 'mayor' as in Simcity; 
'chief', 'warlord', 'prince', 'king', or 'emperor' in Civilization {Sid Meier 1991}; or 
'business tycoon' in games like Railroad Tycoon {Sid Meier 1990}. As Ted Fried-
man observes, however, the position of the player is really that of a god or at 
least one of his angels keeping an eye on their part of His creation (1999). Not 
only can the player order swords to be forged and castles to be built, she can 
also move across the game map in a fraction of a second, give orders to her 
subordinates, or scrutinize dozens of real-time economical and demographical 
statistics. Unlike a mayor or even an emperor, she has direct access to what lies 
before  her  and  it  is  her  divine  will  that  determines  how the  virtual  world 
evolves.
In  her  contribution  to  the  Handbook  of  Computer  Games  Studies,  Britta 
Neitzel (2005) adopts Gérard Genette's (1980) distinction between intradiegetic 
and extradiegetic positioning and links it with 'point of action' referring to the 
position from which the player takes action in the game world. The intradieget-
ic point of action is associated with an active and personal role within the devel-
opment of the game story and largely corresponds to my notion of introjective 
form. Both in games presenting an avatarial perspective and in those presenting 
a transcendental perspective, the player is an initiator of the action and is there-
fore part  of  the diegesis.  Her description of extradiegetic point of action is 
more problematic however. According to her analysis, an extradiegetic point of 
action occurs when the player does not take a role within the story of the game. 
As examples she puts forward Myst {Robin & Rand Miller 1993} and Tetris ar-
guing that the player of these games does not take the role of a character in the 
story and therefore remains outside the narrative framework. I disagree with 
this viewpoint, however, as both of these examples can be said to involve role-
taking. In Myst, the player is explicitly assigned the task of delivering and saving 
the virtual worlds built by Atrus through his magical books. It is true that there 
is no visible avatar in the game, but the player  does take part in the emerging 
story of the game from within the story world. The most difficult game to de-
fend as being intradiegetic is undoubtedly Tetris, but I nonetheless tend to take 
that position. Indeed, it can be argued that there is no diegesis in Tetris, as does 
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Juul (2005) for example, but I see that as a literature-centered view on narrative. 
The story of Tetris is one of a struggle to keep on ordering blocks into a wall as 
they are falling. This may not qualify as a story worth reading or watching, but it 
does suffice to base a game on. The role of the player in this story is that of the 
struggler, the person desperately trying to keep up with the ever-continuing rain 
of blocks. Hence Tetris is no different from any other game, reserving a role for 
a player in an, albeit simple and abstract, game story.
Does that mean that there are no computer games employing an extradie-
getic point of action? That they all reserve a role for the player to act from with-
in the game world? I tend to take this position. One of the essential elements of 
a game and one of its most distinctive features vis-à-vis a plain story, is that the 
player mentally projects her self into her imagining. In Walton's terms, repres-
entations are artifacts meant to stir an imagining; they are to serve as props in a 
game of make-believe, a session of pretense during which images and ideas are 
what they in reality only refer to. Books, films, board and computer games can 
all be seen in this light. They are all artifacts produced to be used in games of 
imagining. The main difference between books and films on the one hand and 
games on the other is that, when reading a book or watching a film, there is no 
active role in shaping the artifact's contents from within the imagining whereas 
in a game there is. A reader or a spectator does not have a goal within her own 
imagining, at least not one she can work toward. She may identify with the 
good character and wish that she succeeds in attaining her goals, but she knows 
she cannot do anything about them. In a game, however, the tension is pre-
cisely built around selecting goals and subgoals within the imagining, experi-
menting with different scenarios and testing oneself against others in a safe en-
vironment. This active role, thriving on myriads of small and larger decisions, is 
also the main difference between a computer game and other interactive forms 
of entertainment such as hyperfiction or interactive cinema. The reader of a hy-
pernovel or the watcher of an interactive film does have an active role not just 
in the imagining, but also in the material generation of its story. What she does 
not have, however, is a clear goal in selecting her reading or viewing path. She 
does not have an identity within the interactive book or film. Hence she retains 
an extradiegetic point of action. No introjection takes place.
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HYBRID FORMS
To conclude this  section,  I  would like to return to the distinction between 
avatarial and transcendental introjection. The concept of introjection refers to 
the fact that the player of a game, computer or other, projects part of her self 
into the fictional world. She takes an active role within the game environment. 
In the case of avatarial introjection, she is tied to a clearly delineated entity in 
the simulation – a virtual spaceship, a vehicle or a person and so forth – which 
is her avatar. In the case of transcendental introjection, she is similarly drawn 
into the fictional world but not to become just any member. Instead, she takes 
the role of a god, a military leader or a manager who guides and controls her 
subjects from an external above perspective. When introjected into an avatar, 
the player is restricted by the limitations applying to all members of the virtual 
world. She can only direct her actions through her persona. When introjected 
transcendentally, the role of the player is that of a god sitting upon his cloud 
whispering orders into the ears of his hard-working disciples. Avatarial introjec-
tion is the preferential  setup for most  action genres such as shoot-'em-ups, 
beat-'em-ups, sports games, racing games, platform games, first-person shoot-
ers and action adventures. Transcendental introjection is the default setup of 
most so-called god games: i.e. turn-based and real-time strategy, simulation and 
puzzle games. There are games, however, which do not readily fit in either cat-
egory or show characteristics of both. In this subsection, I look at a number of 
these border cases.
When looking at  two-dimensional  avatarial  action games such as  Space  
War,  Pacman,  Surround  {Alan Miller 1977},  Combat {Joe Decuir 1977} and so 
forth, a distinction can be made between avatar-relative and player-relative con-
trols. In Space War and Combat,  the player is given avatar-relative controls, that is, 
her actions are projected into the game world as if they were those of the space-
ship's pilot or the tank's crew. When she pulls the handle left or right, the avatar 
turns around its axis and when pressed forward it moves in the direction it is 
currently pointing. Games like Pacman and Surround, on the other hand, present 
the player with absolute, directional or  player-relative controls,  that is, when she 
pulls her handle left, the avatar does not move around its axis, but immediately 
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turn and go westward, and when she pushes her handle forward, the avatar 
turns and starts moving upward, toward the top of the screen. In other words, 
the movements of the player's joystick are not directly mapped upon those of 
the avatar but are interpreted and translated in function of the current game 
situation and its visual rendering on the computer screen. Hence it could be ar-
gued that, despite the fact that the player assumes the role of an avatar, she 
controls it from an outside perspective, that she does not take the point of ac-
tion of the avatar itself, but that of a transcendental entity floating above it and 
giving instructions according to its own position. I do not follow this line of 
thought however. It is true that in the case of player-relative controls there is no 
direct correspondence between how the player moves her handle and how her 
avatar changes position within the virtual world, but this does not change the 
fact that it is the player's decisions that are introjected. Hence I tend to regard 
different types of controls more as a question of point of view than of point of 
action, which can be corroborated by the fact that some games offer a choice 
between avatar-relative and player-relative controls.
A second problematic category is constituted by games that present tran-
scendental introjection, but at the same time foster identification between play-
er and one or more game characters. In most simulation and strategy games, 
the inhabitants of the virtual world are no more than tools, means toward a 
goal. Virtual citizens are nameless entities that build houses, forge weapons and 
pay taxes. Military units are canon flesh and are sacrificed even if it yields only 
the smallest tactical advantage. If the player of a game like Simcity or Civilization 
can be said to identify with anything in the game, it is the city or state she is 
governing, not its inhabitants. Some games, however, emphasize rescue rather 
than construction, solidarity rather than combat. One example is the so-called 
save-'em-up  Lemmings {Mike Dailly 1991} in which the player has to guide a 
group of up to one hundred lemming-like creatures past a number of obstacles 
into a portal. In order to achieve this, the player must give instructions to the 
lemmings,  for example to block its fellow creatures,  bash through a pile of 
debris or build a stairs toward a higher positioned platform. Despite the fact 
that the player takes a godly perspective, she also very much depends upon her 
group. When she has to sacrifice or leave a lemming behind, as is sometimes re-
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quired to finish a puzzle, she experiences a feeling of disappointment and loss. 
This  suggests  a  closeness  and  identification  between  player  and  lemmings 
which is rare in games using transcendental introjection. Again, I would not opt 
for recategorization however. It is true that Lemmings engenders a sense of to-
getherness and identification, but this is due to its game formula and clever 
design rather than to any deviation from the transcendental paradigm. The play-
er's role in Lemmings is that of a godly savior, not that of a mortal lemming.
The third and final problematic category I would like to discuss here are 
puzzle and card games. In these game genres, the player has to solve a number 
of organizational problems so as to reach a goal state, after which a new game 
session begins with a new configuration. During this process, the player acts 
directly upon the puzzle pieces or cards using a mouse pointer without an inter-
mediary instance like an avatar. Some game theorists such as Jesper Juul see this 
as a reason to make a radical distinction between puzzle games like Tetris, which 
are seen as real-world activities such as sports, and world-generating games like 
Mortal Kombat {John Tobias 1992}.81 One can also argue, however, that a game 
like  Tetris does involve the acceptance of a number of beliefs in order to be-
come meaningful, and that it does appeal to the player's imagination for generat-
ing the required associations and for framing the activity. These beliefs include 
the idea that playing is pleasant, that earning a higher score is in some way de-
sirable, that walls should be kept low and that tetraminoes need to be piled 
neatly. In a game like Tetris, the player takes a role, namely that of a contender 
but also that of an imaginer, a builder and a demolisher. Several researchers 
have observed that Tetris' popularity may well be due to its aptness to represent 
the everyday experience of coping, of organizing all the rubble in such a way 
that it disappears from the scene, but at the same time alluding to the absurdity 
81 One of Juul's main arguments to regard puzzle games as unfictional is his observation that the 
proposition “In Tetris, when you have covered an entire row, it disappears” is a statement about 
the real-world, not about a fictional entity (2005). This can also be said of the statement “In 
Unreal, when you move your view finder over the target and press the mouse button, you hear 
the noise of shots and see splashes of blood” however. As is also the case for other forms of 
representation, when you make a statement about a computer game, you can either target its 
material configuration, its signs if you like, or the imagining they generate. Thereby the first 
should be seen as referring to its real-world aspects and the second to the fictional world it gen-
erates. Hence, describing puzzle games as exclusively real-world activities would be to disregard 
their creative potential and their faculty to generate suspense.
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of the activity as the rubble continues to come falling from the sky (cf. Herz 
1997: 172; Murray 1997: 144;). As a game and simulation, Tetris is a representa-
tion of a human experience inviting the player to take part in its generation. 
Hence, despite its abstractedness,  it qualifies as an introjective form encom-
passing the player with its generated universe placing her in a transcendental, 
commander-like slot.
3. POINT OF VIEW
In “Die Frage nach Gott” (2001) and “Narrativity in Computer Games” (2005), 
Britta Neitzel  outlines a  framework for the analysis  of player perspective in 
computer games, which she divides into point of action (cf. previous section) 
and  point  of  view.  Her  description  of  point  of  view  is  based  on  Gérard 
Genette's analysis of literary focalization in  Narrative Discourse (1980). Genette 
distinguishes between three types: (a)  internal focalization, whereby the fictional 
world is seen and described from the viewpoint of one the characters in the 
story; (b) external focalization, whereby one character is followed throughout the 
narrative, but the narrator retains an outside position, revealing nothing on the 
character's personal feelings or thoughts; and (c)  zero focalization, whereby the 
story world is not described from the perspective of a character, but from that 
of an omniscient narrator, an instance that sees and knows all. Neitzel then 
transposes this narratological framework from literary to computer game ana-
lysis where the different categories become subjective, semi-subjective and ob-
jective perspective (2005: 238). The (a)  subjective perspective is associated with a 
first-person point of view as in shooters like Unreal {Epic 1998}. The (b) semi-
subjective perspective is linked with third-person point of view as in found in Tomb 
Raider, for example, in which the avatar is kept in view by a camera following 
from behind. The (c) objective perspective, finally, is Neitzel's residual category con-
taining those computer games employing transcendental introjection and those 
avatarial games in which the avatar is seen from a fixed, external camera view-
point as is the case in most early action games from Space War to Donkey Kong. 
Genette's theory of focalization is primarily a framework devised for the 
analysis  of  literary  fiction however.  It  describes  the  way  in  which fictitious 
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events are mediated by a narrating instance in a book. This instance continu-
ously manipulates and filters the information presented to the reader in order to 
produce different types of understanding and emotional response such as iden-
tification, suspense, fear, loathing, excitement etc. In the case of internal focal-
ization, the narrator is allowed access to the protagonist's thoughts, seeing the 
fictional world through her eyes. In the case of external focalization, the narrat-
or is denied allowed access to the character's thoughts themselves, but follows 
closely enough to observe her every response. Furthermore, in the case of zero 
focalization, the narrator is not so much tied to one character, but overtly gen-
erates, oversees and controls the fictional world. However, as discussed in the 
previous section, computer games generally do not employ a narrator-listener 
deep structure, but reserve a role for the player within the virtual world itself 
where  she  takes  part  in  the  ongoing  events.  Hence,  despite  the  merits  of 
Neitzel's analysis, one must recognize that transposing Genette's framework for 
analyzing literary fiction to computer simulation is problematic and can be said 
to suffer somewhat from the 'have theory, will travel' syndrom. In this section, 
I propose a number of adjustments and additions to Neitzel's analytical frame-
work, which, I believe, makes it more precise and robust when applied to com-
puter simulation and games. The model I present makes a rough distinction 
between three levels of description: the virtual world (spatial simulation), the 
virtual self, and the virtual camera. My underlying claim is that each of these lay-
ers play an essential role in shaping the player experience and should therefore 
be taken into account when describing her point of view.
MODELING A WORLD
The simplest and oldest form of simulated space in computer games is that rep-
resenting two dimensions. In these simulations, entities are represented by bit-
map images,  often referred  to  as  'sprites',  upon a  static  background image. 
Movement of the entity is suggested by redrawing it at a different location on 
the screen, often accompanied by a short animation of walking, for example. 
One of the problems early computer game programmers were faced with, was 
what to do when objects approach the edge of the screen. For computer-con-
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trolled entities, this was not such a problem as they could simply be made to 
disappear. Not so for the player's avatar, however, as it would no longer be 
controllable when out of view. Single- screen computer games came up with 
two solutions to this problem. The simplest and most straightforward solution 
was to block the avatar's movement when it approached the edge of the screen. 
In a game like Combat, for example when an avatar tank hits the border of the 
playing area, it comes to a standstill and it will only be able to move again when 
it turns around and takes a different direction. Yet, blocking access is not the 
oldest solution to the screen dilemma.  Steve Russell's  Space War, for example, 
used so-called 'wraparound space'. When Needle or Wedge reach the edge of 
the screen, they disappear and instantly reappear on the opposite side. This cre-
ates the impression that the edges of the playing area are in some way connec-
ted, wrapped around at the back of the screen, as if the viewing area were a pro-
jection of the surface of a spherical object, like a map of the world. Until the 
development of scrolling, or 'rolling' as it was often referred to, this curving or 
wrapping  of  computer  space  remained a  popular  solution  for  games  set  in 
space, allowing the representation of a space which was at the same time un-
bounded, which avoided breaking the spatial  illusion, and finite, limiting the 
need for computing power and memory (cf. Poole 2000: 117).
At the end of the 1970s, as microprocessors grew more powerful, game 
programmers started to come up with new solutions to the screen dilemma. 
The main driving force behind these innovations was a need for a larger and 
more diverse playing area. In other words, game designers needed a technique 
to allow the player to cross the dreaded screen border and explore that which 
lay behind it.  The first and least demanding solution in terms of processing 
power  was  to  divide  the  playing  area  in  different  screens.  When an  avatar 
reached the right-hand border, for example, the screen would be replaced by 
the next room and the avatar would be redrawn on the left side of the screen, 
as if it were entering from there. One of the first games to successfully imple-
ment  this  technique  was  Adventure,  not  Crowther  and  Woods'  Colossal  Cave 
{1972} which was a text-based game, but the 1978 Atari video game classic de-
signed by Warren Robinett. Like Colossal Cave, by which it was inspired, Adven-
ture is primarily a dungeon-crawling game in which the player is to explore a 
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large web of interconnected rooms, find her way out of labyrinths, collect valu-
ables and weapons, fight monsters and eventually retrieve the chalice and return 
it to the gold castle. Within the virtual world, the player is represented by an 
avatar knight who is seen from above and who is really no more than a colored 
square dot which can move around, open doors and pick up objects. When it 
reaches the top of the screen, accessing a doorway for example, it is transported 
to the next room, which it enters from the bottom. Interestingly, in some cases, 
this sudden switch between rooms is used to create tension as monsters can be 
lying in ambush right behind the edge. In this case, what was initially a techno-
logical drawback has become a narrative technique, a way to generate suspense 
by manipulating the player's viewpoint.
Equally  in  1978,  an  arcade  game called (Atari) Football {Steve Bristow 
1978} came out. It was an American football game which could be played with 
two or four players on a black and white football field seen from above. What 
made it remarkable, however, was how it solved the screen dilemma. Instead of 
representing the whole playing field at once, it only showed that part where the 
ball was and when the action moved closer to the border of the viewing area, 
the image would adjust dynamically so that the ball would not leave the screen. 
In this way, computer games introduced the concept of scrolling into the his-
tory of computing,  which would quickly be picked up by other applications 
such as word processors and graphical user interfaces.82 From the perspective 
of virtual representation, the discovery of scrolling algorithms introduced an in-
cipient form of dynamic camera into computer simulation, definitively separat-
ing viewing and playing area and paving the path for later three-dimensional 
single-point perspective viewing. Horizontal scrolling allowed to create an illu-
sion of depth using optical techniques such as parallax. Parallax scrolling, which 
is often said to be introduced by Moon Patrol {Irem 1982}, but which was also 
present in earlier games such as  Battlezone  {Ed Rotberg 1980}, is a technique 
which divides  the  screen into a  number  of  layers  so  that,  when the  avatar 
moves  sideward,  the  foreground  plane  scrolls  faster  than  a  middle-distance 
82 Mark Wolf reports in this respect that “Atari patented the scrolling technique and has won a 
number of lawsuits due to this patent, which has provided the company with more income 
than Football could ever have” (2001b: 58).
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plane,  which  in  turn  moves  faster  than  the  background,  usually  mountain 
ranges and clouds near the horizon. This type of scrolling suggests that there is 
a distance between the different planes and creates an illusion of depth, an-
nouncing the upcoming shift from two-dimensional to three-dimensional spa-
tial simulation.
A THIRD DIMENSION
When discussing perspective in computer games, it is often silently subsumed 
that three-dimensional simulation appeared only decades after its two-dimen-
sional counterpart. This is not so however. Already in 1977,  Larry Rosenthal 
designed an arcade gaming machine presenting an astoundingly realistic, three-
dimensional wireframe simulation of a driving car.  Speed Freak, as the arcade 
game was called, involved driving a car down a winding road while avoiding on-
coming traffic and obstacles such as hitchhikers and cows. Its commercial suc-
cess was limited, however, and only some 700 machines were built. The break-
through  of  three-dimensional  simulation  into  mainstream  gaming  occurred 
three years later with the appearance of the arcade game Battlezone {Ed Rotberg 
1980}. In Battlezone, the player is positioned in the cockpit of a war tank which 
is being attacked by enemy tanks and in some versions also by aircraft. The aim 
of the game is to resist  the enemy army for as  long as possible by moving 
around the battlefield, seeking cover behind obstacles and by firing your can-
non. Battlezone was a tremendous feat both in terms of software design and en-
gineering: not only was it an engaging, almost addictive shoot-'em-up with fear-
inducing sound-effects, it was also an incredibly realistic tank simulation built of 
three-dimensional vector wireframes employing linear point of view. The player 
could turn her tank 360° and move freely around the virtual area which was put 
neatly  into  perspective  against  a  background  of  mountain  ranges,  a  waxing 
moon and the odd erupting volcano scrolling by in parallax fashion. No won-
der that, when US army officials were confronted with the game, they realized 
its potential and commissioned Atari to build an upgraded version for combat 
training. This presented  Battlezone with the doubtful honor of being the game 
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that established the association between the military and the gaming industry 
which would last for decades.
Meanwhile, home computer and console games remained largely two-di-
mensional due to the limited computing power home systems provided in com-
parison to arcade machines. But even in the 1980s, when microprocessors be-
came cheaper and grew more powerful, and home consoles became at least as 
powerful as the systems on which games like  Speed Freak and  Battlezone were 
run, they largely remained in the 2D sphere.83 This was partly due to the often-
quoted gaming industry's conservatism and 'never change a winning team'-ad-
age, but it was also because of the consumer's preference for solid and colorful 
graphics  as  opposed to  abstract  wireframes.  The combination of  immersive 
polygonal 3D and real-time solidly colored or texture-mapped side-planes was 
still well out of reach for contemporary processors however. Hence real-time 
3D would not play a role of significance on the 1980s gaming stage. What did 
play an important role, however, was pseudo-3D simulation, sometimes also re-
ferred to as 2.5D. Pseudo-3D refers to a collection of 2D techniques for trick-
ing the player into believing that she is moving her avatar in a three-dimension-
al environment. King's Quest {Roberta Williams 1984}, for example, is often re-
ferred to as the first adventure game combining text commands with three-di-
mensional  avatar  movement  instead  of  static  stills.  What  King's  Quest does, 
however, is not calculating the position of three-dimensional objects, but creat-
ing an impression of a third dimension by using a three-dimensional linear-per-
spective background image and by allowing the player's avatar to move up and 
down the screen as if it were walking upon this three dimensional scenery. Oc-
casionally, an object like a tree would be placed on a front layer so that, when 
the player's avatar is higher on the screen, it would move behind it, adding to 
the emulated sense of a third dimension. Later, this technique would also be 
used in beat-'em-up games such as Double Dragon {Yoshihisa Kishimoto 1986}, 
83 One exception was the Vectrex,  a  console developed and marketed by General  Consumer 
Electric in 1982. Contrary to most technologies at the time, the Vectrex did not use raster but 
vector graphics on its built-in monitor. This allowed to bring several of the early wireframe 
three-dimensional arcade games to the living room. The Vectrex turned out a commercial flop, 
however, and was taken off the market only two years after it had come out. Today, the Vec-
trex has become a collector's item and an icon of the retro-gaming subculture.
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in which all action takes place on the x-axis, but which allows limited move-
ment on the y-axis, and role-playing games like  Dungeon Master, which would 
also use the technique of shrinking the 2D bitmaps of distant objects and enlar-
ging them when they are up close so that objects further away appeared smaller 
and the illusion of depth was further supported.
Yet another type of three-dimensional simulation, i.e. isometric 3D, ap-
peared in 1982 with Sega's release of Zaxxon, a fairly conventional shoot-'em-up 
if it was not for the player's perspective. Most shooters at the time were two-di-
mensional, either vertical scrolling and seen from above such as Space Invaders, 
or  horizontal  scrolling and seen from the side such as  Moon Patrol.  Zaxxon, 
however placed the player in a diagonal position slightly above and behind her 
spaceship which would be moving toward the right upper corner of the screen. 
The playing area itself was drawn in 3D isometric projection, which literally 
means 'equal measures' and is generated by a geometrical technique whereby 
the horizontal lines of projection are drawn at an angle of thirty degrees instead 
of forty-five, as is usual for single-point perspective, relative to the bottom of 
the screen. Consequently, parallel lines no longer converge as they recede into 
the distance; there is no vanishing point as in single-point perspective. Equal 
emphasis is given to all sides of an object and distant objects appear not just us-
ing the same proportions, but having the exact same size as objects nearer to 
the bottom of the screen. Moreover, isometric projection has the advantage of 
being less processor-intensive than 'real 3D' due to the player's fixed point of 
view. Like a football commentator, she sits fixed high in a corner of the playing 
field and cannot move independently relative to the ongoing action. This also 
turned out to be one of isometrics' weaker points, however, and after Zaxxon, 
its  success  in  action  games  has  been  limited.  Other  genres  such  as  puzzle 
games,  however, e.g.  Pacman-inspired  Crystal  Castles {Franz Lanzinger 1983}, 
adopted the technique and further refined it into a format allowing for the con-
struction of highly complex and engaging three-dimensional  puzzles.  Today, 
isometric  projection  remains  popular  with  game  genres  such  as  real-time 
strategy and simulation, which depend on the player being able to overview and 
control various units and buildings in a large virtual area.
210         UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER GAME CULTURE
Real-time  single-point  three-dimensional  simulation  with  texture-filled 
planes began to appear on the market in the early 1990s as personal computers 
further increased in graphical processing power. Hovertank 3D {John Romero & 
John Carmack 1991} was  an  early,  modest  example  of  a  three-dimensional 
shooter based on John Carmack's graphical engine. In subsequent years,  his 
programming would form the driving force behind the shift toward real-time 
three-dimensional simulation with first-person shooters such as  Wolfenstein 3D 
{1992} and particularly  the horror-themed Doom {1993}, which popularized 
the genre on a global scale. Interestingly, the development and popularity of 
three-dimensional simulation would later in turn form the main driving force 
behind the development of special-purpose 3D hardware such as graphical pro-
cessing units  and hard-coded 3D acceleration.  As a  form of  representation, 
three-dimensional simulation is a reflection of a particular view on reality and 
how it  can  be  represented  in  algorithmic  simulation.  Linear  point  of  view, 
which is induced by the fact that our two eyes register a slightly different image 
of our surroundings, is mimicked on a  two-dimensional surface by real-time 
generative geometrical algorithms. Then, these algorithms, reflecting their own 
human-centered view on reality, are translated into graphical ROM units meant 
to perform the number-crunching for the simulation. In this way, computer 
simulation as a tool devised by man to imitate specific aspects of reality such as 
form, movement and dynamic behavior exerts its influence at the most basic 
computing level, namely hardware and chip design. In the next subsection, I go 
deeper into how the role of the player is coded into virtual simulation and how 
this can be incorporated into a discussion of point of view in computer games.
MODELING A SELF
The second level in the description of point of view in computer games is the 
role that is ascribed to the player: the way in which she is embedded in the 
game's algorithmic and simulational setup. As discussed above, one of the main 
differences between what is generally referred to as a 'story' on the one hand 
and what we call a 'game' on the other is the way in which the imagined events 
relate to the I-persona. When a story is communicated through written words, 
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by a narrator in person or through images, fixed or moving, the I-persona is 
confronted with events that happened somewhere, some time, to someone. By 
analyzing and interpreting various clues, the receiver tries to determine who the 
people in the narrative are and where and when they supposedly lived or still 
do. Then, through various mechanisms, which are as much bound to technique 
as to cultural and personal factors, the receiver (listener, reader, viewer) identi-
fies with a character in the story and mentally place herself in the character's po-
sition. What she usually will not do, however, is imagine herself to be an actor 
in the represented events. She may imagine what she would do if she were in 
the shoes of someone in the story, but she will not be able to maintain her own 
illusion that she is an actor in the fictional world for the simple fact that she is 
not and that all events in the narrative are fixed. In a game, on the other hand, 
the different entities and story elements are conceived in such a way that an act-
ive role is reserved for the player so that the illusion of being an autonomous 
actor within the virtual world can be created and maintained. When playing a 
game, identification mechanisms are only part of what is happening, a player 
does not just put herself in the place of a fictional character, she imagines her-
self to step into the fictional world and take part in the ongoing action. I have 
referred to this phenomenon as introjection, being thrown into the fictional 
universe, and have proposed the compound introjective form for cultural prac-
tices such as computer gaming which apply to introjection. 
As described in the previous section, when looking at computer games, a 
distinction can be made between two prototypical forms of introjection, two 
types of roles that can be reserved for the player within a gaming simulation. 
The first type of introjection is  avatarial introjection, whereby the player is cast 
into the virtual game world as an entity among entities, as a clearly defined ob-
ject or character. In a game like Pacman, for example, the player is cast into the 
role of an inhabitant of the virtual world who lives in a maze and who is des-
perate to eat as many crumbs as possible without getting caught by one of the 
spooks. Within the game world, the player is Pacman and the actions she is able 
to perform are Pacman's. He is her avatar, her godly representative in the neth-
erworld of the game. In the case of transcendental introjection, on the other hand, 
the role of the player within the game world is carved out rather differently. In-
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stead of being one visible, clearly-delineated virtual entity, she is a collection of 
commands which she can exert directly upon the virtual environment and its 
inhabitants. In a game like Age of Empires, for example, the player assumes the 
role of a great past leader such as Jeanne D'Arc or Genghis Khan, but in reality 
she is not a virtual mortal tied to the restrictions of her character. She is an en-
tity hovering the playing field as if she were a god on her little cloud, looking 
around and decreeing orders, alternately helping and encouraging or punishing 
her subjects. Whereas in the case of avatarial introjection, the player is cast right 
into the middle of the action, attempting to figure out a way to keep her virtual 
body intact, in the case of transcendental introjection she is projected into the 
game world in a managerial role, building and governing a third-party world, 
but for her own greater honor and glory. 
FIRST-PERSON POINT OF VIEW
Within avatarial introjection, an additional distinction can be made with regard 
to how the player is positioned vis-à-vis her avatar. The oldest and best-known 
paradigm is  the  so-called  third-person  point  of  view.  Like  in  earlier  board 
games such as  Monopoly,  in  Space War,  the player is represented by an entity 
within the simulation, i.e. a spaceship circling a centralized gravity-emanating 
planet, which she observes from an outside perspective. It is as if there is, with-
in Space War's tiny galactic universe a small cabin hanging from the sky in which 
the player is sitting and guiding her avatar ship toward victory as if it were a ra-
dio controlled model car. In Neitzel's terms (2005), the player takes the point of 
action of either Needle or Wedge, but she does not take their point of view. 
Rather she takes a third-person perspective, a viewpoint not from within the 
cockpit of the ship, but from a safe and vantage position. In the case of first-
person avatarial  introjection,  on the other hand,  the player does  not  take a 
third-person vantage point, but rather looks at the virtual world through the 
eyes of her avatar. She is not just embodied in the sense that she is represented 
by a virtual body, but she is visually embedded within that body. When she 
moves left or right, she does not watch an avatar move its nose while the virtual 
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world remains fixed. Rather the whole virtual universe pirouettes around her. 
She is not just forced to rely on her avatar's abilities to act, but also to perceive.
The first computer game to make use of a first-person perspective was 
the racing arcade game machine  Night  Driver {Ted Michon 1976}.  In  Night 
Driver, the player takes the point of view of the pilot of a sports car which must 
be  driven  along  a  winding  road  without  crashing  into  other  vehicles  and 
without hitting the sidewalk. Interestingly, the front of the car, which is visible 
at the bottom of the screen and which forms the main indication of where the 
car is driving, is not drawn digitally, but is actually a plastic insert that is fixed 
upon the screen. The simulated car remains in exactly the same position relative 
to the player and it is the road that shifts horizontally as she steers her vehicle 
past sharp bends and approaching cars. For the first time, in Night Driver it was 
not just the avatar that tried to find its way under the guidance of the player, 
but rather the player herself using the avatar as a mere vehicle. Several research-
ers such as Mark Wolf (2001b: 66), Alison McMahan (2003: 70) and Bob Rehak 
(2003b: 115) do not see Night Driver as the founding father of first-person per-
spective, but refer to the 1980 tank simulator Battlezone, which, additional to the 
fixed position of  player and avatar  vehicle also offers  free 360° movement. 
Even if we take this as a basic criterion for first-person perspective, however, 
there is at least one console game that came out before Battlezone and offered 
free 360° movement. Like so many other shoot-'em-ups, Star Raiders {Douglas 
Neubauer 1979} was set in a space battle, but whereas most of them presented 
an outside perspective on the ongoing action, Star Raiders places the player per-
spective directly within the cockpit of a spaceship in a pseudo-three-dimension-
al environment. In this way,  Star Raiders not only laid the groundwork for the 
combat flight simulator genre, but also contributed greatly to the development 
of first-person simulation.
To conclude this discussion of how the role of the player is shaped, I 
would like to point to the complexity of the object under scrutiny and stress 
that the categories I have presented are generalizations or prototypical forms 
rather than absolute distinctions. First of all there is the fact that many primarily 
third-person games allow the player to switch to third-person point of view and 
vice versa. Tomb Raider, for example, which is often quoted as the third-person 
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action adventure par excellence, allows the player to shift her viewing position 
from a camera following Lara to a personal viewpoint through her eyes. First-
person games such as the point-'n'-click mystery adventure game The Last Ex-
press {Jordan Mechner 1997}, on the other hand present the player with a first-
person viewpoint as she is wandering through the virtual setting of the game 
and digging for clues whilst discussing with other passengers on the train. From 
time to time, however, the game is interrupted by fighting scenes or cinematic 
sequences in which the player no longer has control over her avatar and in 
which the viewpoint switches to third-person (cf. Taylor 2003). Moreover, be-
side introjection and perspective, there are many other variables which can play 
an equally or more important role in determining the player's experience of the 
game universe and particularly of her assumed role. Some games, for example, 
both action and strategy, implement some form of artificial intelligence in the 
computer characters controlled by the player. When given an order by the play-
er, these characters will carry it out, but when not, they will not remain station-
ary, but do as they please or rather as their behavioral model indicates. This 
semi-autonomy of computer characters very much turns the role of the player 
from a controller to a voice in their head. Finally, there are also idiosyncratic 
games  which  experiment  with  the  mechanism  of  introjection  in  order  to 
achieve a certain result. In the puzzle game  Head over Heels, for example, two 
avatar dog creatures Head and Heels have to work together in order to be able 
to make progress in the game. This creates an atmosphere of loyalty and affec-
tion (cf. Van Looy 2002).
MODELING A CAMERA
Aside from the simulation of a virtual world and that of the player's role, there 
is  a  third  element  to  consider  when describing  point  of  view in  computer 
games, i.e. the camera viewpoint. Arguably, every graphical computer game in-
volves a simulation of some form of recording and playback. In early computer 
games, like in early silent movies, cameras were fixed and used as mere virtual 
recording devices. In Space War, for example, the camera is placed at a distance 
from the two-dimensional playing scene so that the player has a nice overview 
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of the battle area and can steer her avatar toward the required goal most profi-
ciently. The problem with a fixed camera viewpoint, however, was that the vir-
tual environment could not move relative to the camera point and that there-
fore the entire game was to take place upon one screen. As discussed earlier in 
the subsection on two-dimensional space, one of the first solutions to break out 
of the one-screen paradigm was simply to redraw the entire screen when the 
avatar had reached its border and replace it with a next room. In filmic terms, 
this technique is the equivalent  of placing one camera in every room of the 
game and switch from one to the other. In a sense, these games employ the 
metaphor of a security hub whereby the player is sitting in the guardian's cabin 
switching from one security camera to another. The camera viewpoints them-
selves, however, remain fixed. It was only with the invention of scrolling in the 
1978 game  Atari Football, that the camera was taken off its tripod and  placed 
into the hands of a virtual cameraman who would make it follow the ongoing 
action on the playing field. 
When we look at the direction in which the virtual camera is pointed in 
two-dimensional games, we can roughly distinguish between two positions: i.e. 
top-down and side view. In Space War, the direction from which the action is 
recorded is still impossible to make out. Needle and Wedge are perfectly sym-
metrical spaceships which can move in all directions and of course there is no 
absolute above or below in space. One of the first games to fix the player's 
viewpoint vis-à-vis the playing field was  Pong {1972} which lays out a playing 
area like a Ping-Pong table seen from above in which the player has to handle a 
paddle to defend the area behind her which functions as a goal. Many early At-
ari games such as Adventure, Combat, and Surround would adopt Pong's top-down 
perspective which allowed to add a strategic dimension of evasion and seeking 
cover behind computer-generated obstacles. Later, top-down perspective would 
also become standard practice in what was arguably the first truly popular com-
puter game genre, i.e. the shoot-'em-up. In shoot-'em-ups, which appeared on 
the scene in 1978 with  Space  Invaders,  the player controls a laser canon or a 
spaceship which can move left and right – and later also forward and back – 
and which is to shoot down army after army of alien attackers in order to pro-
tect the world which lies behind it. Although strictly speaking Space Invaders em-
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ploys a side perspective – as a player you control a laser cannon mounted on 
the earth's surface – the graphics are highly abstract and the impression is that 
of a moving spaceship in top-down perspective. In many later shoot-'em-ups 
such as  Galaxian {Hurashi  Nagumo 1979},  top-down perspective would be 
combined with vertical scrolling whereby the player is given a sense of moving 
forward and the camera is made to follow the spaceship.
Side view, whereby the camera is placed on the ground on a small dis-
tance from the object, also made its entry in the first half of the 1970s with the 
non-commercial mainframe game Lunar Lander {Jack Burness 1973}. In Lunar 
Lander or Moonlander, as it would also sometimes be called, the player is to des-
cend and land a spaceship on a rocky and uneven moon surface. This surface is 
drawn at the bottom of the screen and the spaceship descends from the top left 
from where it is constantly being pulled downward by the moon's gravity. By 
turning around its axis and thrusting its engines, however, it is able to steer to-
ward an appropriate landing spot. The aim of the game is to choose a landing 
spot – whereby the smaller and further away ones would yield higher scores – 
and land the ship at minimal speed without running out of fuel. Despite the 
success of Lunar Lander, which became a large hit in computer science depart-
ments all over the world, side-perspective was used only sparsely on the 1970s 
console game scene,  Circus Atari {Mike Lorenzen 1978} and  Missile Command 
{Dave Theurer 1980} being two notable exceptions. The game which can be 
seen  to  announce  the  upcoming  popularity  of  side-perspective  was  Pacman 
{1980}, which is set in a maze viewed from above, but in which both Pacman 
and the spooks are drawn in side view. With Donkey Kong, which appeared one 
year later, side view was consolidated as the perspective of choice of what was 
arguably the second truly popular computer game genre: the platform game. In 
platform games like Mario Bros, the player controls a puppet seen from the side 
which is to collect objects by moving left and right and by jumping on plat-
forms while avoiding guarding monsters. Contrary to shoot-'em-ups, the plat-
form genre is associated with horizontal scrolling, mostly from left to right.84
84 Why the popularity shift from top to side-view occurred is difficult to make out, but one im-
portant factor was the influence of the Japanese gaming industry which, with Manga tradition 
in the background, placed a lot more emphasis on character development than strategy. Side 
view allowed characters such as Mario to be drawn human-like rather than just as a square seen 
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MOBILE CAMS
In the early 1990s, as personal computers acquired an increasing amount of 
graphical  processing power and real-time three-dimensional  simulation came 
within reach, the question arose as to where to place the camera. Logically, in 
two-dimensional games, the camera position had always been either fixed or re-
stricted to sideward action-tracking. If it had moved in any other direction, it 
would have exposed the two-dimensional nature of the depicted environment 
just like looking at a painting from the side exposes the artificiality of its repres-
entation. With real-time 3D, however, it became possible to introduce a truly 
mobile camera  into simulated environments  extending its  grammar  of  rudi-
mentary tracking and cutting with cinematographic techniques such as panning, 
zooming and tilting. Stephen Poole,  for example,  distinguishes a number of 
types of virtual camera standpoints that have become popular since then (2000: 
79) such as a 'follow cam', which is often used in driving and flying simulators 
and in which the camera is fixed in a position behind and slightly above the 
vehicle controlled by the player. This is often combined with a possibility to 
switch to a 'cockpit cam' whereby the player takes a first person point of view 
and sits right at the vehicle's controls. A third camera position that is some-
times featured is that of an 'aerial cam' which looks down upon the ongoing ac-
tion from great height and which can help to analyze the strategic position of 
the different units. The 'shoulder cam', finally, which became popular with Lara 
Croft in Tomb Raider, is one of the most dynamic instances of a simulated cam-
era. It presents a third-person viewpoint, but not that of a neutral recording in-
stance. Rather it simulates the role of a voyeuristic cameraman hired to capture 
that which happens in front of Lara, but who at the same time secretly enjoys 
looking at her shapely behind. Interestingly, Lara's face is hardly ever in the pic-
ture. It is only when she stands in a corner, her back to the wall, that the cam-
eraman is forced to relinquish his interest in her pony tale and share a glimpse 
of her deep brown eyes.
from above. Later in the 1980s, side view would also allow the staging of martial arts, another 
important topic in Japanese popular culture at the time, in what could be seen as a third popu-
lar game genre: i.e. the beat-'em-up.
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With the introduction of the mobile camera into computer game screen-
play, an extra layer was added between player and virtual world and the power 
balance between representation and identification was shifted slightly. Film the-
orist Christian Metz  (1982) observes that there are at least two processes of 
identification at work when watching a film. The primary, ongoing identifica-
tion is that between viewer and camera whereby the former imagines and im-
mediately forgets that she takes the position of a bystander, a third party quietly 
and passively yet knowingly registering what happens in the filmic universe. It is 
only in a secondary, intermittent process that the viewer identifies with the hu-
man actors that appear within her field of vision. Sacha Howells notes that, 
with the introduction of a simulated mobile camera, a similar, dualist form of 
identification makes its entry into the computer game narratological grammar. 
“While  players  control  on-screen  characters,  they  also  control  the  camera, 
sometimes overtly, sometimes less so” (2002: 117). In strategy games, for ex-
ample, the player moves across the playing map at her own will sending the 
camera back and forth while giving orders to her subjects. In action games, she 
controls the avatar and the camera becomes a robotic extension of her simu-
lated self mediating between player and avatar and at the same time negotiating 
its position between virtual body and virtual environment. Again there are ex-
ceptions  and  cross-breeds  however.  One  example  of  a  strange  mixture  of 
avatarial introjection and camera identification  is  Gabriel Knight III: Blood of the  
Sacred, Blood of the Damned {Jane Jensen 1999}. In this three-dimensional point 
'n' click adventure game, the player does not directly control Gabriel, the main 
protagonist, but looks around independently, instructing the virtual cameraman. 
When she has found an object worthy of Gabriel's interest, she can click on it 
and Gabriel walks over and examine it. Like in strategy, this technique tends to 
bestow a sense of ghostly presence upon the virtual environment. In  Gabriel  
Knight III, you do not just control the camera and play the character Gabriel 
Knight. Rather you play the camera and Gabriel is some sort of an assistant to 
the director, a quiet, submissive partner in crime.
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EMBRACE AND EXTEND
To conclude this discussion of camera viewpoints in three-dimensional simula-
tion, it should be noted that computer gaming has in the past few decades not 
just imitated or copied cinema's grammar of representation, but also played an 
important  role  in  extending  it.  As  computer  processing  grew  increasingly 
powerful in the late 1980s and 1990s, more and more physical phenomena, or 
rather their effect on human perception, came within reach of algorithmic sim-
ulation. Seamless three-dimensional movement, texture-filling, shadows, reflec-
tions, the flickering of flames, the rippling of water and so forth were all cap-
tured and controlled within arrays of variables and algorithmic constructions. 
Interestingly, these mathematical techniques did not just reproduce the visual 
phenomenon, but at the same time presented a quantitative analysis of it, an in-
terpretation composed of variables and dependent on human perception for its 
decoding. Changing these variables could be used to alter the circumstances in 
which the phenomenon would occur. Say, one variable could be defined to im-
itate the effect of wind on rippling water and incrementing it would cause it to 
form small waves. However, nothing prevented the programmers from going 
outside of the confines of the realistically possible. They were free to experi-
ment with whatever variable they desired to alter or extend. In this way several 
effects were augmented to increase suspense, but in many cases, the effect was 
more than an increase or an augmentation. It became a reinterpretation of real-
ity itself and our perception of it.
One example of this is the special effect generally referred to as 'bullet 
time', whereby the motion is slowed down to the extent that bullets can be seen 
floating in the air while the camera moves at regular speed, as if the whole scene 
were a three-dimensional still composed of slowly moving statues. With the de-
velopment of virtual three-dimensional camera recording, programmers became 
aware of the fact that physical simulation and its representation could be pro-
cessed by separate programs running independently. In other words, the simu-
lation of movement in the virtual world did not necessarily need to coincide 
with the movement of the virtual camera. For example, a computer character 
performing a martial arts sequence could be put on hold in mid-air while the 
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virtual camera program continued to calculate its movement around it. While all 
action in the simulated world had stopped, the recording would continue and 
the viewer would be able to explore the moment in time from different camera 
perspectives.  In this  way,  an additional  layer of  abstraction was constructed 
between camera and virtual world. Just like, first with  Atari Football and later 
with real-time three-dimensional simulation, the camera had been taken off its 
tripod and had started to move independently from its environment, it had now 
been cut loose from its very presence in time and could move independently not 
just in three, but in four dimensions. It acquired the ability to move independ-
ently from how time evolved in the simulated environment, freezing the mo-
ment as if it were a statue to explore from all sides. After the realization of this 
effect in computer-generated imaging, it made its way back to filmic special ef-
fects. In The Matrix, for example, Keanu Reeves' evasive movements were sim-
ultaneously filmed from all directions, after which the recorded images were im-
ported into specialized computer software which combined them and filled in 
intermediary frames in order to imitate computer animation's independent cam-
era movement. In this way, computer graphics ceased to just imitate its cinema-
tographic master and started to feed it back with new ways of understanding 
and representing reality.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude this section on point of view, I would like to make two remarks 
about the analytical framework I have put forward. First of all, I have attempted 
to present a 'layered' analysis. I have tried to lay out three levels in the descrip-
tion of simulated point of view: i.e. the simulation of space, that of the player's 
role and that of the camera. Strictly speaking, however, this separation is a fal-
lacy, an impossible dream and should be seen as a descriptive aid and not as a 
methodological axiom. In reality, the three levels are heavily intertwined, inter-
dependent  and  in  some  cases  indistinguishable.  Two-dimensional  computer 
games, for example do not just present a two-dimensional perspective or point 
of view upon a three-dimensional virtual reality. They are two-dimensional en-
tities, not just perceptively, but also ontologically. Their variables only take into 
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account two axes when calculating positions and their graphics are paper thin. 
Viewing an early version of Mario from the side would yield no more than a 
vertical line. Hence, speaking of a camera in two-dimensional virtual environ-
ments is highly problematic as it implies that there is a difference between the 
images the camera records and the events within the game world, that another 
way of recording had been possible. This is not the case however. In two-di-
mensional games, the images are the world and the world is the images. In fact, 
the three-layered setup which I have employed in my analysis is that of three-di-
mensional gaming, as it exists since the early 1990s, imposed also upon its two-
dimensional predecessors.  Possibly,  in future forms of simulation, additional 
layers of abstraction will be put in place and the analytical levels will become 
four or five, straitjacketing not 2D, but also 3D gaming in the categories of that 
which came after it.
Finally, while I have presented my analysis as a comment and partial rejec-
tion of Neitzel's narratological framework, it should by no means be interpreted 
as a definitive reinterpretation. In fact, most analyses that exist in game studies 
today and on which this analysis is partly based are fragmentary and incidental 
rather than methodical, partial and incomplete rather than based on a scientific-
ally delineated corpus. My analysis is no different in this respect and should 
therefore be seen as an extended illustration of my analytical framework and a 
plea for further research into computer games as a cultural form. Computer 
simulation has been developing since the 1960s and, in this process, it has de-
veloped its own way of looking at the world through an array of digital tools 
and techniques. These are not just objective strategies for dealing with the limit-
ations  and  constraints  of  digital  technology.  They  are  reflections  of  the 
thoughts and ideas of the people who created them. They are witnesses of how 
they, as cultural beings, programmers and children of their time saw themselves 
and their place in reality. They are mirrors of their interests and preoccupations. 
It is based on these observations, that I would like to plead for a more contin-
ued and more methodical interest in computer simulation as a form of repres-
entation.  Computer games are not just  artifacts  for creating pleasant experi-
ences, they also present a partial attempt to make sense of the world by using a 
newly arrived form of information technology. Hence a systematic study of the 
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object's intricacies could not just lead to more understanding of the object itself 
or digital culture as a whole. It could also shed light on how culture and techno-
logy interact in the creation of a (post-)modern world view and help to explain 
and illustrate how man sees his own place in such a world.
V
THE PURPOSE OF PLAY
Nothing reveals humanity so well as the games it plays.
David Hartley, Observations on Man, 1749
In  “Hearts,  Clubs,  Diamonds,  Spades:  Players  Who Suit  Muds”  (2001),  an 
amusing and highly elucidating discussion of the types of players one finds in 
online multi-user dungeons (MUDs), Richard Bartle distinguishes between four 
chief motivations people cite for playing MUDs: achievement, exploration, so-
cialization and imposition. 
(1) Players citing achievement typically set themselves game-related goals such as 
the acquisition of virtual strength, currency, power or another signifier of suc-
cess such as a high character level or numerical score. Once set, achievers work 
toward this goal directly and methodically allowing for as little distraction as 
possible. Making quick progress in the game is often only possible by vigor-
ously chasing mobiles, computer characters roaming the virtual land, and by ac-
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cumulating and selling large quantities of treasure and weapons. Other players 
may consider hours of running around, killing, looting and selling a tedious and 
sad occupation, but achievers do not. They focus on the higher goal and see 
everything else only as a means to work towards that goal. For them, playing is 
trying to win a competition, a way of measuring their performance and eventu-
ally proving that they are more successful than others.
(2) Players primarily interested in  exploration do not attach themselves to any 
specific in-game objectives like achievers do, but rather take a meta-interest in 
the game. Whatever happens, whichever monster they kill or level they reach, to 
them, it is only a means towards their higher goal which is to better understand 
the MUD at hand, and, if possible, extract some knowledge about Multi-User 
Dungeons or fantasy fiction in general. When an explorer accesses a MUD, his 
primary aim is to find out as much as he can about the virtual world. Initially, 
this involves mapping the game's topology, exploring the MUD's breadth as 
Bartle calls it, and later advance to experimentating with its physics program-
ming, explore its depth. Arguably, explorer-types are the more 'geeky' type of 
player, accessing the simulation not primarily for the reflections it generates nor 
for the competition, but for the system itself. They want to explore in order to 
understand in order to control the system and safely hide behind their under-
standing.85
(3) A third group of MUDders, the socializers, is not so much interested in win-
ning or losing the game and neither do they want to understand its technical in-
tricacies. Rather they access MUDs for the other players who are to them sub-
jects to  socialize with in an atmosphere of solidarity. The competition within 
the game world and the role-playing in the context of the virtual world's back-
ground story are to them only a pretext to converse and interact with their fel-
low players.  Socializers  are typically perceived as the more feminine type of 
player, cuddling together in safe havens to talk about the happenings in the vir-
tual but equally often the real world. Whereas the other player-types regard the 
virtual as a means to escape reality and do things they are not allowed to or are 
not capable of in the real world, socializers want to do exactly as they do in real-
85 Without much doubt, the present author would be classified as belonging to this second cat-
egory.
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ity: meet people and converse. MUDs are to them merely a way of diversifying 
partners and setting.
(4) The fourth and final category in Bartle's classification is that of killers who 
access MUDs in order to impose themselves on other players so that they at-
tract their attention by annoying them. The easiest way to achieve this is to at-
tack other players' avatars and kill them for no apparent reason. If killers have a 
general goal, it lies in the negative social sphere. With socializers, killers share 
the interest in other players whose attention they crave, and with achievers and 
explorers they share the fact that MUDs are an outlet, a way of escaping every-
day reality and carry out certain acts that they are denied or disallowed in real 
life. Playing a game is to them a sort of blind revenge, the virtual carrying out of 
a  judgment  against  the  world.  Again  stereotypically  speaking,  killers  are  the 
more frustrated type of player who sees MUDs as a way to relieve that frustra-
tion, although this motivation is often implicit and unconscious. When asked 
about their playing style, killers more often than not simply put forward fun as 
an explanation of their behavior.
Bartle's aim in categorizing players is not just to provide helpful denominations, 
but also to help administrators of MUDs to understand and guide the unfold-
ing dynamics when large numbers of players with different motivations access 
their virtual world. Important thereby are not just the actions by one group 
within the game, but also the way in which they regard the other groups and 
their  actions.  If  Bartle's  primary  categorization  sounds  familiar  and  at  least 
faintly recalls  real-world intuitions about  categorizing people,  his  account of 
their mutual opinions about one another does even more so.86 Achievers tend to 
86 Significantly Bartle's classification of players into explorers, socializers and achievers is reflected 
in empirical  studies of  players'  motivations and choice of  games.  Vorderer,  Hartmann and 
Klimmt (2003), for example, make a distinction between players according to their 'social value 
orientation' which can be individualistic, cooperative or competitive. An individualistic orienta-
tion reflects a tendency to maximize one's own benefits (ego=max) which corresponds to the 
explorer's personal interest in mastering the simulation. A cooperative orientation means that 
the person cares about one's own as well as the benefits of others (ego + other = max) which 
can be found in the socializer's desire to be part of a group. A competitive orientation, finally, 
means that you attempt to maximize your own benefits in relation to those obtained by others 
(ego - other = max). This orientation is reflected in the achiever's desire to beat all competition, 
preferably by a large sum. In their analysis, Vorderer, Hartmann and Klimmt do not point to 
any orientation which could correspond to Bartle's killers. This may be due, however, to the 
fact that their research was largely based on single-player games and that, to a killer, imposing 
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regard other achievers as competition to be beaten and as one of the principal 
factors in making the MUD interesting. Other, more successful achievers are 
treated with respect, not disdain and their success is a motivation for attempt-
ing to achieve even more, not for trying to kill them or turn away from the 
game. Typically, losing achievers will cite bad luck or lack of time as reasons for 
not being as far advanced as others.  Achievers generally regard explorers as 
losers, players who have resorted to tinkering with the game mechanics because 
they cannot cut it as a regular player. Exceptionally skilled explorers may be el-
evated to the level of eccentric: what they do is pointless but knowledge of how 
they do it may come in useful for furthering the achiever's own cause. Social-
izers are seen as a source of information by achievers but are otherwise uninter-
esting. Bartle reports that, occasionally, so-called flame wars break out between 
socializers and achievers and that these can be highly persistent as “achievers 
don't want to lose the argument, and the socialisers don't want to stop talking!” 
Killers, finally, are feared by achievers, who like to fight, but only when they are 
more or less certain from the outset that they will win. Killers are usually highly 
trained in what they do. Hence achievers try to avoid them.
Explorers see other explorers as like-minded individuals who are also on a 
quest to understand and control the virtual universe. What actually happens in 
the universe is largely uninteresting but how it came about is all the more. Like 
in other online communities such as the open source movement, knowledge 
about the simulation is freely shared among the explorer-population and is used 
as a measure against which to compare one's own understanding. Reputation is 
not built on power or social status, but on the knowledge you are willing to 
share. Explorers see achievers as nascent explorers who have not yet realized 
that scratching the surface of a simulation for days or weeks in order to earn 
points or character levels is a meaningless strategy in the long run. Explorers 
believe that, eventually, achievers will come to realize that the game itself is only 
a series of states in a finite state machine and that it is the machine one should 
attempt  to  master,  not  the  states.  Explorers  consider  socializers  as  people 
whom they can impress and who can help them in establishing a reputation, but 
upon a computer character is not nearly as satisfying as annoying a human player.
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who are otherwise uninteresting. If they do not appreciate the explorer's talents 
and understanding, they are not really worth spending time with. Killers, finally, 
are equally uninteresting. Since explorers are not really interested in the game 
events themselves, but rather in the simulation generating them, they do not 
particularly care if they are attacked and will only truly defend themselves when 
they can experiment with or demonstrate some kind of new hack they recently 
discovered.
Socializers visit MUDs to meet other socializers and socialize. Whilst wan-
dering about in the virtual environment, their main aim is to meet the charac-
ters of people they know or people they can get  to know and have a chat. 
Without other members of their own kind, they will quickly relinquish interest 
in the MUD and go some place else. Socializers like achievers, not so much as 
persons but as subjects of conversation. The competition between the achievers 
within the virtual world forms a continuous soap opera which the socializers 
can use to open up or sustain conversation. Significantly, they do not particu-
larly enjoy talking to achievers as the latter usually has no time for conversation 
and will quickly move on to achieve more; they do, however, enjoy talking about 
them. Bartle notes that a “cynic might suggest that the relationship between so-
cialisers and achievers is similar to that between women and men...” (2001). So-
cializers generally regard explorers as sad characters who are desperately in need 
of a life. Both groups enjoy talking, but not about the same subjects, and when 
they do talk, the explorer usually tries to impress the socializer with his know-
ledge and the socializer has nothing better to do at the time. The most prob-
lematic relation between player types is that between socializers and killers for 
whom they bear a deep hatred. What socializers seek in the online environment 
is a sense of togetherness and when a killer goes after them and removes their 
character from the MUD for no apparent reason, their anger usually knows no 
bounds.
Killers, finally, avoid their own kind, except in organized challenges. They 
do not have a particular aim to strive for or to compete for with other killers. 
Their enjoyment in attacking other players is of an ad hoc nature rather than 
part of a competitive scheme. Hence they maintain an implicit agreement to 
leave one another alone so that neither risks their reputation. More or less the 
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same goes for explorers, whom killers similarly tend to leave alone. Not only 
are explorers often formidable fighters with many obscure, unexpected tactics 
at their disposal, they also often do not care when they are attacked and killed, 
which is most killers' primary aim in attacking in the first place. Achievers, on 
the other hand, are seen by killers as their natural prey. They have advanced 
personae with high character levels and powerful weapons, yet they are gener-
ally not as specialized in fighting as killers are because they acquired their skills 
by spending large amounts of time killing computer characters and collecting 
loot. Also, achievers hate being attacked as it diverts them from their grand 
scheme which is to beat other achievers at achieving. In some cases, the achiev-
er may become so annoyed by getting killed that he makes revenge his next 
character's life pursuit and relentlessly devotes himself to hunting the hunter 
and destroy his reputation. Finally, the grudge born by socializers against killers 
is happily returned by the latter. Generally, killers “go out of their way to rid 
MUDs of namby-pamby socialisers who wouldn't know a weapon if one came 
up and hit them (an activity that killers are only too happy to demonstrate), and 
they will generally hassle socialisers at every opportunity simply because it's so 
easy to get them annoyed” (Bartle 2001).
One important question Bartle leaves blank, however, does not deal with 
that which separates achievers, explorers, socializers and killers, but with that 
which brings them together. Why do people with motivations as diverse as be-
ing regarded as successful, mastering the system, meeting new people, and an-
noying them, decide to connect to one and the same virtual world and engage 
in pretense play? What is it that binds male and female, young and old, highly 
educated and less so, to be attracted to something that at the same time imitates 
and  distorts  parts  of  the  world  surrounding  them?  What  is  their  common 
ground for wanting to participate in a competition in the guise of another, vir-
tual character? Why is it that they desire to be immersed in their imagination, 
escape to a different reality and imagine themselves and others performing ac-
tions staging some sort of second life? Why is it that people like to play? In this 
last chapter of my study of the cultural implications of computer simulation and 
games, I formulate a tentative answer to this question. Of course, research into 
the concept and forms of play is not new and predates the appearance of com-
THE PURPOSE OF PLAY          229
puter games by at least half a century. Therefore I start my discussion by look-
ing at how a number of psychologists describe play as a means for the child or 
the grown-up to cope and come to terms with reality. By accessing a mental 
realm evoked through representation or daydreaming, man unconsciously seeks 
to create a reality of his own making where he can explore emotional bottle-
necks and act out that which is denied to him in real life. In the second, final 
section, I attempt to link this idea of coping to my main claim that computer 
simulation is a cultural form reflecting ideas and preoccupations of the society 
in which it functions and claim that computer games can be seen at least partly 
as a way of coping with the system-oriented, competitive society in which we 
live today.
1. PLAYING AS COPING WITH REALITY
The concept of 'play' carries a long and complex history with different inter-
pretations across time periods and cultures. The way in which we, today, in our 
Western society, understand what it is to play, goes back at least to some four 
centuries before the beginning of our time-reckoning.  In the second book of 
The Laws (c. 360 BC), Plato describes a dialog between Cleinias and an anonym-
ous Athenian who describes the notion of 'playfulness' as that “which is neither 
useful, truthful or representative, nor harmful,  but which exists only for the 
pleasure it affords.” 'Play' is a label assigned to those activities we perform auto-
matically for the pleasure they provide, but which do not serve any external 
purpose, or do any harm. This notion of 'play' as something trivial but harmless 
became dominant in later philosophical thought and nested itself in most West-
ern European languages as its prototypical meaning. When we look at the char-
acteristics of play provided by Roger Caillois (1958: 9), for example, we note 
that they almost without exception refer to the fact that play is intrinsically mo-
tivated,  autopoietic (self-generating) and autotelic (self-motivating), and that it 
does  not  serve any  direct  real-world  cause.  For  Caillois,  'play'  is  an  activity 
which is essentially free (not obligatory), separate (limited in space and time), 
uncertain  (variable,  with  unknown outcome),  unproductive  (creating  neither 
goods nor wealth), governed by rules (conventions temporarily replacing ordin-
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ary law) and make-believe (accompanied by an acute awareness of a second 
reality different from real life).
However, despite our intuitions regarding what it is 'to play' and what it is 
not,  and a vague idea of why that is so,  it seems impossible to formulate a 
definition  covering  all  of  its  everyday  uses.  In  his  Philosophical  Investigations 
(1953), Ludwig Wittgenstein notes that a definition of 'play' based on any of its 
characteristics is bound to either exclude playful activities by being too specific 
or include non-playful ones by being too general (65). Whether we base our 
definition on the notion of 'amusement', 'competition' or 'rules', there will al-
ways be games that are outside of its scope. Whereas earlier philosophers, lead-
ing all the way back to Plato, believed in the possibility of uncovering an es-
sence of every object and idea in existence, Wittgenstein notes that it is im-
possible to give a final and essential definition of what is a game and what is 
not. It is impossible to discover any one or a number of characteristics which 
separate a playful from a non-playful activity, and what is even more notable is 
that apparently we do not need such a definition in order to use the notion cor-
rectly.  Our intuitions  function regardless.  Wittgenstein proposes  the idea of 
'family  resemblance'  as  a  more  suitable  framework  for  semantic  description 
than the idea of a definition based on sufficient and necessary conditions. Lan-
guage is a dynamic system for attributing meaning to the world and conceptual 
definitions are forms which emerge from the society and culture in which they 
function. Rather than seeing language as an essential  pre-given, it should be 
seen as a complex network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing (66).
CULTURAL SELECTION
Whilst Wittgenstein set out to find a definition of 'play' as a way of describing 
the functioning of language and the generation of meaning, some play theorists 
have taken his observations in a different direction and have seen in the multi-
tude of types of play one of its fundamental characteristics. In his influential 
meta-study,  The Ambiguity of  Play (1997),  Brian Sutton-Smith notes that  “[i]n 
looking for what is common to child and adult forms of play, to animal and hu-
man forms, to dreams, daydreams, play, games,  sports and festivals, it is not 
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hard to reach the conclusion that what they have in common, even cross-cul-
turally, is their amazing diversity and variability” (221). But what could be the 
purpose of a mechanism generating different types of behavior without an ob-
vious, direct goal? Why is it that a small minority of species – mammals, birds, 
and a few fish and reptiles – engage in seemingly useless activity for which they 
devise complex codes both for prompting and entertaining the behavior? As a 
thought experiment, Sutton-Smith proposes to explore the idea that play as a 
mechanism for generating variable behavior is in some way linked to natural 
variation  and  selection.  In  Darwinian  terms,  natural  selection  refers  to  the 
mechanism generating changes in gene frequencies due to the different ability 
of organisms to survive and reproduce in a specific environment. Because some 
organisms are better adapted to specific circumstances or – for the purpose of 
this thought experiment more significant – are able to deal with a broader range 
of circumstances, natural selection results in an unequal rate of survival and re-
production among the various genotypes present in a species population. Ac-
cording to Darwinism, natural selection, acting on the genetic variations pro-
duced by mutation, is the most important force inducing evolutionary change.
Sutton-Smith's suggestion now is that an organism's ability to display dif-
ferent types of behavior in different situations is an important factor in its ad-
aptability and that play should be seen as a mechanism functioning as a device 
for generating 'behavioral mutation'. Typically, play is a way of organizing virtu-
al interaction with specific aspects of one's environment in order to learn about 
them, and to try and single out the most interesting and profitable strategies 
available in various circumstances. It is a way of dealing with one's environment 
without the danger of causing irreversible changes. Starting a game is creating a 
safe environment, stepping into it and taking with you only those aspects of 
reality which you need and leaving behind everything that could cloud your 
judgment or hamper your imagination in any other way. Within this environ-
ment, a problem is virtually staged and the player is free to explore its intrica-
cies,  experiment  with  different  strategies  of  solving  it,  roll-back  the  virtual 
world  when  the  imaginary  result  is  unsatisfactory,  and  try  out  a  different 
strategy. In this way, variations are generated, explored and selected, which may 
later serve in dealing with the actual world. Hence, it is precisely the aimlessness 
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and seeming unproductiveness which provides playful behavior with the free-
dom and  detachment  needed  to  generate  satisfactory  solutions  to  complex 
problems. According to Sutton-Smith, play can hence be seen as a model of 
natural selection processes, a cultural counterpart of the crude and cruel mech-
anism of genetic variation and selection (229). It could even be argued that play 
in its broadest sense lies at the very basis of cultural development (cf. Huizinga 
1939), driving man to generate theories about the world and producing codes 
such as language and various forms of representation for sharing that know-
ledge.
REHEARSAL AND NEGOTIATION
The idea that play creates a neutral ground where the individual can learn to 
deal with reality is not new. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, philo-
sopher and psychologist Karl Groos observed that playful behavior has an im-
portant role in the development and training of skills both in young animals 
and children. In the early stages of animal development, game play is focused 
on motor skills and the exploration of the environment. At a certain age, this 
type  of  play  begins  to  exhibit  more  and  more  elements  of  adult  behavior. 
Whereas earlier play was ad hoc and directionless, now it is developed as vari-
ations on the themes of hunting and fighting, rivalry and cooperation. A well-
known example is the chasing games young dogs play together. When two dogs 
meet, they familiarize with one another until one of them prompts the idea of 
playing, usually by making a series of overenthusiastic, evasive movements, flat-
tening his ears while focusing his eyes on those of the other dog. If the latter 
accepts to take part in the game, he in turn makes a number of these move-
ments after which the game can commence, usually consisting of running after 
one another and pretense fighting with lots of noise and great waste of power 
and energy. In a similar way, many games children play, not just in sensorimo-
tor, but also competitive and role-play can be linked with activities which they 
will be needing in their later life. Themes like playing house, construction, hide 
and seek, soldier and even more abstract sports like football/soccer and racing 
(chase) or tennis (defense), but also hobbies like collecting stamps (gathering) 
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can be related to skills adults, at least in the past, needed to provide for their 
family and fill in the role they were expected to play in later life.
When looking at the possible explanations for the existence of playful be-
havior, there is, apart from the functionalist, evolutionary hypothesis of 'play as 
rehearsal' also a more psychoanalytical theory of 'play as negotiation' between 
self and world. Around 350 BC, Aristotle wrote in his Poetics (VI) that a proper 
tragedy should not just be a staging of a significant, serious and complete event, 
presented in poetic language, but that it should also aim to stir an emotional re-
sponse in the viewer and cleanse her of negative emotions. By staging violent 
action, the spectator will experience fear, and by staging characters who suffer a 
terrible fate, she will experience pity. This confronts her with her own 'condi-
tion humaine', the anxiety and pain of being mortal, ultimately alone and unable 
to control  her own existence. The identification with a tragic character stirs 
strong aversive and empathic emotions, but it also brings a certain peace. Her 
own fate and finiteness takes on a more definite shape and become less threat-
ening. At the end of the play, when she returns to her everyday life and is again 
confronted with her own day to day problems, the recent experience of the 
possibility of a far worse destiny makes her aware of their relativity and effect a 
release  of  emotional  tension,  a  so-called  cathartic response.  By  engaging  the 
viewer in fictitious aversion and grief, she is delivered from these emotions in 
real life; she can find peace with her own role in reality and her appetite for life 
can be reinforced.
Aristotle's  idea  of  emotional  cleansing  inspired  Sigmund  Freud  in  his 
1908 essay “Der Dichter und das Phantasieren” (“The poet and his fantasy”) to 
formulate his catharsis hypothesis for fiction and play, stating that fantasy func-
tions as a valve for the release of emotional tension. The central idea of the psy-
choanalytic theory of play (cf. also Waelder 1933) is the assumption that it al-
lows for the creation of an alternate reality, which, unlike physical and social 
reality, allows the child to deal with problems with which it cannot deal in the 
actual world. Play provides a way of escaping the harsh restrictions of the reality 
principle and find refuge in the safe and controllable realm of an imagined para-
reality where she can freely act out forbidden fantasies and aggressive impulses. 
In this way, the child can learn to cope with reality and emotionally compensate 
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problems, unfulfillable desires and social pressure. By repeated indulgence in 
playful behavior representing forbidden impulses or past problems, the child's 
negative feelings become more definite and less threatening and her fears and 
anxieties towards them diminish. As in psychotherapy, where patients are asked 
to give expression to their deepest emotions so as to relive traumatic events and 
learn to cope with them, play allows children to explore and negotiate between 
their 'other' self and the laws of reality.
WIELDING THE WORLD
In “Spiel als Lebensbewältigung,” (“Play as Coping with Life”, 2000), develop-
mental psychologist Rolf Oerter presents a theory of play based on earlier work 
by Sigmund Freud, Lev Vygotsky and Jean Piaget. He describes play as a means 
for the child to effect the 'Bewältigung' of reality, a notion that is difficult to 
translate into English without losing an important part of its meaning. 'Bewälti-
gung', which is related to German 'walten' (to reign) and to English 'to wield' 
covers at the same time the idea of 'dealing with' as learning to control, and 
'coping with' as learning to accept. Hence it is highly suited for the description 
of the process of negotiation which alternately involves learning about reality so 
as to be able to control it, and adjusting expectations so as to learn to accept the 
limitations of being in the world and not be paralyzed by them. Play as a cognit-
ive and social tool allows the child to generate an alternate reality, an 'air lock' 
between its own fantasies and the harsh reality of the world in which it is still 
unable to fulfill its desires and wishes. The child can introduce its own inter-
pretation of reality and explore it on its own terms. In the world of play, pilot-
ing airplanes does not require any knowledge about aerodynamics or flight pan-
els while it does permit to  explore the idea of leaving the ground, of flying 
through clouds or of discovering far-away continents. Moreover, it allows the 
child temporarily to be a pilot and try to feel what that would be like. It helps the 
child to satiate its desire to take its place in the world and responds to its claims 
on reality. Play is the learning area par excellence, a place where the child is free 
to develop its skills and explore its fears, anxieties and desires.
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Early child play is concerned with the gaining of control over their envir-
onment.87 When a toddler has discovered the link between cause and effect, 
between his or her own actions and the results they yield, he will repeat these 
actions again and again, enjoying the recognition and control he or she can ex-
ert over the repetitive movement. This type of play is generally referred to as 
mastery play because of the importance for the child to feel in control over action 
and effect. It can also be seen as the first example of a 'flow experience' which 
Csikszentmihalyi (1997) describes as a state in which important achievement is 
combined with a feeling of ease and control, the seeming disappearance of ef-
fort and difficulty (Oerter 2000: 49). Similarly, simple motoric play such as the 
continuous turning over of the child is also a way of learning to deal with their 
environment as they will enjoy the successful movement and the control they 
can exert over his own body in the same way that the smaller child enjoys the 
experience of an effect caused by their own actions (50). Thirdly, playing with 
amorphous materials such as sand and water is a way of exploring the interface 
between self and environment, the observation that oneself is part of physical 
reality. The enjoyment the child experiences when they are handling these sub-
stances is directly related to the experience of being in a close relation to their 
surroundings.  Water allows the hand and body to be completely immersed. 
Sand and clay show more resistance, but allow to be kneaded and molded into 
various shapes. The more the child is interested in forming and shaping when 
dealing with these materials, the more important the moment of control over 
their environment becomes, expressing the desire to change their environment 
after their own image and likeness (Ibid.).
LET'S PRETEND...
In kindergarten and early primary school, different forms of pretense play move 
to the foreground. In pretense play – also referred to as fantasy, pretense or 'as 
if' play – the actual world is reshaped so that it corresponds more to the desires 
and wishes of the child. Objects, other players, actions and places now all ac-
87 Since 1966, when Mark Rosenzweig discovered that rats growing up in a visually enriched en-
vironment which stimulates playful behavior, develop a larger and heavier cerebral cortex, the 
interest in the earliest stages of child education grown significantly (Papoušek et al. 2000: 21). 
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quire meanings as if they were something else. The table and cloth become the 
roof and walls of a school, teddy bear and little brother become schoolchildren 
and the older child their teacher. When the telephone rings in the living room, 
the school bell rings and the children go to class where they are handed invis-
ible test papers and given tasks. Significantly, in this type of play, the objects 
and actions themselves are not the primary focus of the game, but rather what 
they represent. Table, teddy bear, little brother and bag are part of the game, 
but at the same time they are not. In pretense play, the actual objects used for 
the game are no more than props, sometimes also functioning as prompters of 
the fantasy, as the telephone example suggests. What the child is aiming to cope 
with is not its direct environment, but their own interiorized experiences and 
preoccupations.  Hence,  pretense play  is  highly imitative,  often consisting  of 
scenes depicting experiences which the child leading the game recently came 
across, reflecting their interpretation of the situation and using them to generate 
variations based on circumstantial inspiration.
Like mastery play, pretense play reflects the child's desire to exert control 
over and lay claim on reality, and increasingly they will also become an expres-
sion of their desire to be grown-up. Boys will imagine they are driving a car or 
handling an excavator; girls will care for their puppets, but also reproach and 
punish them; and both genders will imagine they construct their own house 
(Oerter 2000: 50). An important theme in play will also be to create a separation 
between the world of play and the immediate environment. Children will hide 
away in a corner, behind the sofa or under the table, imagining they are living in 
a house or traveling alone on a ship. Both the tendency toward active control 
and power acquisition and the theme of separation and aloneness are ways for 
the child to experience their own identity and individuality (51). Furthermore, 
as play becomes a site for negotiation between desired and actual reality, it also 
increasingly functions as a means of coping with traumatic experiences such as 
illness or punishment. These experiences will be incorporated in play and re-
shaped according to the child's desires and goals. By regenerating reality in such 
a way and by repeating the painful scene, this time with a happy ending, the 
trauma becomes less painful and easier to deal with psychologically. One horri-
fying, yet at the same time enlightening example of the role of play in coping 
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with reality is that given by Opie and Opie (1969: 331).  During the Second 
World War, children in Auschwitz, who had begun to realize what happened in 
the camp and what their own fate would probably turn out to be, are reported 
to have played a game called 'Going to the Gas Chamber' in an attempt to cope 
with their ordeal (1969: 331).
Oerter also notes that playing behavior, particularly pretense play, does 
not disappear when humans reach adulthood. First of all, it can be argued that 
the development of play continues into activities we increasingly designate as 
work. As long as work is at the same time play it conserves its positive charac-
teristics: it will not only save energy and help to avoid stress, it will also make 
the occupation meaningful and instill a feeling of control over the activity and 
life in general (54). Secondly, like Kendall Walton (see chapter 3 on mimesis), 
Oerter sees the practice of art creation and reception as a transformation of the 
play dynamic with the aim of coping with life as a common interpretive back-
ground. From the earliest examples of cave drawings, the desire to create rep-
resentations has been first and foremost a way of coping with the difficulties 
and anxieties of everyday existence (53). By interpreting reality and committing 
this interpretation to a form of representation such as language or pictorial art, 
it can not only be used as study material or as a way of sharing knowledge, it 
will also integrate understanding and help to cope with reality. Thirdly and fi-
nally, Oerter notes that the appearance of religious practices can, at least from a 
scientific point of view, be attributed to man's attempt to cope with the know-
ledge of future death. Like children's play, religion creates a second, alternate 
reality in which man is able to attribute meaning to his life and thus cope with 
the knowledge that one day they will no longer be here (53).88
88 As an afterthought to his discussion of religion as a continuation of the practice of play, Oerter 
observes that, whereas children are generally able to make a clear distinction between actual 
and played reality, adults often less so. The growing religious fundamentalism, for example, can 
be interpreted as an attempt to impose religious principles upon socio-cultural reality. This is, 
according to Oerter, an area in which adults can learn from children (54).
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2. GAMING AS COPING WITH COMPETITION
In Man, Play and Games (1958), Roger Caillois makes a distinction between two 
types of play which he sees as extremes on a continuous scale rather than a dis-
crete oppositional pair. On one side, there is the notion of 'paidia', which is best 
translated into English as 'play' or 'playfulness' and which refers to “an almost 
indivisible principle, common to diversion, turbulence, free improvisation, and 
carefree gaiety” (13). At the opposite extreme, there is the principle of 'ludus', 
best translated as 'game' or 'gaming principle', referring to the rule-based nature 
of institutionalized games which bind playfulness with “arbitrary, imperative, 
and purposely tedious conventions” (Ibid.). At first sight, the principle of ludus 
is impractical and even seems to obstruct the more general principle of playful 
paidia. This is not entirely true however. By arbitrating competition, rule-based 
ludus plays an important role in the generation and maintenance of conflictual 
tension guaranteeing each playing party its rightful place within the realm of the 
game. In this section, I explore the idea that game rules serve as a means for the 
creation of a para-reality in which the player can come to terms with the in-
creasing competition in everyday life. First, I look at the principle of conflict 
and how it manifests itself in game play. Then I analyze game reality as a place 
which serves as a refuge from the competitiveness of the real, but at the same 
time presents a safe, controlled environment for exploring it. Finally, I briefly 
return to the main thesis of this study and assert that computer games are a cul-
tural form and can be seen as a response to our twenty-first century competitive 
society.
NARRATIVE CONFLICT
In his  Cours de la Linguistique Générale, published posthumously in 1916, Swiss 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure presents a general theory of representation as a 
system of oppositions. Whereas earlier research in linguistics and the cultural 
sciences had focused on the description of language as it occurs in actual use, 
such as in poetry or prose, Saussure proposes a radical departure from this ap-
proach. To him, language is not primarily a historically grown body of loosely 
connected elements, but surface manifestations of a deeper structure, which he 
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compares to a game of chess, a system at all time functioning as the reference 
point both in the production of signs and the attribution of meaning, a struc-
ture of inseparable tokens and semantic values, signifiers and signifieds, a cul-
tural device at the same time differentiating between various aspects of reality 
and supplying the representative forms for communicating them. By looking at 
the deeper oppositional structure which various sign systems project upon the 
world and upon their representational form, the observer can describe how this 
meta-system permits  its  users to analyze and make sense of the world.  For 
Saussure, there is no objective reality in representation, only a structural inter-
face between man and world, a system of functional distinctions in an other-
wise continuous, chaotic and possibly inapprehensible reality. Representation is 
never neutral, it is always based on a deeper, cultural construct, carving out a 
specific problematics by opposing it to similar notions, projecting a raster of 
distinctions upon the world.
Inspired by Saussure's work in linguistics, that of Claude Lévi-Strauss in 
anthropology and that of Vladimir Propp on folk tales, narratologist Algirdas 
Greimas proposes in his  Sémantique Structurale (1966) to analyze narrative as a 
macroscopic sign system based on semantic oppositions. Following the struc-
turalist axiom that representation is based on signs and that signs are arbitrary, 
existing only in relation to other signs, Greimas postulates that there must be a 
deep structure common to all forms of storytelling and that, like microscopic 
semantic elements such as words, this structure must derive its meaning from 
an  internal  system  of  oppositions  rather  than  from  any  external  pattern. 
Moreover these oppositions are not situated on the surface-level of the repres-
entation, but rather function between deeper, structural slots. Hence Greimas 
makes a radical distinction between actors, characters in a story, say Sherlock 
Holmes and Watson, and actants, structural roles which make out the basic se-
mantic system of storytelling. These actants function on two axes, the axis of 
desire and that of opposition. Essentially, every story presents a subject, say a 
prince, who desires an object, say a princess, but the situation obstructs instant 
gratification, say the princess has been kidnapped by an evil knight. In other 
words, an obstacle has arisen on the axis of desire. In order to overcome this 
obstacle, the subject must engage the oppositional axis and defy his antagonist 
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actant, attack the evil knight and deliver the princess for example. Of course my 
mini-story is a simplified example. In most cases, both the axis of desire and 
that of opposition feature subplots and deal with preliminary objects of desire, 
say a magic sword to fight the evil knight and helper actants, say a wizard who 
reveals the way to the sword. All this is of lesser importance however. The 
point I wish to make is that opposition and conflict lie at the very basis of how 
we interpret and represent the world. By distinguishing not just between cat-
egories of objects, but also between oppositional roles, we negotiate our posi-
tion vis-à-vis reality.
LUDIC CONFLICT
Like narrative, game play can be described as an internal system of oppositions 
generating conflict and suspense. This oppositional system can then in turn be 
seen as the main ground for game play's intrinsic motivation, the fact that it 
does not need to serve any external goal to be meaningful to the player. In asso-
ciative play, paidia rather than ludus, the oppositions drawn within the game 
world are not fixed. Rather, it is the very creation and exploration of differences 
between objects  and strategies  which makes  game play  worthwhile.  A child 
playing in a sandbox, for example, may see a bucket prompting the desire to 
build a sandcastle by filling it and turning it over. This may trigger a medieval 
theme turning the shovel into a knight riding toward the castle. He is attacked 
by a rake and a pick, or rather two bandits waiting for him in the thicket. The 
shovel, that is the knight, is very brave, however, draws his magical sword, kills 
the brigands but then collapses on the road due to blood loss where he is found 
by... the bucket, the beautiful princess who will have him transported to the 
castle and who will mend his wounds. As children are playing, new themes and 
ideas emerge from the playing activity and by steering their imaginary construc-
tion toward the fulfillment of their desire, game play allows the child to explore 
various facets of being and to cope with elements of fear and desire. By gener-
ating oppositions, between the heroic knight and the thieves, for example, but 
also between prince and princess, children create different actants out of their 
imagination, whose interaction, sword-fighting and falling in love can then be 
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staged and acted out. When the child has made enough castles, fought enough 
battles, and has fallen in love with enough princesses, they will be satisfied and 
move on to a different type of game.
In fixed, rule-governed, competitive gaming, ludus rather than paidia, in 
sports or board games for example, the oppositional structure is even more ob-
vious. At the beginning of the game a number of actants are introduced, the 
main competitors usually being human players, but sometimes also game- or 
computer-generated characters.  Apart from these main actants,  a number of 
'subplot-level' actants will enter the game, heaps of cards, pieces, a ball etc. of-
ten representing imaginary objects which will feature in the creation of prelim-
inary goals. In ludic play, the attainment of various goal-states is not a matter of 
free imagining or association as in paidia, but is determined by a rigid set of 
rules. Essentially, playing a competitive game involves jointly generating an ini-
tial state (dealing cards, organizing a board), determining a final state (winning a 
number of tricks, reaching a specific square on the board) and agreeing upon a 
number of rules to move from one state to the next. Significantly, the goal state 
will differ from one actant to the next relative to their own role in the game. In 
other words, each player will want to see his own introjected self in the winning 
position when the final state is reached. The dynamics unfolding due to the 
continuous interaction between actants working toward their own goal state is 
essentially competitive game play. Eventually, a final state will be reached, usu-
ally because one actant has reached his goal state. The game ends, a winner is 
nominated and a new game can be initialized with more or less the same (chess) 
or a different initial state (card game), a new opponent (tournament) or a differ-
ent goal state.89
Like narrative representation, the essential layout of both paidia and ludus 
can be fitted into Greimas' actant scheme working on an axis of desire and one 
of opposition. In paidiic associative play, desires and oppositional instances are 
continuously regenerated, changing course as the interests of the players evolve. 
In rule-governed, competitive play, desires are translated into goal states, op-
89 In a sense, my argument is circular. I started with de Sausure's observation that representation 
functions like a game to arrive at the claim that games are a form of representation. This does 
not undermine my main argument however, which is that opposition as a cognitive strategy lies 
at the basis of both.
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position into competition and play into rule-governed, conventional changing 
of game states. In essence, however, it is the same oppositional scheme that 
buttresses both narrative and play. It is the same interpretative structure projec-
ted upon an imaginary setting which generates suspense by making the out-
come of the conflict uncertain and by promising to resolve it. As argued in the 
previous chapter, the main difference between narrative and play is the role of 
the receiver in his own or a collective imagining. Whereas narrative conflict is a 
product of objective imagining, evoking a fictional world and presenting it to a 
reader or viewer in a sort of third-person outside perspective, ludic conflict al-
lows for the introjection of the receiver who automatically becomes a player in 
her own subjective imagining. Whereas narrative conflict, by being materially 
fixed or static, allows for the generation of highly complex and refined conflict 
resolutions, game play draws the player into its configuration and gives her a 
crude and unambiguous role not so much aiming for refinement and under-
standing than for pure imagination and arousal.90
In conclusion, it is important to note that ludic and narrative conflict are 
not mutually exclusive and that there are cultural forms in which they reinforce 
one another. In most games, for example, be they board, book or computer, an 
imaginary setting is introduced by some form of background story in which dif-
ferent actants are presented, including the player's role, and their various goals 
are explained. In this way, the introjection of the player into the fictional envir-
onment is prepared and guided, allowing her to identify with her in-game iden-
tity even before the initial state has been set. Hence one could say, that in these 
games, narrative conflict functions as a catalyzer to the ludic conflict, not really 
changing the process of identification, but accelerating it. In a similar way, ludic 
conflict may be used to reinforce narrative conflict. In a whodunit novel or tele-
vision series, for example, at the beginning of an episode, a murder takes place. 
90 Again, it should be noted that narrative and ludic conflict are deep-structural patterns, not dis-
cursive or thematic elements. If one were to write an engaging story or create a game about, 
say, giving flowers, they would still be intrinsically motivated by opposition. The story could 
deal with the question of whom to give flowers to and whom not and the game could be set on 
Saint Valentine's Day on which, as a player, you have to give flowers to as many girls as pos-
sible. The essential structure would always be one of opposition however. In the story it would 
be about differentiating between people and in the game it would be about determining one's 
own position vis-à-vis other contestants, playfully exploring the fantasy of wooing all the girls.
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After that, the main protagonist, usually a detective or police officer, is intro-
duced, who will attempt to solve the mystery. In the course of the investigation 
the actant determines various subgoals (forensic examinations, witness interrog-
ation, etc.), gathers clues and eventually puts the puzzle together and unveils the 
perpetrator. This story, driven by the narrative opposition between protagonist 
and killer, would not nearly be as engaging, however, if it were not for the ludic 
conflict supporting it. Central to a typical whodunit is that the reader or spectat-
or does not know who is the perpetrator until the end of the episode and that 
she can follow the main protagonist in his effort to find him. In this way, impli-
citly, a whodunit organizes a challenge for the receiver to find out before the 
detective does, a competition which is not set between narrative actants, but 
between story and receiver catalyzing narrative suspense.
THE PERFECT MIRROR
Initially developed for the Manhattan Project as a device for calculating the im-
pact of atomic bombardments, the digital computer is essentially a giant calcu-
lator, an extremely fast and powerful electronic switch capable of instantly ad-
dressing millions of memory spaces, jumping between any of a finite number of 
different states. As such, a computer is the oppositional machine par excellence. 
Also during the Second World War, the danger of the enemy intercepting radio 
transmissions between troops drove both sides to develop ever more complex 
forms of cryptography, methods for code translation and ways of breaking the 
enemy's schemes. Increasingly complex algorithms were developed for masking 
information until it could no longer be processed by pen and paper and ma-
chines were built to take over the tedious yet work-intensive task of translating 
symbols from one form into the next. This made researchers realize that state 
machines could do much more than just manipulate numbers. Any kind of in-
formation that is  quantifiable or that  can be represented in symbols can be 
stored and processed by a computing device when it is powerful enough. In a 
sense, the computer is the ultimate affirmation of Saussure's claim that repres-
entation functions through opposition, that any piece of information can be un-
derstood as a series of discrete signs deriving their status and meaning from a 
244         UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER GAME CULTURE
process of differentiation. To explain his theory of language, Saussure used the 
metaphor of a game of chess referring to the fact that each piece derives its 
value from the position of all other pieces rather than from any intrinsic quality. 
In a sense, the computer is an electronic reconstruction of that metaphor, a gi-
ant switchboard filled with pieces which are able to take two positions: zero and 
one.
As discussed in the second chapter, being a discrete state machine, a com-
puter is highly suited for the representation of discrete phenomena yet much 
less so for that of continuous processes. As in chess, in order to move from 
one state to the next, the computer uses instructions describing which pieces 
may move and which may not. These instructions are strictly rule-based. They 
determine exactly which values may change and which may not. There is no 
room for vagueness. Either it is zero or it is one. There is no in-between. The 
reason that computers have come nowhere near passing the Turing Test is not 
due to lack of power or speed, but rather to their strict rule-based character. 
When people are having a conversation, they do not follow a finite set of rules. 
Rather they move from one subject to the next, following a loose associative 
scheme based on personal interest, a current preoccupation and the anticipation 
of the conversation partner's reactions. A computer is extremely bad at any-
thing loose and associative. The only way for a state machine to achieve any-
thing like continuity is to mimic it, to change states at such short intervals that 
these intervals become imperceivable or acceptably small for the purpose of the 
simulation. This is one of the main reasons why computer games are so little as-
sociative in their basic design, integrating only sparse paidiic elements in an en-
vironment determined by ludus.
In  his  groundbreaking  1991  essay  “Play  It  Again,  Pac-Man,”  Charles 
Bernstein argues that, from the start, man has been afraid that computers may 
one day become superior to him, that he will be made irrelevant by his own cre-
ation's incontestable logic. A computer never makes mistakes. Unlike man, in 
the logical realm, it is fast, powerful and precise. Moreover, being a perfect ma-
chine, it can never be held accountable when something goes wrong. When a 
bug surfaces or the system stalls, the computer cannot be held responsible. It 
only carries out instructions so the breakage must be due to human error on 
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some level. Even worse, when something goes wrong, this will be another occa-
sion on which the computer can show man how imperfect he is, how he will 
never  be  able  to  master  logic  like  the  computer  does.  Hence,  the  relation 
between man and computer has, from the beginning, been determined by anxi-
ety and suspicion. Suspicion towards the fact that a computer can perform cal-
culations which man cannot and anxiety for the fact that a day might come 
when computers will no longer need any operators or programmers, when they 
will be able to program themselves, making abstraction of any particular human 
needs, erasing man's current privileged position in the world. These fears have 
created an adamant human desire to control the system, to penetrate its core 
and reprogram it from the inside. Computer games are a way of coping with 
this desire, a way of staging a symbolic battle between man and machine, of act-
ing  out  the  most  symbolic  struggle  of  all,  that  between  a  creator  and  his 
prodigy.
MASTERING THE MATRIX
Somewhat  paradoxically,  however,  one of  the main  attractions  of  computer 
simulation, both in a scientific and an entertainment context is their promise of 
being controllable, of being based on principles that are clear and unambiguous. 
Because of its discrete, mathematical nature, computer programming must deal 
with explicit, quantitative rules describing every aspect of a virtual environment. 
When some particular element has not been programmed, say air and respira-
tion,  it  does  not  exist  within  the  simulation.  And  when  it  has  been  pro-
grammed, it is based on sound mathematical principle. All variables are there, 
perfectly controllable. There are no gray zones, no moral questions, no semant-
ic ambiguities.  Computed reality  is  a  rule-based reality  descendant  from the 
dice-throwing  and  hitpoint  counting  reality  of  the  table-top  Dungeons  and 
Dragons {Gary Gygax 1974} role-playing fantasy worlds.  Arguably, the com-
puter rule-book is thick but somewhere deep in the machine lies perfection, ab-
solute control. There are random factors generated by specialized algorithms 
making it reasonably sure that every run of the simulation differs between any 
of a finite number of possible runs. This randomness, however, is fully encap-
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sulated, kept within strict bounds and will never touch the fundamental rules 
driving  the  simulation.  Hence  any  uncertainty  can be  controlled  by  making 
probability  calculations.  “When I  attack him with my wizard's  Fireball  spell 
power 12, even if he manages to boost his Ice Queen to eight, he will not be 
able to save his rogue.” Whereas actual reality is chaotic and incomprehensible, 
computer environments hold a promise of perfection, of answering to a limited 
set of rules. There are few unknowns, even fewer uncertainties and even they 
hold a promise of being understood and controlled eventually.
A second promise held by rule-based systems is that, when the rules apply 
to everyone equally, everyone is equal. When a game is set up, cards are dealt, 
pieces are set on the table, a whistle blows, every contestant has, at least theor-
etically, an equal chance of winning. From that moment onward, it is her skill, 
in most cases complemented by elements of chance, that will determine wheth-
er she is successful or not, not her social background, skin color, beauty, educa-
tion or gender. Roger Caillois observes that, despite their apparent oppositional 
nature, skill and chance “obey the same law – the creation for the players of 
conditions of pure equality denied them in real life. For nothing in life is clear, 
since everything is confused from the very beginning, luck and merit too. Play, 
whether agôn or alea, is thus an attempt to substitute perfect situations for the 
normal confusion of contemporary life” (Caillois 1958: 19). In this context, an 
additional promise made by computer games is that of concealment. Not only 
is the game environment fully determined by quantification and rules, as an op-
ponent, the computer sees and knows nothing outside of these rules and the 
way in which the player interacts with them. A computer is a dumb yet at the 
same time an honest machine, unable to make judgments based on anything 
outside of the input it is provided with, unable to infer anything outside of the 
rules it is built to apply. In her pioneering study  The Second Self (1984), Sherry 
Turkle gives the example of fourteen year old Jimmy who likes to play Space In-
vaders for hours on end and who has found in the computer the perfect playing 
partner, someone who will not judge him on the basis of his physical appear-
ance which has been marred by a birth defect (88). Or as Bernstein formulates 
it:  “[i]n  the Saturday Night  Fever of  Computer Wizardry,  achievement with 
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your joystick is the only thing that counts; success is solitary, objectively meas-
ured, undeniable (1991: 7).
A third and final promise held by games is that of repeatability. First of 
all, like any fictional form, computer games generously offer the safety and se-
clusion of a fantasy environment. When exploring various strategies in a virtual 
environment, this is as much done in the player's imagination as it happens in 
reality. Technically speaking, when performing actions in a computer game, the 
only material consequences that are attached to one's decisions are the switch-
ing  of  bits  and  bytes  and  perhaps  a  change  in  the  table  of  high-scores. 
Everything is perfectly safe. Nothing irrevocable can happen. State machines 
can be reset, discs wiped, software reinstalled. Moreover, the rule-based nature 
of computer games allows for the recreation of almost exactly similar situations 
in consecutive playing sessions or when saving and reloading. “In the social 
world of our everyday lives, repetition is near impossible if often promised. (...) 
With video games, as with all computers, you can return to the site of the same 
problem, the same anxiety, the same blockage and get exactly the same effect in 
response to the same set of actions” (Bernstein 1991: 50). In a simulated envir-
onment, if you act the same in similar circumstances, the same result will be 
produced. This gives the player a sense of control, an illusion of power. Within 
the realm of the virtual, man can imagine himself to be a god, evoking and re-
voking worlds, inventing and reinventing himself, delegating his avatar to carry 
out his instructions within the bounds of his own creation. Power and control 
are are two of the main attractions of computer games, a taste of omnipotence 
their additional reward.
ANXIETY AND CONTROL
But what is it that players of competitive games seek to control so much? What 
is it that underlies their desire for a perfect environment where they can test 
themselves on equal bases without having to fear any of the consequences? For 
Bernstein the answer is clear: it is their own anxiety that they seek to inhibit, 
their own uncertainty. “The dark side of uniformity and control is an intense 
fear of failure, of crashing, of disaster, of down time. Of not getting it right, of 
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getting lost, of losing control” (1991: 47). Games evoke fantasies about fearful 
situations, harsh competition, brutal yet honest conflict. Moreover, they do this 
without exposing the player to any actual danger, and provide an opportunity to 
overcome that fear. You may feel as if you are being followed by ghosts while 
sneaking to the bathroom during the night. In a computer game, however, you 
can wait  for them to  approach you,  eat  the right  pellet  and go after  them. 
Games are a test bed, a place where players can cast themselves into situations 
they will never experience in real life: driving a formula one, flying a fighter jet, 
fighting an army of orcs etc. At the same time, however, play is more than a 
place of rehearsal; it is a place where reality itself is negotiable, a place where 
one can act out and cope with one's darkest fantasies and existential anxieties. 
Brian Sutton-Smith notes that, while play can take many different forms, it is 
never thematically neutral. “All creatures, animal and human, live with some de-
gree of existential angst, and most of them spend some portion of their exist-
ence attempting to secure themselves from this angst by controlling their cir-
cumstances. All creatures live in a world of strong feelings and are dominated 
by those feelings. We constantly seek to manage the variable contingencies of 
our lives for success over failure, for life over death. Play itself may be a model 
of just this everyday existentialism” (1997: 228).
If computer games are on their way to becoming as important a pastime 
as  books and television,  not  just  for  children,  but  also  for  adolescents  and 
adults, there must be something in the format that appeals to all these categor-
ies and that somehow provides them with something meaningful, not just with-
in the gaming environment, but also to their life outside of it. Authors like Bri-
an Sutton-Smith, Rolf Oerter, Torben Grodal, Janet Murray and Charles Bern-
stein agree that playing games, like dealing with representations such as books 
and films, apart from communicating information about their subject, primarily 
have a psychological function. They are an outlet, a mechanism for coping with 
reality, for coming to terms with everyday worries, pressure, anxiety and con-
flict. “Clearly the primary motive of players is the stylized performance of exist-
ential themes that mimic or mock the uncertainties and risks of survival and, in 
so doing, engage the propensities of mind, body, and cells in exciting forms of 
arousal” (Sutton-Smith 1997: 231). Like other forms of representation, game 
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play allows us to symbolically represent elements of real life and thereby deal 
with our mental preoccupations, widen emotional bottlenecks and help us con-
trol our emotions. Additionally, it allows for the introjection of our own self 
into the process. “In games, therefore, we have a chance to enact our most ba-
sic relationship to the world – our desire to prevail over adversity, to survive 
our inevitable defeats, to shape our environment, to master complexity, and to 
make our lives fit together like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle (...). Like the reli-
gious ceremonies of passage by which we mark birth, coming of age, marriage, 
and death, games are ritual actions allowing us to symbolically enact the pat-
terns that give meaning to our lives” (Murray 1997: 143).
VICARIOUS THRILLS
Until this point,  I have largely avoided dealing with the topic of violence in 
computer games. The main reason is that it is a sensitive one. Mere mentioning 
of the matter tends to stir  a deeply emotional  debate,  more often than not 
fueled by bias, prejudice and misinformation, and altogether blurring the col-
lective view from other, more interesting aspects of the form. Perhaps now, 
however, at the end of this inquiry, is the time to make some room for the is-
sue. Thereby, it is not my aim to take an ethical stance vis-à-vis the purported 
violent nature of computer games. It is not my mission to judge, but to observe 
and to try to explain. As discussed previously, a first possible explanation for 
the conflictual nature of computer games is technical in nature. Symbolic sys-
tems of representation operate on discrete signs functioning within a network 
of semantic and semiotic oppositions, every sign deriving the larger part of its 
meaning from the differentiation between itself and other signs. In a similar 
way, narratological structures as forms of representation can be described in 
terms of oppositions between actants working upon axes of desire and opposi-
tion.  Computer simulation and games are  a fictional  form driven by logical 
structures running on the symbol-processing machine par excellence: the com-
puter. Hence it should be no surprise that they represent the world in opposi-
tional terms, in order to generate suspense, but also because of the symbolic 
nature of their underlying logic. Computers are much better adapted for dealing 
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with discrete data, for analyzing the world in terms of opposition, than for ana-
lyzing it in terms of continuity, of psychological association. Therefore it can be 
argued that their basic operational structure as a state machine is more apt to 
represent conflict than harmony, competition than compromise, violence than 
peacefulness. 
A second, more powerful explanation, however, is, again, the coping ar-
gument. The player of violent computer games seeks a safe realm in which she 
can cope with aggressive feelings and come to terms with desires and fantasies 
which she cannot satiate in real life. When applied to computer game violence, 
two variants of the coping argument can be distinguished: one cognitivist re-
miniscing the idea of play as rehearsal and one psychoanalytical referring to play 
as a process of negotiation. The first, cognitivist variant claims that the player 
subconsciously engages in violent representations in order to experience arous-
al, which she can then learn to label and control. As Torben Grodal (2000: 201) 
explains, emotions should be seen as modes of relational action-readiness de-
termining how we relate to our surroundings. In order to be able to cope with 
dangerous situations, man needs a way of learning to control his feelings in 
such a way that he will not be paralyzed whenever he needs to rely on them in 
actual reality. Competitive, conflictual and violent games allow us to do exactly 
that. Of course, modern man no longer hunts and fights on a daily basis. Hence 
an often heard argument is that these emotions should therefore not be stimu-
lated.  There is  a  valid counterargument,  however,  i.e.  that  the absence of  a 
means to express aggressive feelings will not make them disappear and could 
result in frustration which in turn could lead to uncontrolled actual aggression. 
Finally, Grodal notes that  even in a modern society not all  is  harmony and 
sweetness and that competitive spirit and emotional control can “serve possible 
beneficial mental mechanisms; for instance, assertiveness, need-persistence, and 
emotional control in confrontation with aversive stimuli” (200).
The second, psychoanalytical variant of the coping argument takes a dif-
ferent point of departure. Whereas the cognitivist claim presupposes the exist-
ence of a need for practice, for rehearsal, the cathartic theory of coping falls 
back  on  the  more  fundamental  relationship  between  subject  and  object, 
between a person and his environment, and sees play as a way of negotiating 
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between the two. By invoking a fantasy environment, projecting partial repres-
entations of carefully chosen elements from reality, and by introjecting oneself 
into a role within this environment, man enables himself to act out fearful situ-
ations without suffering or causing any actual harm. By repeatedly indulging in 
playful behavior representing forbidden impulses and desires, the player's feel-
ings of anxiety and their concomitant aggression will take a more definite shape, 
become controllable and be experienced as less threatening. Violent representa-
tions serve as an outlet for aggressive thoughts and feelings, a way of releasing 
the valve. Henry Jenkins (1999) notes that man has and always will have a need 
for releasing negative energy and that eradicating reflections of this need will 
not prevent aggression from existing. When people are cut off from symbols of 
aggression, there will be less room for them to express themselves which will 
create frustration. In a similar vein, some parents object to violent themes of 
fairy tales. Children do have antisocial and aggressive feelings, however, and if 
they live in a world of total sweetness where they cannot find a place for these 
feelings, they may come to see themselves as monsters (Ibid.).
COPING IN CULTURE
To conclude this chapter and this study, I would like to return for a moment to 
its main thesis, i.e. that computer simulation and games are more than products 
of technology, that they are cultural forms, human creations developed as an 
answer to human desires and needs, and that, hence, they reflect certain ele-
ments from the culture in which they came about. A first such element I pro-
pose to look at is the growth topos, the idea that numerical increment, usually 
in economic terms but also in other sectors of society, is for some reason fun-
damentally right and that it should therefore be a goal in itself. This theorem, 
which, in my view, is typical for post-war Western, particularly American, cul-
ture and which may have been brought about by the Cold War competition 
with the U.S.S.R. and its consequent arms race, is reflected in most, if not all, 
computer game genres. As a player, you have fallen into terrible danger, evil 
forces are conspiring against you and you will only be able to overcome your 
predicament by prevailing, by becoming more powerful than your adversaries. 
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Whether it is the acquisition of ever higher numbers of magic points to cast 
more  powerful  spells,  larger firearms to  kill  more  dangerous  monsters  or  a 
higher technology level to build more powerful military units, the player is al-
ways placed in a situation where she is in danger and will only be able to survive 
by becoming more efficient and by acquiring more powerful technology. As the 
Cold War raged and both sides were desperately trying to outdo the other in 
terms  of  technological  and  military  might,  the  pressure  to  perform became 
overwhelming. This may have instilled a desire for a realm where that pressure 
is virtualized, where reality is understandable and controllable, where not taking 
the right decisions does not have any definitive consequences, and where suc-
cess is always within reach. Computer games are a cultural response to the hu-
man need to cope with competition, a response to the desire for a lieu where 
one can negotiate one's place in an all too competitive society.
Furthermore,  also  the  conflictual  nature  of  computer  simulation  and 
games can be seen in a cultural light. The twentieth century has been one of 
rapid technological change, of tremendous growth but also unprecedented de-
struction. Rational organization and systemic principle have penetrated more 
and more sectors of Western society, in many cases pushing aside other, reli-
gious or humanist paradigms of thought and working against such principles as 
loyalty and solidarity.  More and more decision-making is  based on systemic 
data – quantitative analysis, statistics, computer simulation etc. – and sometimes 
it seems that there is no more room for human intuition, that our capacities are 
bound  to  become  irrelevant,  replaced  by  mathematical  modeling.  This  has 
evoked in man a deep suspicion, a fear of losing control, of being fully subjec-
ted to principles which are not his own. Man creates systems and rules in order 
to exercise control over himself and his fellow man, yet he fears to lose control 
to these rules; he is afraid that his own creations will eventually turn themselves 
against him. He is anxious that the balance in society will shift from technology 
existing in a man's world to man existing in a world of and for technology. Os-
tensibly a thinking machine, the computer has become a symbol of this con-
glomerate of fears, a personification of the anxiety of being entirely subjected to 
systemic principle. Computer games offer a way of coping with this anxiety. By 
symbolically staging a battle between man and machine, a struggle for control 
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over a rule-based reality, man is able to act out and externalize his fears and 
come to terms with them.91
I believe that this fear is unjust, however, an emotion brought about by 
the misconception that technological change is a linear, teleological process and 
that its course is in some way determined by higher principle. At least since the 
1960s, when Marshall McLuhan proclaimed that the medium is the message, 
media  studies  have  been  dominated  by  a  discourse  of  progression,  not  of 
change or even improvement, but of fundamental, linear moving forward to-
ward a specific point both in time and form. This idea of technology as a power 
of deliverance is closely related to the idea of predestination. Everything in the 
world is on its course either to salvation or damnation and technology as a 
product of change is alternately seen as a guiding force and an angel of doom. 
From a scientific point of view, however, this predestined path is an illusion. As 
constructivist studies have pointed out, technological change is an all but linear, 
predetermined process;  it  is  a broad social  movement whereby many actors 
work in many more different directions and whereby complex combinations of 
factors – technological, economic, social and ad hoc – determine which course 
is followed. Technology is not something alien to human culture: it is one of its 
creations, as are art, literature, politics, medicine, sports etc., something devised 
by man in order to help him cope with his problems and desires. As such, tech-
nology is to serve man and not the other way around and its course is to be 
guided by human principle, not blind faith. Technology is neither something to 
be worshiped nor feared, it is something to be used appropriately. Computer 
simulation and games do not herald a fundamentally new era and neither are 
they a dangerous source of perversion. They are no more and no less than a 
powerful new form of representation, a new way for man to negotiate his place 
in the world.
91 Some theorists make a radical distinction between single- and multi-player games claiming that 
it is only the first group that is concerned with the struggle between man and machine. I do not 
make this distinction, however, as, even when you play against human opponents, the goal of 
playing is still to master the system to such an extent that the chances of losing diminish. Even 
in multi-player games, the most basic conflict is that between player and system.
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